Opinion
RICHARDSON, J.*
Plaintiff Michael Finn, a minor, appeals from a judgment for defendants in a civil action for personal injury. The claimed prejudicial error arises from the trial court’s modification of certain jury instructions offered by plaintiff. Although we granted hearing in this case to consider the application of strict liability principles to injurious side effects allegedly produced by prescription drugs, our review of the record has convinced us that in light of the basis upon which plaintiff tried his case, this broader issue is not properly before us. Rather, we shall conclude that plaintiff has not demonstrated that it is reasonably probable that the trial court’s modifications of his proposed instructions affected the judgment. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
Shortly after his birth on June 6, 1969, plaintiff developed serious diarrhea and a diaper rash. When the rash spread, his pediatrician referred him to a dermatologist, Dr. Romaine, who diagnosed plaintiff’s condition as acrodermatitis enteropathica (AE). AE has been described as commencing “as a skin eruption on an extremity or around one of the orifices of the body, followed by loss of hair, diarrhea, and other gastrointestinal disturbances; it is intermittently progressive and frequently ends fatally.” (Stedman’s Medical Diet. (4th unabridged ed. 1976).)
Dr. Romaine prescribed high doses of a drug, Diodoquin, which had been approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration and manufactured by defendant G. D. Searle & Company (Searle). This drug is a mem[695] ber of a pharmacological group known as hydroxy quinolines. When plaintiff’s illness was first diagnosed, the use of these drugs constituted the only known treatment for AE and, of the group, Diodoquin was the most commonly used.
After moving with his parents to California in 1970, plaintiff became the patient of defendant Dr. McGillis, a dermatologist, who again prescribed massive dosages of Diodoquin for the treatment of plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff’s health improved dramatically with use of the drug, but periodic attempts to reduce the dosage resulted in reappearance of his AE symptoms.
In September 1971, plaintiff’s mother noticed for the first time that plaintiff seemed to have difficulty with his vision. On October 22, he was examined by Dr. Lambert, an ophthalmologist, who diagnosed his condition as possible optic nerve atrophy. Upon learning that plaintiff had been taking large quantities of Diodoquin for an extended period, Dr. Lambert called Searle’s headquarters to inquire as to the effects of the drug. After investigation, a physician employed by Searle informed Lambert that there had been a report of possible relationships between optic nerve atrophy and the prolonged use of large quantities of Diodoquin in children with AE. This information of a possible link was given by Dr. Lambert to Dr. McGillis who in turn advised plaintiff’s mother to discontinue plaintiff’s use of the drug. She did so, but when plaintiff’s symptoms promptly reappeared, she again administered Diodoquin, ultimately resuming the higher dosage when a lower amount proved less effective in curbing the AE symptoms.
In December 1971, plaintiff was examined by various physicians on the staff of the University of California at Los Angeles Medical Center. Dr. Hepler, a neuro-ophthalmologist, finding severe visual problems, suspected that Diodoquin was the cause and advised plaintiff’s mother to discontinue its use. Following examination, a gastroenterologist who saw plaintiff on December 28 concluded that plaintiff was actually suffering from irritable colon syndrome rather than AE and prescribed a different drug. Plaintiff’s rash and diarrhea thereupon subsided, and there was some temporary improvement in his vision. However, he now suffers permanent and almost total blindness.
In 1973, plaintiff’s mother acting as his guardian ad litem filed suit against Searle and Dr. McGillis, alleging that plaintiff’s blindness was caused by Diodoquin. The complaint contained three causes of action. The first alleged that the Diodoquin was defective because Searle failed “to give adequate warning” of the risks of optic nerve atrophy; the second asserted that Searle negligently developed, tested, manufactured and distributed the drug; and the third charged that Dr. McGillis negligently examined, diagnosed and [696] treated plaintiff, and negligently prescribed Diodoquin in excessive amounts and for prolonged periods.
At trial, plaintiff presented a variety of evidence to support his contention that Searle had notice of a possible link between Diodoquin and optic atrophy which required a warning at the time plaintiff took the drug from 1969 through the end of 1971. First, plaintiff presented evidence that in 1966, two physicians, Drs. Etheridge and Stewart, published an article in the British medical journal Lancet reporting the development of optic atrophy in a child suffering from AE who had undergone prolonged high-dosage Diodoquin treatment. Plaintiff also presented a published report in 1968 which linked Vioform, a different drug which was a member of the same chemical family (hydroxyquinolines) as Diodoquin, with the development of optic atrophy in a patient with AE. Finally, in April 1971, another physician reported that Vioform was implicated in the development of a disease called subacute myelo-optic neuropathy (SMON) and in a few cases patients had developed optic neuritis or atrophy. Plaintiff asserted that the chemical similarities between Diodoquin and Vioform were so significant that the Vioform reports in conjunction with the 1966 study provided a basis upon which Searle was required to warn about possible optic atrophy and the use of Diodoquin.
In response, Searle’s medical director stated that the 1966 report had been considered, but that because it was unclear whether the patient’s eye problems had been caused by the drug or the disease, no labeling change was necessary. This conclusion was reiterated by three experts presented by Searle, including the physician who had served as director of the Federal Food and Drug Administration’s Division of Medical Epidemiology in the mid-1960’s, who stated that the report did not establish a causal link between the drug and the effect. As to the Vioform reports, Searle’s experts testified that (1) the 1968 report failed to demonstrate that the Vioform rather than the AE had affected the optic system, (2) it was probable that SMON was caused by a viral agent or a pollutant and not Vioform, and (3) in any event, because of the chemical differences between Vioform and Diodoquin, the reports of possible side effects associated with the use of Vioform provided no basis for a determination that there was a need to warn about possible side effects from the therapeutic use of Diodoquin. In this connection, the experts noted that Diodoquin had never been linked to the development of SMON.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, Searle contended that at the time that plaintiff was using the drug there was no basis upon which it could have been required to issue a warning. A warning was later affixed to Diodoquin which recited that “prolonged high-dosage therapy with hydroxyqui[697] nolines” should be avoided because optic difficulties had been reported in conjunction with such therapy. Searle explained that this language was included based on consideration of the 1966 report, the SMON report, which was then being reviewed by the FDA, and after it had learned of plaintiff’s case and of a similar case which was reported two months later.
Finally, in response to plaintiff’s evidence in support of his contention that his condition was negligently diagnosed and that his blindness was caused solely by the Diodoquin, Searle offered testimony supporting the diagnosis and in addition demonstrated that a zinc deficiency has since been identified as a cause of AE. Searle introduced evidence to establish that such a deficiency alone may have caused plaintiff’s optic nerve atrophy. In summary, every issue, from the question of whether plaintiff had initially been misdiagnosed, through the possible causes of his blindness, and the propriety of issuing a warning based on the information available at the time, was contested at trial.
The trial court altered two jury instructions proposed by plaintiff which related to the nature and extent of a manufacturer’s “duty to warn.” One instruction read: “The manufacturer of a prescription drug is strictly liable to a plaintiff if it fails to warn the medical profession within a reasonable time after it knew or should have known that possible harmful side effects could be produced in persons such as plaintiff by long continued use of the drug known as Diodoquin.”
The trial court redrafted this instruction, which as given to the jury then read: “The manufacturer of a prescription drug is liable to a plaintiff if it fails to warn the medical profession within a reasonable time after it knew or should have known that harmful side effects could be produced in users of its drug.” Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew any objection to the deletion of the adverb “strictly” and as the dissent concedes, the word “strictly” in the context of this instruction added nothing of substance. (Dis. opnpost, at p. 711.) As to deletion of the modifier “possible” before “harmful side effects,” counsel responded, “I don’t object too much.” His principal complaint, referable to the instruction, was the substitution of the final phrase regarding users of the drug.
In amplification of the foregoing instruction relative to a manufacturer’s general duty, plaintiff further requested a second instruction: “The manufacturer of a prescription drug is under a duty to warn the medical profession of potential dangers from use of its drug, even though the percentage of users who may be injured is not large.”
After modification of the instruction by the trial judge, the jury was told: “The manufacturer of a drug is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to [698] warn the medical profession of potential dangers reasonably foreseeable from use of its drug, even though the percentage of users who may be injured is not large. The duty of the drug manufacturer is to warn the medical profession and there is no duty by the drug manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the patient for whom the drug is prescribed.” This instruction, and the court’s modifications thereof, form the focus for plaintiff’s contentions.
Following a three-month trial, the jury returned verdicts favoring both defendants. On appeal, plaintiff asserts multiple errors. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in (1) modifying the foregoing instructions by improperly injecting negligence concepts into the jury’s consideration, thereby effectively clouding and confusing his strict liability claim, (2) excluding from evidence a Searle warning label referring to optic nerve atrophy, (3) excluding testimony of Dr. McGillis regarding the sufficiency of the Searle warning, and (4) instructing on the physician’s duty of care as applied to defendant McGillis.
I. “Strict Liability”
The sole basis on which plaintiff sought to impose “strict liability” upon Searle was its asserted failure to warn “of a severe side effect” which it knew or should have known could result from use of its drug. Plaintiff argues that by modifying his proposed instructions the trial court erroneously introduced negligence principles into the case thereby impairing his strict liability claim. However, our review of the challenged instructions is limited to consideration of the extent to which they departed from the theory actually presented by plaintiff at trial. We will conclude that despite plaintiff’s expanded claims on appeal which encompass broader principles and applications of strict liability, plaintiff in fact proceeded at trial on a much narrower path. Under the theory on which the case was tried, no prejudicial error occurred. Contrary to the rationale of the dissenting opinion, we do not consider the applicability of strict liability in this case based on any claims other than a failure to warn of known or knowable side effects.
Plaintiff here was only asserting Searle’s “delinquency” in failing to notify of known or knowable side effects. The dissenter’s assertion that the trial court’s modification “withdrew plaintiff’s strict liability claim from the jury’s consideration,” and that “[t]his modification was critical to plaintiff’s ability to prove his case against Searle” (dis. opn., post, p. 711) does not survive scrutiny. These assertions are founded upon the proposition that “a significant difference exists between strict liability and negligence claims based on a failure to warn” (ibid.). The authorities cited for that proposition are cases in which the question was whether liability could be imposed for [699] failure of the product to contain a warning of defects discovered, and reasonably discoverable, only after the product has caused injury. Obviously, under such a “hindsight” theory there exists a substantial, and critical, distinction between a negligence standard and strict liability.
The decisions on the point in other states have developed two lines of cases: one imposes strict liability for a failure to warn regardless of defendant’s knowledge or ability to know of the side-effect-causing injury (see cases cited in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co. (1980) 79 111.2d 26 [402 N.E.2d 194, 197]), and one focuses first on the manufacturer’s actual or constructive knowledge. (See, e.g., Tomer (Estate) v. America Home Prod. Corp. (1976) 170 Conn. 681 [368 A.2d 35, 38]; Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1973) 224 Pa.Super. 418 [307 A.2d 449, 457-458].) Here, we need not favor one position over the other because both plaintiff’s theory and proposed instructions were based on the premise that Searle’s duty to warn extended only to effects which were or should have been known at the time plaintiff took Diodoquin. Plaintiff himself offered the instruction limiting liability to such dangers.
“Failure-to-warn” cases involving claims that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the asserted danger and accordingly should have supplied a warning have been subject in California to a distinct form of analysis in the strict liability arena. The unique nature of the “defect” within this context was recently well described as follows: “[T]he jury cannot compare the product with other units off the same assembly line, nor can they at least weigh the reasonableness of the design against alternative designs presented by the plaintiff [citation]. Instead, they must decide whether a product flawlessly designed and produced may nevertheless possess such risks to the user without a suitable warning that it becomes ‘defective’ simply by the absence of a warning.” (Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 338, 347 [157 Cal.Rptr. 142].)
The requisite warning may be of two kinds, each of which may have different implications. (See Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 99 at p. 659; contrast dis. opn. at p. 723 lumping all warnings together.) First, the manufacturer may be required adequately to instruct the consumer as to how the product should be used. For example, in Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 67 [127 Cal.Rptr. 217], strict liability was imposed when the manufacturer failed to advise users on the proper use and assembly of a telescope, thereby causing serious eye injury to the plaintiff. A second distinctive form of warning is that which informs a consumer (or, in the case of prescription drugs, the physician) of potential risks or side effects which may follow the foreseeable use of the product. (See generally Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation (5th Cir. 1973) 493 F.2d [700]*7001076, 1088, 1089; Twerski et al. The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability—Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age (1976) 61 Cornell L.Rev. 495, 520-521.) Within the prescription drug context, the giving of this second form of warning may cause a physician-user to refuse to prescribe the drug. The particular risk described in the warning may well persuade the physician and patient in determining the treatment of choice. The distinct functions performed by the two kinds of warnings were described succinctly by one commentator: “In some circumstances a warning or directions would have reduced the risk. In other circumstances the warning would simply have afforded the consumer an opportunity to make an informed choice.” (McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability (1978) 25 Wayne L.Rev. 1, 32.)
Some California courts have held that where imposition of liability is contingent upon the finding of dangers which were or should have been known, “concepts from negligence law have been amalgamated into the doctrine of strict liability . . . .” (Carmichael v. Reitz (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 958, 988 [95 Cal.Rptr. 381]; see Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman (1979) 180 Ind.App. 33 [388 N.E.2d 541, 550].) Another division of the Court of Appeal concluded that rules conditioning liability upon knowledge of danger “are rules fixing duties of care. Since violation of a duty of care has always been an element in the definition of negligence, the rules expressed in comment j of the new Restatement, although stated as an adjunct to ‘strict’ liability are merely well settled rules already a part of the law of negligence.” (Oakes v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 645, 650, fn. 4 [77 Cal.Rptr. 709]; see Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 75, 79-80 [92 Cal.Rptr. 825, 53 A.L.R.3d 292].) However, following our decision in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413 [143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 96 A.L.R.3d 1], in yet another opinion the Court of Appeal extended the balancing approach formulated in that decision to a case involving an asserted failure to warn. (Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at pp. 347-348.)
Arguably, the difference between negligence and strict liability standards in this situation is the focus: in the first, the jury must determine the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct; in the second, the determination is whether the product has been rendered defective because, applying an objective standard, and weighing the relevant costs and benefits, a warning was required. In light of the opinion in Barker, a balancing test as enunciated in Cavers may therefore be appropriate. However, as we discuss, plaintiff here relied on cases emphasizing the overlap of negligence and strict liability principles in this context and we need not decide whether [701] and how the Barker formulation would apply. He did not at any point urge a standard which called for a jury decision as to whether the benefit of a particular warning would outweigh its costs under Barker.
Furthermore, the critical instruction as it was originally proposed by plaintiff did not in fact furnish any standard for the jury to apply with respect to the nature or degree of the potential danger which would give rise to an obligation to warn. Even after the trial court indicated its intent to modify the instruction by adding the words “reasonable care,” it does not appear from the record that plaintiff offered any different standard to provide guidance. This lack would have invited the jury to find Searle liable for failure to warn of any “danger” without limitation. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that on plaintiff’s limited theory of liability there could be a practical difference between negligence and strict liability bearing on the manufacturer’s duty to warn based on information it possessed or could have obtained, it seems obvious that liability ought not to be imposed for failure to warn based on every piece of information in a manufacturer’s possession. (See Cavers, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at pp. 348-349.)
The quality of evidence supporting a causal connection between product and injury may range from extremely vague to highly certain. Knowledge of a potential side effect which is based on a single isolated report of a possible link between a prescription drug and an injury may not require a warning. “If we overuse warnings, we invite mass consumer disregard and ultimate contempt for the warning process.” (Twerski et al., supra, 61 Cornell L.Rev. at p. 521.) Moreover, both common sense and experience suggest that if every report of a possible risk, no matter how speculative, conjectural, or tentative, imposed an affirmative duty to give some warning, a manufacturer would be required to inundate physicians indiscriminately with notice of any and every hint of danger, thereby inevitably diluting the force of any specific warning given. (See Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation (1983) 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 861, 932-935; Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 755 [167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 12 A.L.R.4th 701].) The strength of the causal link thus is relevant both to the issue of whether a warning should be given at all, and, if one is required, what form it should take. The trial court was justified in modifying the instruction to take into account the dangers of overwarning and plaintiff failed to offer an alternative approach. “ ‘In a civil case, each of the parties must propose complete and comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation; if the parties do not do so, the court has no duty to instruct on its own motion.’ [Citations.]” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 950-951 [160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58].) Neither a trial court nor a reviewing court in a civil action is obligated [702] to seek out theories plaintiff might have advanced, or to articulate for him that which he has left unspoken.
The conclusion that the court’s modification here did not significantly alter plaintiff’s theory of liability is further buttressed by consideration of plaintiff’s submissions to the court in support of his instruction. Plaintiff cited two negligence cases as authority for his proposed instruction: Love v. Wolf (1961) 249 Cal.App.2d 822, 833 [58 Cal.Rptr. 42] (Love II) and Love v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378 [38 Cal.Rptr. 183] (Love I). In both cases the courts stated that “in the case of a drug it has been held that there is a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn of potential dangers from use even though the percentage of users who will be injured is not large. [Citation.]” (Love I, at p. 395, italics added; Love II, at p. 833.) The trial court’s alterations in fact conformed the instruction to the authorities presented by plaintiff which specifically referred to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct.
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that the jury was misled in this case by the court’s failure to instruct in terms other than reasonable care. As we have noted, the jury arguably should have been specifically instructed to consider whether after balancing the costs and benefits of such a warning, a warning based on information Searle had in hand would have been appropriate. (Cf. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d 413.) Even though plaintiff requested no such instruction, Searle in fact presented to the jury an argument couched in terms of a “balancing test.” Defense counsel argued: “[W]hat it really comes down to is what are you trying to do? What is the logic of all of this? And it seems to me the logic is that you. warn, if you think that by doing that you are going to do some good, and you don’t warn if you believe that in doing that, by warning you are going to cause harm.”
One further basis for concluding that no prejudicial error occurred is that, even if the modification constituted error, and even if that error could have misled the jury, further significant questions exist whether on this record a jury was likely to find a causal relationship between lack of notice and plaintiff’s injury. Assuming that plaintiff’s condition was not misdiagnosed, as the jury apparently concluded by absolving Dr. McGillis of liability, this drug was the only known treatment for plaintiff’s disease. The disease was frequently fatal if untreated. In fact, plaintiff’s use of the drug was resumed even after plaintiff had knowledge of potential side effects to the degree known by Searle. It seems unlikely that the jury would have believed that plaintiff’s physician would have (or should have) refrained from prescribing the drug, or that plaintiff would have refrained from taking it, on the basis of the rather insubstantial evidence then in Searle’s possession regarding possible side effects.
[703] In summary, we conclude that given plaintiff’s theory at trial and the instructions which he requested, the trial court modifications provide no basis for a reversal. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the jury was, or may have been, actually misled.
II. Exclusion of the Package Insert Warning
The trial court admitted into evidence Searle’s February 1972 label insert for Diodoquin containers which had been altered after Searle had reviewed plaintiff’s case, a similar case in December 1971, and evidence regarding the development of a rare disease in Japan linking usage of a related drug and optic nerve atrophy. While Searle’s previous label had not recited any optically related risks, the new label indicated under “Adverse Reactions” that “Optical neuritis, optic atrophy, and peripheral neuropathy have been reported following prolonged high-dosage therapy with hydroxyquinolines. Long-term use of the drug should be avoided.”
Plaintiff claims that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to permit introduction of a label inserted in the Diodoquin package by defendant in May 1972. This label included the above described language under the heading “Warning.” Essentially the same language, under the heading “Warnings,” was contained in later package inserts.
Plaintiff relies on Ault v. International Harvester Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 113 [117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148, 74 A.L.R.3d 986], and Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 768 [150 Cal.Rptr. 419], as authority for the admission of the evidence of subsequent remedial measures, claiming that the change in the warnings was relevant on the issue of Searle’s knowledge and duty to warn.
Whether or not Ault applies, we find no reversible error occurred in the trial court’s exclusion of the postaccident warning contained in the package. Such labelling information, at best, was cumulative. The jury had previously been advised that, following plaintiff’s injury, warnings of effects similar to those claimed by plaintiff had been inserted by Searle in its Diodoquin containers.
III. Other Contentions
Plaintiff urges error in the trial court’s refusal to permit him to question Dr. McGillis about the adequacy of Searle’s warning. However, because Dr. McGillis had not been qualified as an expert in drug epidemiology (Evid. Code, § 801), he was not qualified to render an expert opin[704] ion regarding Searle’s duty to warn. Moreover, three expert witnesses did testify for plaintiff on the point. Any error was harmless.
Further with reference to Dr. McGillis, plaintiff challenges the court’s refusal to give the following instruction: “A physician has a duty to properly diagnose a patient’s condition once he has undertaken the role of a treating physician. He must perform said diagnosis in accordance with the degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons of good standing practicing in the same or similar locality and under similar circumstances, [¶] By diagnosis is meant the discovery of the source of a patient’s illness or the determination of the nature of his disease (or ailment) from a study of its symptoms.”
Consistent with BAJI No. 6.00, sixth edition 1977, the jury was instructed that a physician has a general duty to exercise the care and skill ordinarily exercised by members of the profession. The jury was also told that a specialist is held to the standards of specialists in the same field and under similar circumstances. (BAJI No. 6.01 (6th ed. 1977).) Plaintiff argues that the court’s refusal to give his proffered instruction improperly removed from the jury’s consideration the issue of whether Dr. McGillis was negligent in making the original diagnosis. The instructions which were given, however, applied to all of the relevant functions of a physician. More importantly, as framed, plaintiff’s proposed instruction arguably would have imposed strict liability on a physician for failure properly to diagnose a patient’s condition. This is an overbroad and inaccurate description of a physician’s duty, and as such was properly rejected. (Compare BAJI, supra, No. 6.02 [physician not negligent merely because he or she errs].) Even if the suggestion of “strict liability” presented in the first sentence of the proposed instruction was vitiated by the second sentence’s reference to ordinary community standards of medical care, this issue was adequately covered by the instructions given and plaintiff suffered no prejudice.
Plaintiff also sought to introduce into evidence three articles from various medical journals. One, a report on iodism, had little relevance and was properly excluded. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The remaining articles, while relevant, were hearsay, and plaintiff has not asserted that they were offered to “prove facts of general notoriety and interest.” (Id., §§ 1200, 1341.) The court properly permitted plaintiff to read certain passages from the documents and to question witnesses concerning them without receiving the documents themselves into evidence. (Id., §§ 721, 802; see Luque v. McLean (1972) 8 Cal.3d 136, 147-148 [104 Cal.Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163]; People v. Kozel (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 507, 535 [184 Cal.Rptr. 208]; see generally, 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (1982) § 29.8, p. 1034 et seq.) No error has been demonstrated.
[705] The judgment is affirmed.
Mosk, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Grodin, J., concurred.