Fire Insurance Exchange v. Tibi

51 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22353, 1996 WL 1094707
CourtDistrict Court, D. Montana
DecidedJuly 23, 1996
DocketCV-93-141-GF-PGH
StatusPublished

This text of 51 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Tibi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fire Insurance Exchange v. Tibi, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22353, 1996 WL 1094707 (D. Mont. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HATFIELD, Chief Judge.

In the present declaratory judgment action the court was called upon to determine whether certain personal injury claims advanced by defendant Jonathan Kayser against defendant Pierre Tibi are covered under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) to Robert and Suzanne Colwell; and a policy of homeowner’s insurance issued to Tibi by the plaintiff, Fire Insurance Exchange. The subject claims emanate from a bullet wound Kayser sustained on a hunting trip with Tibi. 1 On October 25, 1995, the court issued a Memorandum and Order wherein it concluded the personal injury claims asserted by Kayser were covered under both the automobile liability policy issued by Allstate, and the homeowner’s insurance policy issued Fire Insurance Exchange. Judgment was entered accordingly on October 30, 1995. On November 27, 1995, Allstate appealed the final judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, an appeal which, at the present, is under submission for determination.

Presently before the court is Allstate’s motion requesting the court to relieve it from the final judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), 2 upon the ground the court erred when it concluded the “employee” exclusion contained in the Allstate automobile liability policy was void and unenforceable. 3 Allstate argues the decision of the court is contrary to the prescription of Mont. Code Ann. § 61 — 6— 103(5), which provides, inter alia, that a motor vehicle liability policy need not insure an employee of an insured for injuries he incurs while engaged in the employment of the insured. Having reviewed the record, together with the parties’ briefs in support of their respective positions, the court is prepared to rule.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the court notes that after Allstate filed the present Rule 60(b)(1) motion, it appealed the final judgment issued by this court. When Allstate instituted the appeal, this court became divested of jurisdiction to grant relief under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b), absent a remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See, Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1981), vacated on other grounds, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S.Ct. 468, 70 L.Ed.2d 242 (1981); Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.1979). To seek Rule *1078 60(b) relief, at this juncture, the proper procedure is to ask this court to indicate whether it wishes to entertain the motion, or to grant it, and then move the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, if appropriate, for remand of the case. Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d at 1307. Because Allstate failed to properly invoke this procedure to obtain relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) during the pendency of the pz-esent appeal, the court is compelled to deny Allstate’s Rule 60(b) motion for lack of jurisdiction.

Assuming arguendo that Allstate were to pass the described procedural threshold, the Rule 60(b) motion advanced by Allstate would fail on the merits because it is premised upon a misinterpretation of the court’s Memorandum and Order issued on October 25, 1995. Contrary to Allstate’s characterization of the referenced order, the court did not conclude that Kayser’s injuries were covered by the Allstate automobile liability policy because the “employee” exclusion contained in the Allstate policy, was as a whole, void on its face. It is true, as noted by Allstate, that an automobile liability insurance policy may contain an “employee” exclusion as a valid limitation on coverage to the extent it is consistent with Mont.Code Ann. § 61-6-103(5). The court, however, properly concluded the “employee” exclusion was void as applied to the facts in this case, because the portion of the exclusion relied upon by Allstate places a limitation on coverage that is not contemplated by Mont. Code Ann. § 61-6-103(5), and is otherwise contrary to the prescriptions of Montana’s Mandatory Liability Act, MontCode Ann. § 61-6-301.

Montana Code Ann. § 61-6-103(5), permits an automobile liability insurance policy to exclude coverage in a situation where a claimant-employee seeks to recover damages from his employer who, under the terms of the policy, is either a named insured or an omnibus insured:

61-6-103. Motor vehicle liability policy defined.
***
(5) A motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability under • any workers’ compensation law or any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured or while engaged in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a motor vehicle or any liability for damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of, or transported by the insured.

The purpose of MontCode Ann. § 61-6-103(5) is to protect the insured employer from the expense of double coverage where an employee is covered by workers compensation.

The employee exclusion, contained in the Amendatory Endorsement to the Allstate policy, provides that Allstate will not pay for damages an insured person is legally obligated to pay because of:

4. Bodily injury to an employee of any insured person arising in the course of employment.... (emphasis added).

This exclusion operates to exclude coverage not only in the situation where a claimant-employee seeks to recover damages from his insured employer (a coverage limitation permitted under Mont.Code Ann. § 61-6-103(5)), but also when the claimant-employee seeks to recover damages from an insured third party, who is not the claimant’s employer. Allstate relies upon this latter portion of the “employee” exclusion to challenge coverage for the injuries sustained by Jonathan Kayser. Specifically, Allstate argues that because Jonathan’s injuries arose during the course' of his employment with his father, Terry Kayser, an omnibus insured under the Allstate policy, the employee exclusion contained in the Allstate policy operates to preclude coverage for any personal injury claim asserted by Jonathan Kayser against any other insured person, including Tibi. 4

*1079 Because the portion of the “employee” exclusion relied upon by Allstate is not expressly permitted under Mont. Code Ann. § 61-6-103(5), it is valid only if it complies with the prescriptions of Montana’s Mandatory Liability Protection Act, MontCode Ann.

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51 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22353, 1996 WL 1094707, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fire-insurance-exchange-v-tibi-mtd-1996.