Finch v. Barnhart

463 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93444, 2006 WL 3477744
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 14, 2006
DocketCV 06-2229-RC
StatusPublished

This text of 463 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (Finch v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Finch v. Barnhart, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93444, 2006 WL 3477744 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

CHAPMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

On April 12, 2006, plaintiff Lillian Finch filed a petition for writ of mandamus, 1 a supporting memorandum of points and authorities, and the supporting purported declaration of plaintiffs counsel, 2 Manuel D. Serpa, with exhibits. On June 22, 2006, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition and the supporting declaration of Dennis V. Ford, with exhibits, and on July 7, 2006, plaintiff filed a reply. -

BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2002, plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423. On July 7, 2005, following an administrative hearing, Administrative Law Judge Theodore T. Gotsch (“the ALJ”) issued a decision finding plaintiff is not disabled and denying plaintiffs application for disability benefits. Declaration of Dennis V. Ford (“Ford Deck”), ¶ 3(a), Exh. 1. The plaintiff attempted to obtain review by the Appeals Council of the ALJ’s decision; however, on March 6, 2006, the Appeals Council dismissed plaintiffs request for review, stating:

The request for review filed on November 4, 2005, was not filed within 60 days from the date notice of the decision was received as required by 20 CFR 404.968(a). The date of receipt of such notice is presumed to be five (5) days after the date of such notice unless a *1004 reasonable showing to the contrary is made. [¶] The regulations provide that the Appeals Council may dismiss a request for review where the claimant has failed to file the request within the stated period of time and the time for filing has not been extended. The time period will be extended if good cause is shown for missing the deadline. [¶] Your letter dated February 17, 2006 cites portions of the Appeals Council’s regulatory policy on filing a request for review of a hearing decision/order. As you rightly note, a request for review must be filed within 60 days from the date you get the notice of hearing decision and the Appeals Council assumes that the notice was received within 5 days after the date of the notice. That regulatory policy also provides that a,request for review will be considered filed as of the date it is received in any SSA office or other authorized place. It further provides that where the request for review is mailed the U.S. Postal Stamp cancellation or “postmark” date on the envelope in which the request is mailed to us may be used as the date of filing. In the instant case, a stamp from the Post Office on a “certificate-of mailing”-does not constitute a postmark as it does not represent the stamp cancellation on the envelope in which the request for review was mailed to us. In fact, according to the U.S. Postal Service! ], the certificate of filing is used to provide a record for the customer and since they do not verify the articles intended for mailing or the actual mailing, it does not constitute legal proof of mailing. There being no other documentation of filing prior to the facsimile dated November 4, 2005, or possibly October 5, 2005[,] no earlier date can be established in this case. [¶] The Appeals Council, therefore, finds that there is no good cause to extend the time for filing and, accordingly, dismisses the claimant’s request for review.

Ford Deck, ¶ 3(c), Exh. 4 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I

A federal court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). When, as here, subject matter jurisdiction is challenged in a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam); Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir.1997).

“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1018, 125 S.Ct. 1973, 161 L.Ed.2d 856 (2005); Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-40 n. 2 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009, 124 S.Ct. 2067, 158 L.Ed.2d 618 (2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal- jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039; Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.2004). When the motion to dismiss constitutes a “factual attack” on federal jurisdiction, “the district court is not confined to the four corners of the complaint — it may consider facts and need not assume the truthfulness of the complaint!,]” and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the Court from evaluating the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Americopters, LLC v. Federal Aviation Admin., 441 F.3d 726, 732 n. 4 (9th Cir.2006) (emphasis in origi *1005 nal); Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039.

“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Congress may prescribe the procedures and conditions under which the federal courts may review administrative orders. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 336, 78 S.Ct. 1209, 1218, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345 (1958); Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1519 (3d Cir.1992). Congress has enacted Section 405(g) of the Act, which prowdes:

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Related

City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma
357 U.S. 320 (Supreme Court, 1958)
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District
475 U.S. 534 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Sims v. Apfel
530 U.S. 103 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Sullivan v. Heckler
602 F. Supp. 85 (D. Maryland, 1985)
O'CONNELL v. Chater
958 F. Supp. 466 (C.D. California, 1996)
Burbage v. Schweiker
559 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. California, 1983)
Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment
236 F.3d 495 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer
373 F.3d 1035 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Wolfe v. Strankman
392 F.3d 358 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
463 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93444, 2006 WL 3477744, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/finch-v-barnhart-cacd-2006.