Fines Under Vehicle Code of 1929

20 Pa. D. & C. 28
CourtPennsylvania Department of Justice
DecidedSeptember 21, 1933
StatusPublished

This text of 20 Pa. D. & C. 28 (Fines Under Vehicle Code of 1929) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Department of Justice primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fines Under Vehicle Code of 1929, 20 Pa. D. & C. 28 (Pa. 1933).

Opinion

Moss, Deputy Attorney General,

You have submitted to this office several questions involving the right of different county officials to-[29]*29deduct fees from fines payable to the State under The Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, as amended by the Act of June 22,1931, P. L. 751, before transmitting them to the Department of Revenue.

You state that in some instances the clerk of court collects the fines and deducts a poundage fee. In other cases he transmits the fines to the sheriff, who deducts a poundage fee before transmitting the money to the State. In some ■counties the sheriff collects the fines, deducts his poundage, and transmits the balance to the county treasurer, who in turn deducts a further commission before transmitting to the State. We have learned that in some counties the probation officers are appointed by the sheriff as deputies and that, in this ■capacity, they collect these fines and deduct the sheriff’s fees; and that in other counties the county commissioners collect the fines and pay them to the county treasurer.

All these many different methods of collecting and handling fines imposed by the courts of quarter sessions demonstrate that no uniformity exists throughout the State. The questions you have submitted relate primarily to the fees •chargeable by the various officers in transmitting the fines to the State. The fees chargeable by the various county officers are fixed by statute, and no officer is authorized to make a charge without specific statutory authority.

However, a more fundamental question is involved in your inquiry. Obviously, a county officer who is not authorized to receive payment of a fine imposed under The Vehicle Code by the court of quarter sessions and payable to the State would not have the right to claim any fee for collecting such fine. Therefore, your questions resolve themselves into one primary question — what officer is authorized to receive the payment of a fine imposed by the court of quarter sessions? The determination of this question first is necessary in order to decide which act relating to fees is applicable.

The question is not free from doubt, and our most diligent search has failed to uncover any authoritative and definite statement by any of the lower or appellate courts of this State.

Jurisdiction to impose fines under The Vehicle Code is vested in the court of quarter sessions of the peace. The Criminal Procedure Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, sec. 32, v, states that:

“The courts of quarter sessions shall also have jurisdiction in cases of fines, penalties or punishments, imposed by any act of assembly, for offences, misdemeanors or delinquencies, except where it shall be otherwise expressly provided and enacted.”

And the further power is granted to those courts by the same section:

“. . . to award process to levy and recover such fines, forfeitures and amercements, as shall be imposed, taxed or adjudged by them respectively;

From the above section of the act, it is clear that the court not only has the power to impose the sentence but to control the enforcement of it. Until compliance by the defendant, the case is completely under the court’s control.

When the court is compelled to issue its process to collect the fine, such process is directed to the sheriff and is in the form of a fi. fa. to collect it by levy on the defendant’s goods: Commonwealth v. Gabriel, 14 Dist. R. 862 (1904); In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Dist. R. 561 (1912). Until some process has issued out of the court to the sheriff to collect the fine, that officer has nothing to do with the receipt or the collection of the money.

Even where the court directs the commitment of the defendant until the fine is paid, the sheriff’s duty is only to hold the body of the defendant in custody and convey him to prison. That is the extent of the sheriff’s power under his writ, even though that writ is a method of compelling the payment of the fine.

[30]*30Therefore, until a writ of execution is issued to the sheriff to collect the fine, its collection is still in the control of the court. Compliance with the sentence can be properly made only by payment to the duly constituted officer of the court.

The Act of April 14,1834, P. L. 333, sec. 45, provides as follows:

“A clerk shall be commissioned for each of the said courts; he shall have the custody of the records and of the seal of the respective court, and keep the same at the place of holding such court, and in the apartments provided by authority of law for that purpose. He shall faithfully perform under the direction of the court all the duties appertaining to his office.”

As the clerk of the court is the duly constituted officer of the court: Commonwealth ex rel. v. Smith et al., 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 31 (1929) ; and performs the ministerial duties relating to the procedure of the court and the keeping of its records, he is the proper and only officer authorized, in the absence of any order of the court directing otherwise, to receive money paid to the court in compliance with the sentence imposing the fine.

We have no doubt, however, that the court can direct that fines be received by probation officers. Probation officers are appointed under the authority of the Act of June 19,1911, P. L. 1055, as amended June 21,1919, P. L. 569. These officers are appointed by the court to perform such duties as the court may direct. Likewise, desertion probation officers, appointed under the authority of the Act of June 12,1913, P. L. 502, are authorized under the direction of the court to collect and pay over to the person entitled thereto money ordered to be paid by the defendant.

In many instances, it is highly desirable to have the cases handled by probation officers kept entirely separate from the other business and officers of the courts. That the legislature recognized the right of probation officers to receive money is evidenced by the Act of June 9, 1931, P. L. 401, sec. 12, adding a new section to the county code and directing that the county comptroller or auditor should audit the books of parole and probation officers.

Whether the fine is paid to the clerk of court or to the parole or probation officer, it is nevertheless a payment to the court through its officer duly designated to receive it in compliance with the sentence of the court. While it might be highly desirable for the parole officer at least to certify his collections to the clerk of court in order that the record of each case would be complete, that is a matter within the discretion of the court.

There is no statute which fixes any fees to be received by parole or probation officers for collecting or supervising the collection of fines. Even though a sheriff may have the right to appoint a parole officer as a deputy sheriff, such officer in collecting fines does so under the direction of the court in the capacity of parole officer and cannot purport to act as sheriff and collect the sheriff’s fees for doing so.

When process has been issued to the sheriff in the form of a fi. fa. to levy on property of the defendant, the sheriff is entitled to a fee of 3 cents on the dollar out of the fine collected. The fees of the sheriffs of the various counties are regulated by the following acts applicable according to varying populations: Act of June 20, 1911, P. L. 1072; Act of July 11, 1901, P. L. 663; Act of April 9, 1915, P. L. 54, as amended by the Act of May 2, 1919, P. L. 110.

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Related

Free's Appeal
151 A. 583 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1930)
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Gill v. Smith & Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance
96 Pa. Super. 31 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1929)

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Bluebook (online)
20 Pa. D. & C. 28, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fines-under-vehicle-code-of-1929-padeptjust-1933.