Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Mallie Hill & Liberty Mutual Insurance

498 S.W.2d 865, 255 Ark. 73, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1318
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 17, 1973
Docket73-74
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 498 S.W.2d 865 (Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Mallie Hill & Liberty Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Mallie Hill & Liberty Mutual Insurance, 498 S.W.2d 865, 255 Ark. 73, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1318 (Ark. 1973).

Opinion

J. Fred Jones, Justice.

The question before the Commission in this compensation case, was which of two insurance carriers is liable for temporary total disability from January 5, 1971, to February 18, 1972, and permanent partial disability in the amount of 50% to the body as a whole awarded to Mallie Hill as a result of a ruptured disc sustained in the course of her employment by Frolic Footwear.

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. was the compensation carrier for Frolic until January 1, 1970, at which time Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. became the compensation carrier. The compensability and amount of the award are not questioned. The specific question is whether the disability from a ruptured disc suffered by Mrs. Hill resulted from injury sustained prior, or subsequent, to January 1, 1970. The Compensation Commission found that it resulted from injuries sustained subsequent to January 1, 1970, and made the award against Liberty Mutual. On appeal by Liberty Mutual the circuit court found that the Commission had ignored the evidence of injury sustained in 1969 and the court failed to find any substantial evidence that the ruptured disc and resulting disability were caused by injury subsequent to January 1, 1970. The circuit court reversed the award of the Commission and remanded with directions to make the award against Fireman’s Fund. The circuit court judgment recites in part as follows:

“According to the record herein the claimant sustained injuries to her back November 5, 1969, while pulling a rack of shoes.
Subsequent to that date claimant has suffered severe back injuries aggravating her condition, including but not limited to her injuries in lifting boxes in August, 1970, and pulling the racks in December, 1970, all of which ultimately required surgery in 1971 to correct.
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The Court finds that the claimant’s injuries primarily began with the back injury on November 5, 1969, and that the injuries of 1970, as well as the other injuries, were in aggravation of the 1969 injury; that there was no substantial evidence to support the Referee or Commission in ignoring the injury of November, 1969, and accepting in lieu thereof an injury of a later date; that disability should begin with the 1969 injury.”

On appeal to this court Fireman’s Fund contends that there was substantial evidence to sustain the award of the Commission and the circuit court erred in holding otherwise.

Both sides recognize the well-established rule that an award of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission has the same force and feffect as a jury verdict and must be affirmed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support it. The question on appeal is not what decision the circuit court or this court would have reached on trial de novo; nor is the question on appeal whether there is substantial evidence to sustain a different award than the one made. The question on appeal is whether there is any substantial evidence to sustain the decision or award the Compensation Commission did make. In Sneed v. Colson Corp., 254 Ark. 1048, 497 S.W. 2d 673, we said:

“On appeal to die circuit court and to this court the only question for determination is whether or not there was any substantial evidence to sustain the Commission’s finding and we, of course, in examining the evidence for such determination, must view it together with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commission’s finding the same as in a jury verdict. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Weast, 253 Ark. 710, 488 S.W. 2d 322; Warwick Electronics v. Devazier, 253 Ark. 1100, 490 S.W. 2d 792.”

We agree with the circuit court’s finding of facts contained in the record as above set out, but we disagree with the conclusion reached by the circuit court. The record in this case is made up> from two separate hearings before the Referee. At the first hearing on December 17,1971, Mrs. Hill testified that she went to work at Frolic Footwear in October, 1968, and had no physical defects or disability at that time. She testified that she sustained an injury to her back on the night of November 4, 1969, when a shoe rack almost tipped over on her. She said she went to the nurse immediately] reported her injury and then called Dr. Modelevsky who prescribed pain pills and requested her to come to the office the next morning if she felt no better. She said she did return to Dr. Mode-levsky on November 5 and was given muscle relaxants and pain pills and was told sbe had pulled a ligament in her back. She said she was hospitálized at that time for pneumonia; was also treated for her back injury and was released to return to work on December 8, 1969. She said she did return to work on December 9 and as she was going up an incline at the Frolic plant, she slipped and fell on the ramp, skinned both knees and again hurt her back but lost no work because of these injuries. She said she continued to work the remainder of 1969 “off and «on” and then testified as follows:

“Q. Explain why you only worked off and on.
A. Well my back was hurting so bad, pushing and pulling those racks and some of them you couldn’t hardly pull — you had to have two people to help— I would pull those racks and it would just tear me in two — I would have to take off a few nights and then maybe I would lay around and get to feeling better and I would return to work — Dr. Modelevsky would tell me I could go back to work and I would do it again for a while and the same thing would happen again.”

Mrs. Hill testified that on February 3, 1970, she sustained a hernia and testified as follows:

“Q. When did you after that reinjure your back?
A. I reinjured my back January, 1971, and though I am sorry I am getting too far ahead of myself — I reinjured my back in August of ‘70 — I lifted a box of shoes up over my head and my hernia came out again and my back was still just killing me and I re-entered the hospital at that time — I had hernia surgery — was also taken back to surgery for more treatment on my back.”

Mrs. Hill testified that following her operation for hernia she returned to work about November 2, 1970, she then testified as follows:

“Q. Did you reinjure yourself again on December 22nd, 1970?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell how you injured yourself at that time.
A. At that particular time I was pushing — pulling the rack just like I said and these racks were hard to push and pull and it yanked my back and I was rein-jured in my back again.”

Mrs. Hill testified that on January 5, 1971, she reentered the hospital and underwent surgery for a blocked intestine and also received treatment for her back. She said that after her January, 1971, hospitalization she has not returned to work. She said that Dr. Modelevsky referred her to Dr. Mahon in January, 1971, at which time she was having back pain and numbness in her leg and foot. She said that after conservative treatment failed to relieve her condition, Dr. Mahon referred her to Dr. Cunningham at St.

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Bluebook (online)
498 S.W.2d 865, 255 Ark. 73, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/firemans-fund-insurance-v-mallie-hill-liberty-mutual-insurance-ark-1973.