Finguerra v. Stone

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Finguerra v. Stone

154 A.D.2d 290, 546 N.Y.S.2d 366, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13405

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 26, 1989

StatusPublished

This text of 154 A.D.2d 290 (Finguerra v. Stone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Finguerra v. Stone, 154 A.D.2d 290, 546 N.Y.S.2d 366, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13405 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).

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Opinion

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Baer, Jr., J.), entered on or about June 29, 1989, which, in an action seeking, inter alia, specific performance of a contract for the sale of a condominium apartment, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We find that the court properly denied summary judgment. A fair reading of the contract of sale supports finding a triable issue of fact as to whether paragraph 4 of the rider constitutes an escape clause, thus allowing the defendant to unilaterally cancel the sale (Krasne v Gedell, 147 AD2d 616, 618). While normally the interpretation of the words in a contract is for the court, the meaning of the clause at issue, to wit: "unable or fails to convey title”, is unclear, and that and other possible questions of fact must be resolved at trial (cf., Barclay Arms Assocs. v Clemente, 98 AD2d 892). Concur — Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Carro, Kassal and Wallach, JJ.

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— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Baer, Jr., J.), entered on or about June 29, 1989, which, in an action seeking, inter alia, specific performance of a contract for the sale of a condominium apartment, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We find that the court properly denied summary judgment. A fair reading of the contract of sale supports finding a triable issue of fact as to whether paragraph 4 of the rider constitutes an escape clause, thus allowing the defendant to unilaterally cancel the sale (Krasne v Gedell, 147 AD2d 616, 618). While normally the interpretation of the words in a contract is for the court, the meaning of the clause at issue, to wit: "unable or fails to convey title”, is unclear, and that and other possible questions of fact must be resolved at trial (cf., Barclay Arms Assocs. v Clemente, 98 AD2d 892). Concur — Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Carro, Kassal and Wallach, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

154 A.D.2d 290, 546 N.Y.S.2d 366, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/finguerra-v-stone-nyappdiv-1989.

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