Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Columbus Steel Structors Co.

154 N.E.2d 3, 106 Ohio App. 197, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 453, 1957 Ohio App. LEXIS 735
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 23, 1957
Docket5534
StatusPublished

This text of 154 N.E.2d 3 (Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Columbus Steel Structors Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Columbus Steel Structors Co., 154 N.E.2d 3, 106 Ohio App. 197, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 453, 1957 Ohio App. LEXIS 735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).

Opinions

Bryant, J.

This is an appeal on questions of law from the decision of the Common Pleas Court overruling the motion for a new trial of plaintiffs-appellants hereinafter called plaintiffs. Plaintiffs began this proceeding by filing a petition in the court below seeking damages in the amount of $56,101.66. There are eight parties plaintiff. Two of them, a corporation, Bay Lewis & Son, Inc., and a partnership, B. H. Lewis and Harold Lewis, d. b. a. Bay Lewis & Son, are the owners and operators of a machine shop located in Marysville, Ohio. They will hereinafter be referred to as the Lewises. The other six plaintiffs are corporations engaged in writing fire insurance.

The defendant-appellee, Columbus Steel Structors Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the defendant, pursuant to a contract, erected a building in Marysville for the Lewises. The building caught fire on July 17,1952, with the result that it was almost totally destroyed and great damage was done to the contents. The building and contents were owned by the Lewises, and the six insurance companies above referred to, on August 14, 1952, settled the claim of the Lewises by paying $48,924.71 and taking the necessary steps to subrogate the said insurance [199]*199companies to whatever rights the Lewises might have to sue as a result of the fire.

It appears that negotiations for the construction of the new building were carried on by William JM. Brock as president of the defendant corporation and R. H. Lewis, Sr., and R. H. Lewis, Jr., also known as Harold Lewis, of the partnership above referred to and officers and owners of the Lewis Corporation also referred to above.

It was the claim of the Lewises in their petition that one of the reasons for obtaining a new location for and erecting a new building for what was then known as the Lewis Machine Shop was to permit them to expand their operations by entering upon die-casting operations in addition to the machine-shop operations previously carried on. Plaintiffs contend that defendant was negligent in the construction of the new building, which was a quonset type of building and in which insulation known as Ultralite “75” was installed, in that (1) the insulation material was installed in an improper manner and (2) defendant represented that such insulating material was fire resistant and suitable for shop hazards said to be common in a die-casting equipment shop, whereas, according to plaintiffs, such material was highly inflammable, not satisfactory and during normal operations created a fire hazard. -It was plaintiff’s contention that defendant knew of the alleged hazardous nature of insulating material but that this fact was unknown to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim further that they had informed defendant of the new and more hazardous type of business they were about to engage in. Defendant in its answer admitted the existence and capacity of plaintiff the Lewis Corporation, that a fire occurred, and other formal matters, and concluded with a general denial. Prior to the filing of the answer certain objections were sustained and an amended petition was filed.

The matter came on for trial before a jury in the court below and, at the conclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence, defendant’s motion to withdraw from the jury consideration of allegations of defective installation was concurred in by counsel for plaintiffs and sustained by the court. Plaintiffs also withdrew from consideration by the jury the amounts claimed for damages to certain open stock and damages claimed becáuse of loss of time [200]*200and cost of cleaning up the debris. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court overruled defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The court also overruled defendant’s motion to withdraw from the jury “all pleadings and testimony in regard to representations allegedly made by the defendant to one or more of the plaintiffs.” The matter was submitted to the jury under the charge of the court, excepted to in part by plaintiffs and generally by defendant, after which eleven members of the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.

The objection by plaintiffs to the court’s charge is as follows :

“Mr. Reeves: Will you show an objection to the charge on behalf of the plaintiff on the ground that you cannot charge the plaintiff in the same cause of action in a negligence action with contributory, negligence and the assumption of risk.”

On behalf of the defendant the record shows the following objection to the charge:

“Mr. Janata: Let the record show an exception by the defendant generally to the charge of the court.”

The motion of plaintiffs seeking a new trial alleged that the trial court committed error of law “in its charge on negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of risk, to which exception was taken by plaintiff at the time.” Following the overruling of the motion for a new trial, plaintiffs filed notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court overruling plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. In the assignment of errors and brief the following errors were assigned:

“1. The court erred in excluding certain testimony and excluding from the consideration of the jury all references and testimony pertaining to die casting operations.

‘ ‘ 2. The court erred in failing to overrule the motion of the defendant-appellee (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendant’) at the close of plaintiffs ’ case and withdrawing all references to die casting equipment shop, as it applies to the issues in the case.

“3. For errors in the court’s general charge.”

In support of the first two assignments of error and part of the third assignment of error, plaintiffs refer to the claim in the petition and the evidence in support thereof by some of [201]*201plaintiffs’ witnesses that defendant represented that the insulating material used was fire resistant and suitable for meeting the hazards commonly found in die-casting equipment shops.

The amended petition contains the following allegation:

“Plaintiffs further say that during October, 1951, the corporation of Ray Lewis & Son, Inc., entered into a written contract with defendant for the erection of a building of what is commonly classified as a quonset hut steel building, in order to carry on the manufacture of cast die products by the Ray Lewis & Son, Inc., and Ray Lewis & Son partnership. Further that at said time and place, the defendant represented to the plaintiffs RayH. Lewis, Inc., that said quonset steel building was fire resistant and that they also agreed to insulate said building and original structure with a glass fibre insulation called Ultralite 75, which insulation, they represented to the plaintiff Ray Lewis & Son, Inc., to be fire resistant and suitable for the possibility of shop hazards such as would be common in die cast equipment shop. Further that based upon the representations made by the defendant, plaintiff Ray Lewis & Son, Inc., entered into and agreed to allow the defendant to erect said quonset type steel building and to also insulate same and the original building with Ultralite 75 glass fibre insulation. * * *

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Bluebook (online)
154 N.E.2d 3, 106 Ohio App. 197, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 453, 1957 Ohio App. LEXIS 735, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/firemans-fund-insurance-v-columbus-steel-structors-co-ohioctapp-1957.