Figueroa v. Kern County

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 31, 2024
• Docket: 1:19-cv-00558
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VICENTE BENAVIDES FIGUEROA, Case No. 1:19-cv-00558-NODJ-CDB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEFENDANT DR. JAMES DIBDIN’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 13 v. THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST INSURERS 14 KERN COUNTY, et al. (Doc. 117) 15 Defendants. ORDER DIRECTING PARTIES TO MEET 16 AND CONFER AND FILE JOINT REPORT

17 21-DAY DEADLINE

18 19 Pending before the Court is Defendant Dr. James Dibdin’s (“Dibdin”) motion for leave 20 to file third-party complaint against insurers (Doc. 117), wherein Dibdin requests that the court 21 grant him leave to file a third-party complaint against United National Insurance Company 22 (“United National”), National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA. (“National 23 Union”), American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company (“AISLIC”), and 24 Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (Fireman’s Fund”) (hereinafter collectively, “Third-Party 25 Defendants” or “Insurers”) for all or part of Plaintiff Vicente Benavides Figueroa’s (“Plaintiff”) 26 claims against Dibdin. Id. at 2. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. Id. at 4. Defendants Kern 27 County, Robert Carbone, Gregg Bresson, and Ray Lopez did not file a response to Dibdin’s motion. 1 Background 2 On April 29, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this with the filing of his complaint. (Doc. 1). 3 Plaintiff filed the operative third amended complaint on September 20, 2021, in which he raises 4 the following claims: (1) false evidence violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) joint action 5 conspiracy under § 1983, (3) Brady violations under § 1983, (4) reckless investigation in 6 violation of Plaintiff’s due process right to a fair trial under § 1983, (5) Monell violations under 7 § 1983, (6) respondeat superior and vicarious liability for negligent hiring, failure to train 8 supervision, promotion, and retention under California Government Code § 815.2, (7) gross 9 negligence, and (8) Bane Civil Rights Act claim under California Civil Code § 52.1. (Doc. 66). 10 On October 4, 2021, Dibdin filed an answer to the third-party complaint along with a 11 crossclaim against Kern County. (Doc. 67). Dibdin’s counterclaim seeks statutory indemnity 12 against Kern County. Id. at 52-53. On December 20, 2023, Dibdin filed the instant motion for 13 leave to file third-party complaint against insurers. (Doc. 117). Dibdin asserts claims for 14 declaratory judgment, indemnification, and breach of contract. Id. at 18-19. 15 Legal Standard 16 Federal Rule 14 provides that “[a] defending party may as third-party plaintiff, serve a 17 summons and complaint on a [non-party] who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim 18 against. But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court’s leave if it files the third- 19 party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1) 20 The purpose of Rule 14 is to “promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the necessity 21 for the defendant to bring a separate action against a third individual who may be secondarily or 22 derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s original claim.” Sw. Adm'rs, 23 Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A] third-party claim may be 24 asserted only when the third-party’s liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the 25 main claim and the third-party’s liability is secondary or derivative.” United States v. One 1977 26 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983). “The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim 27 is that defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against 1 same transaction or set of facts as the original claim is not enough.” Stewart v. Am. Int'l Oil & 2 Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court has discretion in determining 3 whether a defendant should be granted leave to file a third-party complaint. See Sw. Adm'rs, 791 4 F.2d at 777. 5 In determining whether to permit impleader, the court must consider (1) potential 6 prejudice to the original plaintiff, (2) complication of the issues at trial, (3) likelihood of trial 7 delay, and (4) timeliness of the motion to implead. Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 8 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 9 Discussion 10 The Court has considered the factors set forth above and notes that at least one appellate 11 court has approved of Rule 14’s use in a Section 1983 lawsuit where the impleaded insurer 12 refused to defend the state employee defendants in the underlying action. See Colton v. Swain, 13 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975). The Court there considered questions of Illinois state law and 14 public policy that may or may not be relevant and/or applicable in the instant case. pursuant to 15 Rule 14. Other courts have come to different conclusions as to the propriety of impleading a 16 party’s insurer in an underlying lawsuit. Cf. Waller v. Chevron USA, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 313, 318 17 (M.D. La. 1986) (determining the merits of the impleaded insurer’s duty to defend “represents 18 precisely the type of case for which Rule 14, Fed. R. Civ. P., was invented.”) with South Macomb 19 Disposal Auth. v. Model Development, LLC, No. 11-cv-12715, 2013 WL 607840, at *8 (E.D. 20 Mich. Feb. 19, 2013) (striking third-party complaint under Rule 14 because impleading party’s 21 insurer would “interject more complication into this matter in light of the apparent difficulty the 22 parties have had thus far in efficiently engaging in the discovery process.”). 23 Before completing an analysis of the relevant factors and entering findings and 24 recommendations on Defendant’s motion – the granting of which inevitably would result in 25 prolonging an already overlength litigation, reopening discovery and likely motion practice – the 26 undersigned believes it prudent to invite the parties to confer with the relevant insurance parties to 27 determine whether a settlement conference before an unassigned magistrate judge would be 1 Accordingly, the Court shall direct the parties to confer among themselves and with the 2 || proposed Third-Party Defendants and file a joint report updating the Court on the results of their 3 || consultations. 4 | Conclusion 5 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, within 21 days of entry of 6 || this Order, the parties SHALL meet and confer jointly and with the Third-Party Defendants and 7 | file a joint report setting forth their respective positions regarding a settlement conference. 8 If all parties and the Third-Party Defendants are agreeable to a Court-convened settlement 9 | conference, the parties’ joint report shall identify at least two dates of mutual availability during 10 | the months of March and/or April to convene with an unassigned magistrate judge for settlement 11 || conference. 12 | ITIS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ January 31, 2024 | hr 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28