Fils-Aime v. Colombo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fils-Aime v. Colombo

2017 NY Slip Op 5422, 152 A.D.3d 493, 58 N.Y.S.3d 131

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 5, 2017

Docket2016-09904

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 5422 (Fils-Aime v. Colombo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fils-Aime v. Colombo, 2017 NY Slip Op 5422, 152 A.D.3d 493, 58 N.Y.S.3d 131 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

*494 In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), dated August 25, 2016, which granted the separate motions of the defendant Jasvir Singh and the defendants Sandra P. Roye and Elrac, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and the separate motions of the defendant Jasvir Singh and the defendants Sandra P. Roye and Elrac, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.

In support of their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, the defendant Jasvir Singh and the defendants Sandra P. Roye and Elrac, LLC (hereinafter collectively the defendants), failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants’ submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977 [2010]). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

Balkin, J.P., Miller, Duffy, LaSalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.

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*494 In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), dated August 25, 2016, which granted the separate motions of the defendant Jasvir Singh and the defendants Sandra P. Roye and Elrac, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and the separate motions of the defendant Jasvir Singh and the defendants Sandra P. Roye and Elrac, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.

In support of their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, the defendant Jasvir Singh and the defendants Sandra P. Roye and Elrac, LLC (hereinafter collectively the defendants), failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants’ submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977 [2010]). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

Balkin, J.P., Miller, Duffy, LaSalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 5422, 152 A.D.3d 493, 58 N.Y.S.3d 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fils-aime-v-colombo-nyappdiv-2017.

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