Finney v. Commissioners of Mercer

1 Serg. & Rawle 62
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 13, 1814
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 1 Serg. & Rawle 62 (Finney v. Commissioners of Mercer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Finney v. Commissioners of Mercer, 1 Serg. & Rawle 62 (Pa. 1814).

Opinion

Tilghman C. J.

Walter Finney was a captain in the Pennsylvania line of the army of the United States, during the revolutionary war, and as such, became entitled to, and received a grant from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, of 500 acres land in the county of Mercer. This land has been always held by the said Finney, and the question is, whether it is subject to county and road taxes.

In the 7th section of the act “ for the more effectual sup- “ ply and honourable reward of the Pennsylvania troops, in “the service of the United States of America,” {passed 1st March, 1780), it is enacted, that S‘ all lands which have been, “ or may hereafter be granted within this state to any officer “ or soldier of the line of this state, by virtue of any resolu- “ tion. of congress, or law of this state, as a reward for their “ services, shall be, and are hereby exempted from taxes, for “ and during the life of such officer or soldier respectively, “ unless the same shall be transferred or aliened to any other “ person.” And the same provision is inserted verbatim, in the 33d section of the act of 16th March, 1785, (2 Dall. St. Laws, 256). The act of 1st March, 1780, was passed at a very critical period of the war, when the paper money issued by, congress was much depreciated, and the credit of the United States was very low. The army had suffered much and, was badly paid, of course great discontents prevailed. [65]*65To remove these discontents by promises of ample reward, was the great object of the act of assembly. It is to be considered as a contract between the government and the army, and the words being spoken by the legislature, are entitled to a liberal construction in favour of the soldier. But there needs no liberality of construction. The plaintiff asks no other than the literal and common meaning of the expressions of the law. He asks whether money levied by public authority for the making and repair of roads, and the defraying of various county expenses, be not taxation '? It is granted by the county commissioners, that this levy is a taxation, but they say, that county taxes are generally distinguished by the name of county rates and levies, and that it cannot be supposed the legisture intended to exempt the land of officers and soldiers from the payment of these rates and levies, because they are in fact for their benefit, and without them, the county would remain a wilderness. As to the distinction between county rates and taxes, it may be observed, that the legislature have sometimes used one expression and sometimes the other; so that very little is to be concluded from it. In an act concerning county rates and levies, passed 1st October, 1779, (1 Dall. St. Laws, 807), the word tax is frequently used. So likewise in the act 3d April, 1792, (3 Dall. St. Laws, 206), sect. 1st, we find the expression county or city rates or taxes. But what is much more to the purpose, in the 15th section of the act of 8th April, 1785, (2 Dall. St. Lazos, 318), it is enacted, “ that “ no land taken up by virtue of that act, shall be subject to, “ or charged with any general tax for the use of the state, for “ two years from the time of the passing of the act.” And by the act 3d April, 1792, sect. 12, no direct tax for the use of the commonwealth was to be laid for the term of ten years, on certain lands therein mentioned. This shows, that when it was the intent of the legislature to exempt from state taxes only, they knew very well how to express their meaning without leaving room for doubt or cavil. The argument drawn from the utility of the county taxes has not much weight. All taxes are, or at least ought to be, useful to the public ; and consequently to the individual, but it is of advantange to the individual to be exempt from the payment of the tax, because the object of the tax is attained without any expense to him. So of roads and other objects of county expenses. But it is objected, that unless soldier’s lands were [66]*66taxed, there could be no roads. This by no means follows. -At the time this law was passed, no lands were located for ^le soldiers, nor was it certain then, that they would all be located together. And even if they should be, many would gejj shares, which would immediately become subject to taxation. At any rate, if roads were wanted, they might be made by voluntary contribution. And if it was the interest, of the land-holders to make roads, the necessary money would be raised. But the argument is at least but conjecture, opposed to fact. The fact is, that in the present situation of the county, sufficient taxes may be raised, without breaking in upon the lands of the soldiers. And yet, the commissioners would have us suppose, that the legislature knew it to be impossible to defray the county expenses without taxing those lands. Upon the whole, the exemption claimed by the soldiers is warranted by the words of the law, and I am not for taking it away from motives of policy. My opinion is, that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas should be reversed, and judgment be entered in this Court for the plaintiff in error.

Yeates J.

The plaintiff in error has brought a suit to recover back money, which he paid to the defendants as commissioners of Mercer county, for county and road taxes, op a tract of donation land. He contends, that as an officer of this state duly commissioned in the service of the United States, during the revolutionary war, he is exempted from the payment of such taxes in consequence of two acts, of assembly, passed on the 1st March, 1780, (1 Dall. St. Laws, 834), and 16th March, 1785, (2 Dall. St. Laws, 256).

The first act recites the resolve of congress of 15th May, 1778, declaring certain military officers to be entitled to receive annually, for the term of seven years after the conclusion of the war, one half of their pay, and after paying a just tribute to the services and sufferings of the troops, directed by the 7th section, “ that all lands which have been, or may “ hereafter be granted within this state, to any officers or “ soldiers of the line of this state, by virtue of any resolution of congress, or law of this state, as a reward for their ser- “ vices, shall be, and are hereby exempted from taxation, for “ and during the life of such officer or soldier respectively, “ unless the same shall.be transferred or aliened to any other [67]*67" person.” The 33d section of the act of 16th March, 1785, contains the same words, and this section remains unrepealed by the act of 9th April, 1791. 3 Dall. St. Laws, 65.

The house of assembly by their resolution of 20th March, 1779, promised, “ that at some future time they would by a "suitable gratuity, recompense the services of such of their veteran soldiers, as might have engaged and should continue during the war.”

The commonwealth is unquestionably bound by its engagements as well as private individuals ; and the true mean-: ing of the law of the 1st March, 1780, must govern our decision in the case before us.

The general word taxation is inserted in both laws now under consideration. Was it then the intention of the legislature, that the donation lands, while they remained in the hands of the officers and soldiers, should be exonerated from every species of taxation ?

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Bluebook (online)
1 Serg. & Rawle 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/finney-v-commissioners-of-mercer-pa-1814.