Finias (James) v. State

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Decided: September 10, 2015
• Docket: 66023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

exchange for her testimony because he did not have a good faith basis to

make such an inquiry in the circumstances presented. See Daniel v. State,

119 Nev. 498, 513, 78 P.3d 890, 900 (2003) (requiring party to have good-

faith basis for inquiry about specific acts of misconduct).

Second, Finias argues that the district court erred in refusing

to give an instruction that Robinson was an accomplice and that her

testimony should be corroborated. We disagree. The record does not

indicate that Robinson was ever charged with or was liable for any offense

arising out of the shooting. See NRS 175.291(2) (defining an accomplice as

"one who is liable to prosecution, for the identical offense charged against

the defendant on trial"). Moreover, Robinson's testimony was

corroborated. Phone records placed Finias in the area of the shooting and

demonstrated that Finias was planning to meet the victim, Finias' DNA

was recovered from a cigarette at the scene, a weapon that was in Finias'

possession matched the shell casings left at the scene, and the condition of

the weapon confirmed that Finias damaged it after the shooting to thwart

forensic testing. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing the

proposed instruction. Rose v. State, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 255 P.3d 291,

295 (2011).

Third, Finias contends that the district court erred in

instructing the jury that direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind

may not exist and the jury may infer state of mind from the circumstances

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e proved at trial.' We discern no abuse of discretion. Id. The given

instruction correctly states Nevada law. See Miranda v. State, 101 Nev.

562, 568, 707 P.2d 1121, 1125 (1985) ("The prosecution is not required to

present direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind as it existed during

the commission of a crime, and the jury may infer the existence of a

particular state of mind from the circumstances disclosed by the

evidence."), overruled on other grounds by Bejarano v. State, 122 Nev.

1066, 146 P.3d 265 (2006).

Fourth, Finias argues that the given instruction on the

presumption of innocence improperly reduced the State's burden of proof

because it did not define what elements were "material." 2 We disagree

because other instructions defined the elements of each charged offense

and the State's burden to prove those elements. Burnside v. State, 131

Nev., Adv. Op. 40, P.3d (2015); see also Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev.,

Adv. Op. 69, 263 P.3d 235, 259-60 (2011); Morales v. State, 122 Nev. 966,

971, 143 P.3d 463, 466 (2006); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 751, 121

P.3d 582, 586-87 (2005); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209, 969 P.2d

'The challenged instruction reads: "A defendant's state of mind does not require the presentation of direct evidence as it existed during the commission of a crime. The jury may infer the existence of a particular state of mind of a party from the circumstances disclosed by the evidence."

2 Thechallenged instruction reads: "The Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense."

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A ateo 288, 296 (1998). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in giving the challenged instruction. Rose, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 255 P.3d

at 295.

Lastly, Finias argues that the cumulative effect of the errors

committed during his trial warrant reversal of his conviction. As Finias

has demonstrated no error, there is nothing to cumulate.

Having considered Finias' contentions and concluded that they

lack merit, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

\nusi /AIR , J. Douglas Cherry

cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge Special Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A 4Tetpo