Firsov, minor, by & through parent Sergey Firsov v. Church of Scientology of Silicon Valley

Opinion

L.F., A MINOR, BY & THROUGH Case No. 25-cv-03265-SVK PARENT SERGEY FIRSOV, Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY; UNSEALING AND v. DENYING RENEWED APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF SILICON VALLEY, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 14, 15

Defendants.

Minor plaintiff L.F. has initiated this case through his parent Sergey Firsov1 against the Church of Scientology of Silicon Valley and the Church of Scientology Mission of Silicon Valley. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff previously filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which this Court denied without prejudice due to its failure to include Mr. Firsov’s financial information as Plaintiff’s parent. Dkts. 4, 12 (explaining that “where leave to proceed in forma pauperis is sought to vindicate the alleged substantive rights of a minor, the financial resources of both the minor and the volunteer parent should be considered….” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff has timely filed a renewed IFP application, (Dkt. 13), and shortly thereafter on May 16, 2025, Plaintiff re- filed the IFP Application under seal, (Dkt. 14). Also on May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify the undersigned from this case (the “Motion”). Dkt. 15. The Court determines that the IFP applications and the Motion are suitable for resolution without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7- 1(b). Having considered Mr. Firsov’s submissions, the relevant law and the record in this action, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion and IFP Applications and ORDERS that the Clerk of the

1 The Complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis style Mr. Firsov as Plaintiff’s Court shall unseal the IFP Application at Dkt. 14. Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify is incorrectly brought under California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1, a statute that applies to the disqualification of state court judge. See Dkt. 15 at 1-3; Firsov v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 25-cv-02841-NW, Dkt. 19 at 2 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2025). Motions to disqualify federal magistrate judges fall under one of two statutory provisions: 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Firsov v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. 25-cv-3387-TSH, Dkt. 15 at 1 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2025); Williams v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 10-cv-06062-GAF (SHX), 2011 WL 13217366, at *2 n.19 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (citing In re Webster, 382 F.2d 79, 82 (9th Cir. 1967). Because the undersigned is a federal magistrate judge, the Court assesses the Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455.2 Under this statute, a federal judge must disqualify herself in “any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including where she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455. The standard for disqualification is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008). Additionally, “the alleged bias must stem from an ‘extrajudicial source.’” United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-56 (1994)). Thus, judicial rulings are not a valid basis for a motion for disqualification. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Firsov v. JetBlue Airways, No. 25-cv-3387-TSH, Dkt. 15 at 2. Finally, a “judge should not disqualify [herself] when the facts do not warrant disqualification, as there is an equally compelling obligation not to recuse where it is not appropriate.” Firsov v. Alaska Airlines, No. 25-cv-02841-NW, Dkt. 19 at 2 (citing Holland, 519 2 28 U.S.C. § 144 does not provide grounds for disqualification here because it requires the party seeking disqualification to “file[] a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice” concerning a party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Plaintiff has not filed such an affidavit here. In any case, “the substantive test for personal bias or prejudice F.3d at 912). Plaintiff’s raises two primary arguments for why the undersigned should recuse: (1) that Plaintiff’s case is not proceeding as quickly as he would like; and (2) that this Court has not sua sponte ordered the Clerk to seal Plaintiff’s IFP application. Dkt. 15 at 1 (e.g., “Defendants’ were served on 04/11/25, but summons still not ready. 30 days expired to cooperate with court,” and “Judge reviewed the case and not ordered court clerks to SEAL application of IFP. Plaintiff should not [have to] ask the court every time, this is [the] duty of the court to protect Plaintiff’s privacy.”). Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities reinforces these arguments, contending that the undersigned has violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy. See id. at 2. As to Plaintiff’s first argument, the Court has not delayed and has proceeded through Plaintiff’s motions in an expeditious fashion. Plaintiff filed his initial IFP Application on April 11, 2025, which the Court ruled on 18 days later. Dkts. 4, 12. The Court denied Plaintiff’s application without prejudice, giving him time to file a renewed IFP application. Dkt. 12. The renewed application was not filed until May 8, 2025, with Plaintiff filing yet another renewed IFP application on May 16, 2025, under seal. It has now been 19 days to this ruling. This Court, like other Courts, “handles hundreds of cases and cannot move motions in front of others that have been waiting for consideration without very good reason. Sometimes it may take several months for the Court to consider a motion.” Harris v. Nevada Unemployment, No. 24-cv-01870-DJA, 2025 WL 27771, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 2, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv- 01870-JAD-DJA, 2025 WL 275620 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2025). Simply put, litigation takes time; a matter of weeks to consider each IFP application does not show bias or prejudice. Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, there is no “expir[ation]” date to “cooperate with [the] court.” Dkt. 15 at 1. Plaintiff’s second argument is incorrect because, in civil cases, it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to request that this Court seal documents by filing an administrative motion in accordance with this District’s local rules. See Civ. L.R. 79-5. Plaintiff has not filed any administrative motions to seal any of the documents, including IFP applications, he has filed in and seal his documents; rather, it has acted in accordance with this District’s local rules. This, too, does not show bias or prejudice on the part of the undersigned. Finally, Plaintiff has several other arguments that, although not fully developed, are scattered throughout the Motion. See generally Dkt. 15. For the sake of completeness, the Court briefly addresses them. Plaintiff argues that the undersigned “show[ed a] lack of respect” by “[a]sking [Plaintiff] to file AGAIN [the] same [IFP Application.]” Dkt. 15 at 2. The Court did not ask Plaintiff to file the “same” application; it gave him the opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his first application, namely Plaintiff’s failure to include the financial information of his parent, Mr. Firsov, as required to consider an IFP application made by a minor. Dkt. 12 at 2 (quoting Cottingham for Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Emery Unified Sch. Dist., No. 93-cv-0824-DLJ, 1993 WL 79698, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1993)). This is not an “extrajudicial source” and does not show bias or prejudice. Plaintiff argues that the undersigned erroneously required Mr. Firsov to answer the questions on the IFP form and that “Mother or father should not [need to] file any additional documents.” Dkt. 15 at 2. This is, at best, an argument that the undersigned’s opinion was legally incorrect. But, “while judicial rulings may constitute grounds for an eventual appeal, they are not a valid basis for a motion for [disqualification or] recusal.” Firsov v. JetBlue Airways, 5-cv-3387- TSH, Dkt. 15 at 2 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the undersigned “violated Amendments 5th and 4th to [the United States Constitution because [of] distractions and improper questioning [that] interfered with a fair hearing” in this case. Dkt. 15 at 3. Here, Plaintiff appears to be conflating this case with one of many other cases Mr. Firsov has pursued in this District – no hearing has been requested and no hearing has been held in this action. In sum, no reasonable person could conclude that the undersigned’s conduct in presiding over this action has demonstrated bias or prejudice, or the appearance thereof, such as would require disqualification or recusal. Rather, the undersigned has acted in accordance with this District’s local rules, has ruled on Plaintiff’s applications and motions expeditiously and, otherwise deficient IPF application. Thus, the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for disqualification. II. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROPERLY SOUGHT TO SEAL HIS IFP APPLICATION On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an IFP Application under seal in this action. Dkt. 14. The sealed application is an amalgam of (1) Plaintiff’s prior IFP application including his personal financial information, (Dkt. 4), and (2) Plaintiff’s father’s, Mr. Firsov’s, IFP affidavit including his financial information (Dkt. 13). The only difference is that the first page of each of the IFP application and IFP affidavit in Dkt. 14 are marked “Confidential.” Courts recognize a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. Of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). Under this District’s local rules, “[t]he public has a right of access to the Court’s files.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(a). Accordingly, ordinarily, “[a] party must file a motion to seal a document at the same time that the party submits the document.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(b). Such a motion must include “a specific statement of the applicable legal standard and the reasons for keeping a document under seal,” as well as any necessary evidentiary support and a proposed order. Civ. L.R. 79-5(c). In other words, it is Plaintiff’s burden to show that the information he seeks to seal meets either the “compelling reasons” or “good cause” standard, as appropriate. See Ctr. For Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016). Because Plaintiff has not filed such a motion, the Court hereby ORDERS the Clerk to unseal Dkt. 14. Moreover, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s marking of Dkt. 14 as “confidential” as a motion to seal the information therein, Plaintiff has not met either the “good cause” or “compelling reasons” standard. “[S]ealing motions must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material. … Merely stating that a party designated material as confidential is insufficient by itself to seal a document.” Comet Techs. USA, Inc. v. XP Power, LLC, No. 20-CV- 06408-NC, 2022 WL 2442808, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is further bolstered by the fact that Plaintiff has not moved to seal either matter of public record. For this independent reason, the Court could also order the Clerk to unseal Dkt. 14. The Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s IFP applications. As the Court previously explained, a district court may authorize a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis if the court is satisfied the would-be plaintiff cannot pay the filing fees required to pursue the lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § (a)(1). “The right to proceed without prepayment of fees in a civil case is a privilege and not a right.” Elmer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-cv-01045-SAB, 2022 WL 5237463, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-cv-1045-AWI-SAB, 2022 WL 9452375 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2022) (citing Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 198 n.2 (1993)). “In order to proceed in court without prepayment of the filing fee, a plaintiff must submit an affidavit demonstrating that he ‘is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). Plaintiff has now submitted such information, and the Court considers Plaintiff’s financial information together with that of his parent, Mr. Firsov. Here, Plaintiff’s application shows that his father is employed with a net income of approximately $8,000 per month, and his mother is employed with a net income of $700 per month. Dkt. 13 at 1-2; Dkt. 14 at 5-6. Plaintiff’s father makes payments to prior spouses and to his children totaling $4,500 per month, although $1,000 of that is paid to an “L.S. Firsov,” who appears to be the same as Plaintiff and thus may be discounted. See Dkt. 13 at 2-3; Dkt. 14 at 6-7; compare id. with Dkt. 4 at 2 (Plaintiff receives “child support $1,000 per month”). Plaintiff’s father has other monthly expenses, including rent and food, totaling $4381. Dkt. 13 at 3; Dkt. 14 at 7. In total, after necessary expenses, Plaintiff and Mr. Firsov have approximately $819 remaining per month ($8,700 - $3,500 - $4,381). Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that he is unable to pay the Court’s filing fee. Moreover, the Court’s decision is bolstered by the fact that “other cases in this District also show that [Mr. Firsov] recently has paid to fly internationally on multiple flights involving ] at 1. Furthermore, numerous other judges in this District across 9 other cases arising from Mr. 2 Firsov’s air travel have recently denied his IFP applications when presented with similar financial 3 information. Firsov v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 25-cv-02841-NW, Dkts. 15, 27; Firsov v. 4 Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 25-cv-02898-SVK, Dkts. 5, 13; Firsov v. SkyScanner, Inc., No. 25-cv- 5 03198-DMR, Dkt. 16; Firsov v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. 25-cv-03387-TSH, Dkt. 6; Firsov v. 6 Austrian Airlines, No. 25-cv-3504-NC, Dkt. 9; Firsov v. Scandanavian Airlines of N. Am., No. 7 25-cv-03691-KAW, Dkt. 6; Firsov v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 25-cv-03784-SVK; Firsov v. 8 United Airlines, Inc., No. 25-cv-03903-DMR, Dkt. 9; Firsov v. Air Canada, Inc., No. 25-cv- 9 04058-LJC, Dkt. 4. This Court agrees with the findings of other cases in this District that Plaintiff 10 “has not shown that he could not afford to pay the Court filing if [Mr. Firsov] adjusted or deferred 1] other of his discretionary expenses.” E.g., Firsov v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 25-cv-02841-NW, 12 Dkt. 15 at 2. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs IFP applications. 13 Iv. CONCLUSION 14 For the forgoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the 15 || undersigned, DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to unseal Dkt. 14 and DENIES Plaintiffs IFP a 16 || applications (Dkts. 13-14). 17 In the interest of justice, the Court now re-sets the deadline for Plaintiff to pay the filing Z 18 fee. Plaintiff must pay the fee by June 26, 2025. If he fails to do so, the Court will issue an order 19 that this case be reassigned to a District Judge with a recommendation that the case be dismissed 20 without prejudice. 22 Dated: June 5, 2025. 23 24 Summ verKul SUSAN VAN KEULEN 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28