Finnegan v. CSX Transportation

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMarch 25, 2019
Docket4:16-cv-40071
StatusUnknown

This text of Finnegan v. CSX Transportation (Finnegan v. CSX Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Finnegan v. CSX Transportation, (D. Mass. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

__________________________________________ ) JOSEPH P. FINNEGAN, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION ) NO. 16-40071-TSH CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER March 25, 2019

HILLMAN, D.J. Background This is an action brought by Plaintiff, Joseph P. Finnegan (“Plaintiff” or “Finnegan”) against CSX Transportation, Inc. (“Defendant” or “CSX”) alleging claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§12112 and 12203 (“ADA”) and the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, Mass.Gen.L ch. 151B, §4 (“Chapter 151B”).1 This Memorandum of Decision and Order addresses the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether CSX violated the ADA and Chapter 151B by failing to reasonably accommodate him by refusing to engage in a meaningful interactive process. CSX seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that the record evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that it did not discriminate or retaliate against

1 Plaintiff also alleged a state law breach of contract claim which he voluntarily dismissed. Finnegan. For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff Joseph Finnegan’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 46), is denied and Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc.’s Motion For Summary Judgment (48) is granted, in part and denied, in part. Summary Judgment Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court shall grant summary judgment

if the moving party shows, based on the materials in the record, “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute precludes summary judgment if it is both “genuine” and “material.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). An issue is “genuine” when the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party. Morris v. Gov’t Dev. Bank, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994). A fact is “material” when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Id. The moving party is responsible for “identifying those portions [of the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1968). It can meet this burden either by “offering evidence

to disprove an element of the plaintiff’s case or by demonstrating an ‘absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.’” Rakes v. U.S., 352 F. Supp. 2d 47, 52 (D. Mass. 2005) (citation to quoted case omitted). Once the moving party shows the absence of any disputed material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to place at least one material fact into dispute. See Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir.1994) (discussing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Scanlon v. Dep’t of Army, 277 F.3d 598, 600 (1st Cir. 2002). However, the court should not “credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, rank conjecture, or vitriolic invective.” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). ). “Cross-motions for summary judgment require the district court to ‘consider each motion separately, drawing all inferences in favor of each non-moving party in turn.’” Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2014)(citation to quoted case omitted). Facts

Finnegan’s employment with CSX CSX is a railroad transportation company operating in the eastern United States and Canada. CSX operates various yards, including a yard in West Springfield, Massachusetts. Trains pass through the West Springfield yard every day and at all hours. Within the confines of the yard, yard crews move railcars on the track to switch and build trains, and maintenance-of- way employees move machinery on the track. For safety reasons, every track in the yard is considered live. The mainline track in the yard is used for trains to travel through the yard without stopping, and it is always considered live. Finnegan began working at CSX in April 2008 as a Freight Conductor in CSX’s Albany Division. This was a union position with responsibilities including the inspection, switching,

loading, unloading, coupling, and de-coupling of trains; train travel; operation of switches; minor repair of railcars; monitoring of train movements; and understanding of and abiding by safety requirements. Prior to working for CSX, Finnegan, had a background in law enforcement and as a small business owner. In November 2008, CSX promoted Finnegan to Yardmaster, which was also a union position, and which required him to oversee the operation of the West Springfield yard. A Yardmaster supervises the movement of trains in the yard, ensures that railcars are switched and delivered on schedule, and ensures that paperwork and shipping documentation are accurate and complete. The Yardmaster job description describes the position as “sedentary” and involving “sitting for long periods of time.” The Yardmaster works primarily in the yard office, at a desk with computer monitors, radios, and video feed that allows the Yardmaster to monitor the trains coming and going and communicate by radio with crews, and where the Yardmaster can look out a window to the yard to make observations. Yardmasters work on three, distinct, eight-hour shifts, without excessive work hours. The Yardmaster job summary states that one of its duties is to “[e]nsure the safe, efficient

operation of yard service,” and that it is required as a condition of employment to “work safely to prevent on the job accidents and injuries.” As part of the job, a Yardmaster is required to mount and dismount locomotives in order to monitor crews at work.” “Physical Requirements” for being a Yardmaster include the following: - “Demonstrate auditory and visual acuity/tracking/ inspection” - “May require climbing stairs at some locations” - “Stoop/bend/kneel/crouch/balance/climb on occasion.” Additionally, the Yardmaster position is classified as “Safety Sensitive.” The “Safety Sensitive” designation refers to the access and information that the Yardmaster has regarding the safety-sensitive information about train shipments and does not refer to the physical aspects of

the job.

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Finnegan v. CSX Transportation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/finnegan-v-csx-transportation-mad-2019.