Firestone T. & R. Co. v. Kline

71 F. Supp. 438, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1776
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedSeptember 9, 1946
DocketNo. 291
StatusPublished

This text of 71 F. Supp. 438 (Firestone T. & R. Co. v. Kline) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Firestone T. & R. Co. v. Kline, 71 F. Supp. 438, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1776 (S.D. Miss. 1946).

Opinion

MIZE, District Judge.

I have considered the briefs and affidavits including the one of Mr. L. M. Dever of July 25th and filed Aug. 1st, on the motions for summary judgment and have-reached the conclusion that the defendants are entitled to a summary judgment and that their motions should be sustained. I do this solely on the theory that plaintiff with full knowledge of all the facts ratified the lease with Fried when it subleased from him. Up until that time plaintiff had the right to demand a lease for itself and to enforce that demand by a bill for specific performance, but the plaintiff has not at any time bound itself to Kline a-nd Pearl under a new lease within the time allowed-It now could withdraw its bill and Kline- and Pearl could not hold it to a new lease. [439]*439If plaintiff had not entered into a lease with Fried, it could have at any time filed its bill prior to April 30th for specific performance, and that would have been sustained, but it waived that and elected to sublease from Fried. I think this was ratification. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 492, page 995 et seq.; Koenig v. Calcóte et al., Miss., 25 So.2d 763.

The last affidavit of Mr. Dever only confirms this. He knew November 27th so he states that it was to be leased and he told Kline he would accept the lease for three to five years, but this was not binding because not in writing. Thereafter with full knowledge of all the facts plaintiff subleases from Fried. This is ratification.

An order may be drawn accordingly and also a finding of fact and conclusion of law may be drawn in accord herewith and submitted to me for signature. In the finding of fact I think all the correspondence should be set out as well as the contents of the verbal conversations.

I. Findings of Fact By the Court.

The Court finds that the material facts set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment by the defendants, Kline and Pearl, and the Motion for Summary Judgment by the .defendant, David B. Fried, and the Answer to said Motions by the complainant, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, and the facts as stated in the affidavits of the defendants and the affidavit of the complainant are undisputed. These facts are as follows:

1. Under date of March 18, 1943, the defendants, Kline and Pearl, entered into a lease contract with the complainant, hereinafter for convenience referred to as the Firestone Company. The renewal option in this lease, set forth at Item 23 thereof, was availed of and the lease continued in force from its expiration date of April 30, 1944, to the 1st day of May, 1945, at a rental of $125 per month. At Item 25 of the lease there was the following provisions: “First Refusal To Re-Lease. During Lessee’s tenancy under this lease, or its renewal or extension, Lessee shall have first refusal option to renew this lease upon the same terms and conditions as contained in any acceptable bona fide offer Lessor may receive. Lessee shall have ten days after receipt from Lessor of written notice of such offer (with complete details) within which time to exercise said option.”

At Item 28 of said lease the same provides : “Notices. Any notice to Lessor provided for herein shall be deemed to have been served when such notice addressed to Lessor has been delivered at the place where the rent shall have last been accepted prior to such notice. Any notice to Lessee as provided for herein shall be deemed to have been served when delivered to the Real Estate Department of The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 1200 Firestone Parkway, Akron, Ohio.”

2. During the one year period that the lease was renewed, the following transpired :

(a) On July 11, 1945, the Firestone Company, through its District Manager, wrote to the defendant, Kline, as follows:

“You will recall that I contacted you at your store in Anguilla on March 7th, with reference to an extension of the lease on the property that we now occupy at 1412 Washington St., Vicksburg, Miss., and also to advise of our intention of exercising our option of one year renewal.
“At that time you stated you would not consider a renewal of the lease under the present basis, due to the fact that you contemplated selling this property, and I am wondering at this time if you have completed the transaction or just what the present status is. Naturally, we are interested in making our future plans in Vicksburg, and we are unable to make any permanent plans under a temporary lease agreement. I am wondering if you would be interested on a five or ten year lease basis, and if so, you might make a rental proposal.
“At any rate, I would appreciate hearing from you by return mail the present status of the property in order that we may be able to formulate our plans for our future in Vicksburg.”

(b) To this letter from the Firestone Company Mr. Kline, on behalf of himself [440]*440and the defendant, Pearl, under date of July 16, 1945, replied:

“I have yours of the 11th. in reference to the Store Building in Vicksburg.
“We have not yet had a satisfactory offer for the buildings, and it may be that we will not have any for the time being. However we would like to wait say two or three months before we offer the buildings for release.
“If you care to wait a while longer we would he glad to offer you the two buildings, or the building'you now occupy.”
(c) On August 23, 1945, the District Manager of the Firestone Company wrote to Mr. Kline as follows:
“Have not heard from you since July 16th, with reference to your property, which we now occupy at Vicksburg, Mississippi.
“Since the war is now over, we naturally are begining to think of permanency, and-I am sure you are also. I would appreciate your writing me making a rental proposal on a three or five year basis on the same property which we occupy. • If you are not in a position to do this, I would appreciate your advising also, in order that we may pursue other leads that have been offered in the City of Vicksburg. Frankly, we are not interested in moving particularly, unless your proposal is so far out-of-line that it will require us to move.”

(d) To this letter of said August 23d Mr. Kline replied under date of August 29, 1945, as follows:

“I have yours of the 23rd. and in reply will say we will be glad to continue leasing you the building you now occupy for a term of five years for $250.00 per month.

“This is in line with what other buildings in the same block is bringing at this time, of course you know that the rent you are now paying is just about enough to pay taxes on the building.

“Shall be glad to hear from you.”

(e) Thereafter, under date of September 18, 1945, Mr. Kline wired the District Manager of the Firestone Company as follows:

“On August 29th. we wrote you offering to lease the Vicksburg store to you. Please wire to-day your decision.”

(f) Under date of September 19, 1945, the District Manager of said Firestone Company wired to Mr. Kline, the original of the wire being misplaced or lost, but same simply contained a statement that his proposal was in the hands of the Akron office of the complainant.

(g) Under date of September 22, 4945, Mr.

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Related

Koenig v. Calcote Et Ux.
25 So. 2d 763 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1946)

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Bluebook (online)
71 F. Supp. 438, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1776, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/firestone-t-r-co-v-kline-mssd-1946.