Financial Federal Credit Inc. v. Ramar Crane Services, LLC

604 F. App'x 38
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMarch 19, 2015
Docket14-1972
StatusUnpublished

This text of 604 F. App'x 38 (Financial Federal Credit Inc. v. Ramar Crane Services, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Financial Federal Credit Inc. v. Ramar Crane Services, LLC, 604 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. 2015).

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Financial Federal Credit Inc. (“FFCI”) appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, /.), granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Ramar Crane Services, LLC, Ramar Steel Sales, Inc., and Ramar Steel Erectors, Inc. (collectively, “Ra-mar”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all evidence in the manner most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Janes v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 774 F.3d 1052, 1054 (2d Cir.2014).

1. The Liebherr crane: as the district court concluded, Ramar qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course under section 1-201(9) of the New York Uniform Commercial Code. 1 Ramar purchased the Lie- *40 bherr crane, in cash, from a used crane dealer. The conditional “buy back” option (which was never exercised) and the contemplated “trade-in” of another crane (which never happened) are not enough to take this transaction out of the “ordinary course of business” under New York U.C.C. § 1-201(9). The district court correctly concluded that Ramar purchased the Liebherr crane free of any security interest from FFCI. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-320(a).

2. The Tadano crane: we agree with the district court that FFCI never obtained a perfected security interest in the Tadano, because Ramar neither completed the sale, nor delivered the crane. See N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-106(1), 2-401.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in FFCI’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

1

. This is a diversity case. The parties disagree about whether Maryland or New York law should apply, but all agree with the district court's conclusion that the relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are identical in both states. Because we agree that there is no relevant conflict between Ma *40 ryland and New York, we apply the law of the forum state: New York. See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir.2012).

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Related

Licci Ex Rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL
672 F.3d 155 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Janes v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority
774 F.3d 1052 (Second Circuit, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
604 F. App'x 38, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/financial-federal-credit-inc-v-ramar-crane-services-llc-ca2-2015.