Findley v. Findley

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

Findley v. Findley

519 So. 2d 1357, 1987 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 1474, 1987 WL 1431

CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama

DecidedNovember 13, 1987

DocketCiv. 6070

StatusPublished

This text of 519 So. 2d 1357 (Findley v. Findley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Findley v. Findley, 519 So. 2d 1357, 1987 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 1474, 1987 WL 1431 (Ala. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

BRADLEY, Presiding Judge.

Lena H. Findley and William T. Findley were divorced on September 30, 1986. Incorporated in the divorce decree was an agreement of the parties to the divorce. Paragraph 5 of the agreement provides as follows:

“FIFTH: In addition to the monthly alimony of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) provided in the preceding paragraph, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff monthly as additional alimony Fifty Percent (50%) of any excess in his net monthly income in excess of Two Thousand Eighty-nine Dollars ($2,089.00) per month.”

Shortly after the divorce decree was rendered, the husband retired from CSX Transportation, Inc., his employer. He was paid $40,284.62 in a lump sum as a “separation allowance.”

The wife petitioned the trial court to construe paragraph 5 of the divorce decree as entitling her to one-half of the $40,-284.62. She argues that the lump sum paid to her former husband should be considered as monthly income within the meaning of paragraph 5 of the divorce decree. The husband did not favor us with a brief.

It is accepted that a trial court has the power to interpret and construe its own decrees. White v. White, 490 So.2d 1 (Ala. Civ.App.1986); Hurd v. Hurd, 456 So.2d 316 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). As requested, the trial court construed the divorce decree and determined that a separation allowance was not monthly income within the meaning of paragraph 5 of said decree. Such a determination is reasonable in view of the fact that husband was no longer employed by CSX Transportation and was not earning or receiving a monthly income from that employer. The lump-sum amount received by husband from his former employer was a separation allowance, not monthly income.

We conclude that the trial court correctly construed paragraph 5 of the divorce de[1358]*1358cree, and hold that its judgment should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

HOLMES and INGRAM, JJ., concur.

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BRADLEY, Presiding Judge.

Lena H. Findley and William T. Findley were divorced on September 30, 1986. Incorporated in the divorce decree was an agreement of the parties to the divorce. Paragraph 5 of the agreement provides as follows:

“FIFTH: In addition to the monthly alimony of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) provided in the preceding paragraph, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff monthly as additional alimony Fifty Percent (50%) of any excess in his net monthly income in excess of Two Thousand Eighty-nine Dollars ($2,089.00) per month.”

Shortly after the divorce decree was rendered, the husband retired from CSX Transportation, Inc., his employer. He was paid $40,284.62 in a lump sum as a “separation allowance.”

The wife petitioned the trial court to construe paragraph 5 of the divorce decree as entitling her to one-half of the $40,-284.62. She argues that the lump sum paid to her former husband should be considered as monthly income within the meaning of paragraph 5 of the divorce decree. The husband did not favor us with a brief.

It is accepted that a trial court has the power to interpret and construe its own decrees. White v. White, 490 So.2d 1 (Ala. Civ.App.1986); Hurd v. Hurd, 456 So.2d 316 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). As requested, the trial court construed the divorce decree and determined that a separation allowance was not monthly income within the meaning of paragraph 5 of said decree. Such a determination is reasonable in view of the fact that husband was no longer employed by CSX Transportation and was not earning or receiving a monthly income from that employer. The lump-sum amount received by husband from his former employer was a separation allowance, not monthly income.

We conclude that the trial court correctly construed paragraph 5 of the divorce de[1358]*1358cree, and hold that its judgment should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

HOLMES and INGRAM, JJ., concur.

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519 So. 2d 1357, 1987 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 1474, 1987 WL 1431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/findley-v-findley-alacivapp-1987.

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