Finch v. State

696 So. 2d 1304, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 8176, 1997 WL 398860
District Court of Appeal of Florida·Decided July 16, 1997·No. No. 96-4233·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant complains that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution, in the form of a civil judgment, after the maximum permissible probationary term for her offense had expired. The state responds that the trial court possessed the authority to enter the order pursuant to section 775.089(5), Florida Statutes. The applicable version of section 775.089(5) reads: “An order of restitution may be enforced by the state, or a victim named in the order to receive the restitution, in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.” § 775.089(5), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988) (emphasis added). We fail to see how this provision supports the state’s position. Finding nothing in section 775.089, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), to support the proposition that the trial court possessed jurisdiction to enter a restitution order after the maximum permissible probationary term for appellant’s offense had expired, we reverse, and remand with directions that the judgment be vacated.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

ALLEN, WEBSTER and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.

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Finch v. State, 696 So. 2d 1304, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 8176, 1997 WL 398860 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997).

696 So. 2d 1304 (Finch v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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