Finalrod IP, LLC v. Endurance Lift Solutions, Inc.

District Court, E.D. Texas·Decided October 22, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00189·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION

FINALROD IP, LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Case No. 2:20-cv-00189-JRG-RSP § ENDURANCE LIFT SOLUTIONS, INC., § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM ORDER Before the Court is the Motion to Strike the Expert Report of W. Todd Schoettelkotte and to Exclude his Expert Opinions and Testimony, filed by Plaintiff Finalrod IP, LLC. Dkt. No. 87- 2. Plaintiff moves the Court to exclude or strike certain opinions of Mr. W. Todd Schoettelkotte’s damages report. See id. at 2.1 The Motion is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. I. BACKGROUND On June 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging the Defendant’s Series 300 sucker rod end fittings infringe Claims 13–15 of U.S. Pat. No. 10,385,625 (“’625 Patent” or “patent-in- suit”). See generally Dkt. No. 1. Expert discovery has closed, Plaintiff now moves2 the Court to strike certain opinions of Mr. Schoettelkotte, Defendant’s damages expert, under Daubert. See Dkt. No. 87-2 at 1–2.

1 Citations are to the document numbers and page numbers assigned through ECF. 2 On July 29, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the Motion. Dkt. No. 87-2. On August 12, 2021, the Defendant filed its response. Dkt. No. 101. The Plaintiff did not file a reply. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Daubert An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine

a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 instructs a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified

various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010). Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law) (“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under

Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). B. Motion to Strike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides, “If a party fails to provide information. . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information. . . to supply

evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” To determine whether a failure to disclose was harmless, courts in the Fifth Circuit consider a number of factors: “(1) the importance of the evidence; (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of including the evidence; (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance; and (4) the explanation for the party's failure to disclose.” Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tex. A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2003)). The determination of whether to exclude evidence is within the discretion of the district court. Id. at 563. III. ANALYSIS3 A. Mr. Schoettelkotte’s Reliance on Expert Report Mr. Schoettelkotte permissibly relied on the expert report in this case. Plaintiff’s dispute with Mr. Schoettelkotte’s report appears to be that it relies on a technical expert’s report for this

case and that Plaintiff finds this report objectionable. See Dkt. No. 87-2 at 4–5. The issues that the Plaintiff finds objectionable have been previously discussed by the Court. Dkt. Nos. 133, 134, 144. Mr. Schoettelkotte properly relied on the technical expert’s report in this case, rather than a different report in another case. See Dkt. No. 87-2 at 5 (“The Appendix to Schoettelkotte’s Present Report lists only the Present Report of Crichlow as something he considered for his own Present Report.”). B. Mr. Schoettelkotte’s Reliance on Non-Infringing Alternatives Opinions As Plaintiff points out, Mr. Schoettelkotte has taken the position that since the Series 200 end fittings are unaccused they are also non-infringing. See Dkt. No. 87-6 at 4–5 (“Q: And if it could be established that the Series 200, if it was being manufactured still today, would infringe

the '625 Patent, how would that affect your opinion? . . . A: Well, to the extent that it was determined that it was accused of infringement, then it would not be a non-infringing substitute. Other than that, it wouldn't have or bear on my analysis.”). Mr. Schoettelkotte admitted that merely accusing the Series 200 end fittings is sufficient for him to reverse his position, at least with respect to the Series 200 end fittings. In other words, Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Finalrod IP, LLC v. Endurance Lift Solutions, Inc., (E.D. Tex. 2021).

Finalrod IP, LLC v. Endurance Lift Solutions, Inc. (Finalrod IP, LLC v. Endurance Lift Solutions, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Mathis v. Exxon Corporation
302 F.3d 448 (Fifth Circuit, 2002)
United States v. Valencia
600 F.3d 389 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
526 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1999)