Fildes v. Williamson

92 F.2d 914, 25 C.C.P.A. 765, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 220
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 6, 1937
DocketNo. 3861
StatusPublished

This text of 92 F.2d 914 (Fildes v. Williamson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fildes v. Williamson, 92 F.2d 914, 25 C.C.P.A. 765, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 220 (ccpa 1937).

Opinion

LeNeoot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court :

This is an appeal in an interference proceeding from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, affirming a decision of the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority of invention of the subject matter in issue to appellee.

[766]*766The issue embraces four counts, numbered 1 to 4, inclusive, of which count 1 is illustrative; it reads as follows:

1. A shipping container of the character described having side walls, top and end walls of sheet metal, separate horizontal and vertical binding strips terminating short of the upper corners of the container and connecting its top and side walls with the end walls and corner pieces continuous with the horizontal and vertical binding strips aforesaid, connecting the top, side and end: walls of the container and completely filling in the intervals between the binding strips, the said corner pieces being integrally formed with hooks for engagement by lifting tackle.

The interference is between a patent, No. 1,868,633, issued to appellant, and an application filed by appellee. Appellant’s patent was. issued on July 26, 1932, upon an application filed January 23, 1931. Appellee’s application was filed on April 22, 1931. Inasmuch as appellee’s application was copending with appellant’s application at the time of the issue of said patent, appellant derived no advantage from such issue.

The invention involved, as set forth in appellant’s patent and in appellee’s application, relates to improvements in containers for use with railroad equipment in the transportation of merchandise. Appellant’s patent states:

This invention relates to shipping containers such as are used in making shipments in separate consignments by railroad, and which are separately removable from special cars designed to support them in transit.
Containers of the type referred to are ordinarily constructed with sheet metal top, side and end walls; and it has been the practice heretofore to connect these side walls, top and end walls by angle strips which extend continuously around their perimetric edges meeting at opposite ends of the structures.
The bending of these continuous binding strips into conformity with the upper corners of the container was extremely difficult of accomplishment in view of the sharpness of the angle and often precluded the formation of weathertight junctures.
One object of my invention is to overcome the above indicated drawbacks through use of separate horizontal and vertical strips terminating short of the upper corners of the containers, and through provision of corner pieces to connect the container walls in the intervals between the separate binding strips aforesaid.
In addition to the foregoing, I aim to embody in the corner pieces, hooks for engagement by lifting tackle incident to placement and removal of the containers with respect to the supporting cars.
Other objects and attendant advantages of this invention will be manifest from the detailed description following in connection with the attached drawing, whereof Fig. I is a view showing, in side elevation, a fragmentary portion of a shipping container embodying the present improvements.

Appellee copied, for the purpose of interference, the four claims, from appellant’s patent corresponding to the counts here in issue.

Following the declaration of interference both parties filed preliminary statements, and thereafter appellant moved to dissolve the [767]*767interference upon the ground that appellee’s application does not support the counts.

This motion was denied by tbe Primary Examiner. Thereafter testimony was taken by both parties. Inasmuch as appellant claimed that the evidence submitted was relevant to the question of appel-lee’s right to make the claims corresponding to the counts, raised upon appellant’s motion to dissolve, the Examiner of Interferences-re-examined that question and held that all of the elements of the involved counts were disclosed in appellee’s application.

Upon the merits of the case he held that appellee was the first, to conceive the invention and that he fully disclosed it to appellant.. He therefore awarded priority of invention as to each of the counts-in issue to appellee.

Upon appeal the Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the examiner, expressly holding that appellee’s application supports -the counts, and that appellant derived the invention from appellee.

Appellant has appealed to this court. Before us he does not contest the finding of the Patent Office tribunals that he derived the invention from appellee, but expressly confines his appeal to the question of whether appellee’s application discloses the subject matter of the counts in issue, and his reasons of appeal relate wholly to that subject.

Appellant’s notice of appeal reads as follows :

And Now comes Frederick K. Fildes, by Fraley & Paul, his attorneys, and gives notice to the Commissioner of Patents of his appeal to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals from the decision of the Board of Appeals rendered on or about June 23, 1936, awarding priority of invention-to Clarence H. Williamson in the above entitled case, and assigns as his reasons of appeal the following:
1. The Board of Appeals erred in holding that Williamson’s application discloses the subject matter of the counts in issue.
2. The Board of Appeals erred in holding that the “slip effect” or “slip joint” which is the essence of the invention, could be presumed to be disclosed in Williamson’s application, although not shown or described therein, because such a joint would be selected as a matter of course.
3. The Board of Appeals erred specifically in holding that a disclosure can be predicated upon pure speculation.
Notice is hereby given that the party Fildes in the presentation of this Appeal, confines the issue to the matter of disclosure of the invention in Williamson’s application; and that in preparing the record for the Court of Customs and Patent Ai>peals, the party Fildes will ask that only such of the testimony and exhibits as bear directly upon the issue of disclosure-shall be incorporated in the printed record.

Prior to the hearing of this case upon its merits, appellee moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This motion was heard by us-[768]*768at the same time that oral arguments were presented upon the merits of the case, and decision upon such motion was reserved.

It is appellee’s position that the reasons of appeal do not assign any error of the Board of Appeals in awarding priority of invention to appellee, and that in his reasons of appeal appellant deliberately excluded the issue of priority and confined the issue to the matter of disclosure of the invention in appellee’s application. Appellee also contends that the reasons of appeal are not sufficiently specific to comply with the statute, section 4911 R. S.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

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Bluebook (online)
92 F.2d 914, 25 C.C.P.A. 765, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fildes-v-williamson-ccpa-1937.