Fink-Carver v. Kuhn

District Court, N.D. California·Decided August 14, 2024·No. 4:21-cv-00664·Unknown

Opinion

1 NOAH G. BLECHMAN (State Bar No. 197167) noah.blechman@mcnamaralaw.com 2 MCNAMARA,NEY,BEATTY,SLATTERY, BORGES &AMBACHER LLP 3 3480 Buskirk Avenue, Suite 250 Pleasant Hill, CA 94523 4 Telephone: (925) 939-5330 Facsimile: (925) 939-0203 5 Attorneys for Defendants 6 CITY OF PLEASANT HILL and OFFICER KUHN 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JENNIFER FINK-CARVER and JASON Case No. C21-00664 JSW FINK, 12 STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] Plaintiffs, ORDER TO VACATE UNLAWFUL 13 ENTRY RULING IN LIGHT OF vs. TENTATIVE SETTLEMENT 14 CITY OF PLEASANT HILL POLICE Re: Dkt. No. 69 15 OFFICER KUHN, CITY OF PLEASANT HILL, and, DOES 1-20, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 The parties, by and through their respective attorneys of record, hereby stipulate and jointly 20 request and move for an order from the Court to vacate only a portion of the Court’s prior Order 21 Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (“Order,” ECF No. 62), per the good cause 22 reasons stated in detail below and in light of the negotiated, tentative settlement by the parties to 23 end this litigation and the Ninth Circuit appeal by Defendants. 24 WHEREAS, on February 22, 2024, Your Honor issued an Order Resolving Cross-Motions 25 for Summary Judgment. In this Order, the Court found, in granting certain aspects of Plaintiffs’ 26 motion for partial summary judgment, that the entry by officers, into the residence of Plaintiff 27 Jennifer Fink-Carver on the evening of May 9, 2020, was an unlawful entry, in violation of the 28 1 Fourth Amendment. ECF Doc. 62, pgs. 20:18-26:6. In its ruling, the Court also denied qualified 2 immunity for Ofc. Kuhn as to the entry issue (he was the only individually named Defendant). Id. 3 WHEREAS, Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit concerning issues 4 raised in the Order, including the denial of qualified immunity as to the entry, as well as in relation 5 to the denial of qualified immunity as to the force (canine contact) used on Plaintiff Fink-Carver. 6 SeeCity of Pleasant Hill et al. v. Fink-Carver et al., Ninth Circuit Case No. 24-1718. 7 WHEREAS, during the pendency of that Ninth Circuit appeal and prior to briefing the 8 appeal, the parties participated in a private mediation session with Mr. Simmons, Esq., and 9 thereafter, the parties entered into a tentative settlement. The settlement to end this litigation is 10 conditioned by the Defendants on Your Honor setting aside the unlawful entry ruling in the Order, 11 namely ECF No. 62, at pgs. 20:18-26:6; 29:12-13; 29:21-22 (portions related to unlawful entry 12 only). 13 WHEREAS, attached hereto as Ex. A is the fully signed Settlement Agreement and Release, 14 which includes vacatur of the unlawful entry aspect of the Order as a material term for the tentative 15 settlement. 16 WHEREAS, while Defendant Kuhn’s Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, which raised 17 various issues and which the parties agree posed an unpredictable outcome for both sides, the 18 parties negotiated and entered into a bargained for exchange for a tentative settlement at mediation, 19 subject to several conditions, the last of which relates to Your Honor setting aside (vacatur of) the 20 ruling that there was an unlawful entry. 21 WHEREAS, the Defendants have now dismissed the Ninth Circuit appeal, without 22 prejudice (mandate issued August 12th via Ninth Circuit order dismissing appeal, without prejudce, 23 per Docket Entry 18.1, e-filed 8-12-24), so that Your Honor once again has jurisdiction in this 24 matter. The parties herein jointly request, as required by the settlement referenced above, that Your 25 Honor set aside the unlawful entry ruling and vacate those portions of the Order, namely ECF Doc. 26 62, pgs. 20:18-26:6; 29:12-13; 29:21-22 (portions related to unlawful entry only). 27 WHEREAS, the District Court has the authority to vacate this portion of the Order. Under 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), a district court may modify “any order or other decision ... 1 that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... 2 at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and 3 liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Orders granting summary judgment are interlocutory in nature 4 and do not fully adjudicate the rights and claims of the parties. Therefore, they can be vacated at 5 any time prior to final judgment. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Pac. Award Metals, Inc., No. C 04- 6 04941JSW, 2006 WL 1825705, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2006); Persistence Software, Inc. v. The 7 Object People, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 626, 627 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The standard for 8 vacatur under Rule 54(b) is less rigid than the standard applicable under Rule 60. Persistence 9 Software, Inc. v. The Object People, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 626, 627 (N.D. Cal. 2001).Under Rule 54(b), 10 the court has wide latitude to revise prior orders and an order may be revised at any time before the 11 entry of a judgment. Jaynes Corp. v. Am. Safety Indem. Co., No. 210CV00764MMDGWF, 2014 12 WL 11115424, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 2, 2014). Moreover, district courts have “‘complete power’ 13 over non-final orders and may vacate or revise them ‘at any time,’ if doing so would be ‘consonant 14 with equity.’” Midmountain Contractors, Inc. v. Am. Safety Idem. Co., No. C10-1239JLR, 2013 15 WL 5492952, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 2013) (quoting Gypsum, 2006 WL 1825705, at *1). 16 Additionally, in considering vacatur of a ruling, a district court should evaluate whether all parties 17 involved in the ruling request and agree to vacatur as a condition of a proposed settlement of the 18 action, whether a former party to the action would be adversely affected by vacatur, and whether 19 the costs of continuing the action with uncertain results are outweighed by the benefits of the 20 proposed settlement of the action. De La O v. Arnold-Williams, No. CV-04-0192-EFS, 2008 WL 21 4192033, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2008). Courts have applied these and other similar principles 22 in deciding to vacate summary judgement orders to facilitate settlement in numerous cases. See, 23 e.g., Atain Specialty Ins. Co. v. Reno Cab Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14449 *5-8 (D. Nevada 24 2019) (vacating summary judgement to facilitate settlement as no considerations of equity weighed 25 against doing so); Quest Integrity USA, LLC v. A.Hak Indus. Servs. US, LLC, No. 2:14-CV-01971- 26 RAJ, 2019 WL 1572691, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2019) (“In this case, the Court finds that the 27 strong public interest in the settlement of this litigation and the conservation of judicial resources 28 1 outweigh the benefit of the limited collateral estoppel effect of the orders entered to date in this 2 case.”); Cosgrove v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 2:14-CV-2229-HRH, 2019 WL 3944551, 3 at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2019) (“On May 4, 2017, the parties formally notified the court that they 4 had reached a settlement. As part of their settlement, the parties requested that the court vacate and 5 seal its orders on the cross-motions for partial summary judgment...”); Jacobo v. Ross Stores, Inc., 6 No.CV154701MWFAGRX, 2018 WL 11465299, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2018) (“On May 26, 7 2017, Ross moved for summary judgment, which the Court granted but later vacated pursuant to 8 the parties’ stipulation and joint motion to vacate the Order granting summary judgment in light of 9 the parties’ proposed settlement.”); Bassett v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8:17-CV-69, 2019 WL 10 6767053, at 1 (D. Neb.

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