Finestone v. Florida Power & Light Co.

319 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9811
District Court, S.D. Florida·Decided May 19, 2004·No. 03-14040-CIV·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

ORDER

COHN, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant, Florida Power & Light Company’s (“FP & L”), Motion for Determination of Duty Owed (DE 54), Plaintiffs’ Response (DE 60), FP & L’s Reply (DE 75), and FP & L’s Request for Oral Argument (DE 70). The Court has considered the submissions of the parties and the record.

I. Background

This action arises from operations at FP & L’s Hutchinson Island Nuclear Plant (“Plant”), which operates as a generator of electricity from the use of nuclear power. (Compl. at ¶ 10). Plaintiffs claim that Zachary Finestone, contracted cancer as a result of FP & L’s negligence. (Compl. at ¶ 27-32). Plaintiffs allege that their minor child developed neuroblastoma as a result of FP & L’s negligence when it released radiation in an amount that exceeded the maximum allowable dose to the public outside its Plant. (Compl. at ¶¶ 31(a)-(g), 32). FP & L denies that releases of radioactive materials into the environment from the Plant exceeded allowable limits and denies that any action or failure to act by it caused Zachary Finestone’s cancer. (Answer at ¶¶ 26, 31, 32).

The parties do not dispute that this is a *1348 “public liability action” 1 arising under the Priee-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (“Price-Anderson” or “Act”), because it is an action in which Plaintiffs seek to impose liability arising out of or resulting from a “nuclear incident.” 2

II. Discussion

FP & L seeks a ruling by this Court based on federal regulations that both parties agree apply in this case. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs claim that FP & L’s Motion is premature and that without any exchange of documents to this point, “it is impossible for the. court to knowledgeably rule as to the extent of the duty owed by FP & L to Plaintiffs.” (Resp. at p. 7). Plaintiffs argue that discovery is necessary to allow this Court to ascertain the duty of FP & L. (Resp. at ¶ 7). Courts in other PLA cases have found ruling on this issue "early in the litigation is an effective and appropriate way to manage this type of case. See, e.g. O’Conner, 748 F.Supp. 672, 679 (C.D.Ill. 1990); Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F.Supp. 12, 14 (D.Mass.1995). Accordingly, this Court will proceed with its analysis of the issue.

A.The Duty of Care Owed in a Public Liability Action

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “federal safety regulations conclusively establish the duty of care owed in a public liability action.” Roberts v. Florida Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir.1998) (noting that “virtually every federal court to consider the issue, including three circuit courts of appeals, have held that federal regulations must provide the sole measure of the defendants’ duty in a public liability cause of action.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

B. Duty of Care Under Federal Regulations

FP & L contends the standard of care owed in a PLA is governed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (“NRC”) regulations. “Plaintiffs agree with FP & L’s assertion that the Federal regulations on nuclear safety generally do impose the standard of care on purveyors of nuclear power.” (Resp. at p. 4). However, Plaintiffs argue that: (1) a different standard of care applies here because the victim in this case is a minor and the federal regulations have defined minors as a discrete class of persons (Resp. at p. 4); (2) the federal regulations require that doses to “unrestricted areas” be “as low as is reasonably achievable (Resp. at p. 4); and (3) FP & L’s motion does not address the Offside Dose Calculation Manual or FP & L’s Final Safety Analysis (Resp. at p. 2).”

1. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003 Applies to Adults and Children

Plaintiffs contend that pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003, “adults and children are to be treated separately and distinctly with respect to the regulations and proper doses.” (Resp. at p. 4). Plaintiffs basis for this argument is that “[w]hile § 20.1003 defines member of the public as ‘any individual except when that individual is receiving an occupational dose,’ it further goes on to define an adult as an ‘individual *1349 18 or more years of age’ and ‘a minor’ as an ‘individual’ less than 18 years of age.” This argument is without merit. The distinction between an adult and a minor does not apply here. A member of the public means “any individual except when that individual is receiving an occupational dose.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003. Plaintiffs have not alleged a claim for violation of “occupational dose” limit in this case.

2. As Low as Reasonably Achievable Standard (“ALARA)”

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Finestone v. Florida Power & Light Co., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9811 (S.D. Fla. 2004).

319 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (Finestone v. Florida Power & Light Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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