Figueroa v. DOR

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1885
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1885 Figueroa v DOR 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1885 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV244 Honorable David Prince, Judge

David Figueroa,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

State of Colorado Department of Revenue,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Harris and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025

David Figueroa, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Danny Rheiner, Assistant Solicitor General, Sasha G. Jasty, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, David Figueroa (Figueroa), appeals the district court’s

order affirming the one-year revocation of his driver’s license by

defendant, the Colorado Department of Revenue (the Department).

Figueroa also appeals the court’s orders denying his motions for

(1) recusal and (2) change of venue. We reject Figueroa’s

contentions and, therefore, affirm the district court’s orders.

I. Background

¶2 Late one evening in February 2024, Officer B. Baliko1 (Officer

Baliko) observed Figueroa driving and watched him swerve over the

line on the road several times. Figueroa parked his car at a

convenience store, turned off the car, and removed the key from the

ignition. Officer Baliko approached Figueroa’s car and initiated a

traffic stop. The officer requested backup patrol and Officer Jason

Craddock (Officer Craddock) arrived on scene. Both officers smelled

alcohol on Figueroa’s breath and observed that his eyes were

bloodshot.

¶3 After Officer Craddock asked Figueroa to perform voluntary

roadside maneuvers and Figueroa was uncooperative, the officer

1 We could not find any mention of Officer Baliko’s full first name in

the record on appeal.

1 explained Colorado’s express consent law to him. Figueroa did not

respond as to whether he was willing to take a blood or breath test,

and the officer took his nonresponse as a refusal. Officer Craddock

arrested Figueroa on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI).

He then served Figueroa with a copy of the summons, a notice of

revocation, and an affidavit indicating Figueroa waived express

consent to a blood draw or breath test.

¶4 Figueroa timely requested an administrative hearing before the

Department to challenge the revocation. The hearing officer found

that Officer Baliko had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop

and that Officer Craddock had probable cause to arrest Figueroa

and to request a blood draw or breath test. Because Figueroa

refused to consent to either a blood draw or breath test, the hearing

officer sustained the revocation.

¶5 Figueroa sought judicial review in the district court and

requested that the court stay the license suspension pending

appeal. The district court denied his request. Figueroa then filed

two motions to recuse the district court judge, both of which were

also denied. Figueroa filed a third motion seeking recusal and on

the same day also filed a request to change venue. The district

2 court denied both requests and, in the same order, affirmed the

hearing officer’s order suspending Figueroa’s license.

¶6 On appeal, Figueroa contends that the district court erred by

(1) affirming the suspension of his license without evidence;

(2) denying his request for recusal; and (3) denying his request for

change of venue.

II. Pro Se Pleadings

¶7 Figueroa proceeded pro se at the revocation hearing, in the

district court seeking judicial review, and on appeal. While we

liberally construe pro se pleadings, unrepresented parties have the

same obligations as parties represented by attorneys to comply with

the procedural rules. Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶8 Figueroa contends that the hearing officer did not have

sufficient evidence to revoke his driver’s license because Officer

Baliko did not have probable cause to detain him and Officer

Craddock fraudulently obtained the express consent waiver.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 As a reviewing court, we must base our decision on the

administrative record. Long v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Motor Vehicle

3 Div., 2012 COA 130, ¶ 7. We cannot reverse a hearing officer’s

determination unless “the Department acted in an arbitrary and

capricious manner, exceeded its constitutional or statutory

authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, made

clearly erroneous factual findings, or made a determination that is

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Jansma v.

Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 2023 COA 59, ¶ 15 (citing

§ 24-4-106(7)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2025).

B. Analysis

¶ 10 The hearing officer found that Officer Craddock had probable

cause to detain Figueroa because an officer had observed Figueroa

swerving while driving, and Figueroa showed signs of impairment,

admitted to drinking alcohol, and failed or was uncooperative with

the roadside maneuvers. Officer Craddock properly advised

Figueroa on the express consent law by explaining the law to

Figueroa numerous times and informing him that “his actions

constituted a refusal.”

¶ 11 The hearing officer concluded that because Figueroa failed to

respond to Officer Craddock’s requests to identify which test he was

willing to take, it was proper for Officer Craddock to construe

4 Figueroa’s actions as a refusal to consent to any testing. Therefore,

the hearing officer upheld the one-year suspension of Figueroa’s

driver’s license under section 42-2-126(3)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 12 Figueroa was provided with a certified copy of the

Department’s hearing record, which informed him of the procedure

for obtaining an appropriate transcript. In this case, however, the

district attorney representing the Department submitted a

transcript of the hearing. We note that the transcript is difficult to

decipher in parts due to unidentified speakers and confusing

sentences. Nonetheless, an inadequate transcript does not

necessarily foreclose review of an agency’s action if there is

sufficient evidence in the record. See Gilbert v. Julian, 230 P.3d

1218, 1221 (Colo. App. 2009) (despite missing documents not being

submitted by the Department, the appellate court was able to

conduct meaningful judicial review of the issue raised on appeal).

¶ 13 The record contains the complete Department agency record,

which includes Officer Craddock’s written report. It stated that

Officer Baliko initiated a traffic stop due to Figueroa failing to stay

within his lane. Officer Baliko observed that Figueroa had

bloodshot eyes and smelled of an unknown alcoholic beverage, and

5 Figueroa admitted to the officer that he had had one beer. When

Officer Craddock arrived, he also observed that Figueroa had

bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes. Officer Craddock then asked

Figueroa to perform roadside maneuvers; initially, Figueroa

conducted a few, but he became uncooperative. Officer Craddock

then explained the express consent law to Figueroa and asked him

“numerous times” if he would submit to a blood or breath test.

When Figueroa did not respond, Officer Craddock informed

Figueroa that he “was taking [Figueroa’s] actions as a refusal.”

¶ 14 The Department’s final agency order made findings consistent

with Officer Craddock’s report and noted that the officer’s report

and testimony were “credible and persuasive,” whereas Figueroa’s

“testimony was not legally persuasive.”

¶ 15 We understand that Figueroa disputes Officer Craddock’s

version of events. But credibility determinations and the resolution

of conflicting evidence are solely within the province of the hearing

officer. Long, ¶ 6. Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient

evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings of probable cause

and that the officer had obtained from Figueroa a valid express

6 consent waiver; consequently, we affirm the hearing officer’s

decision.

IV. Motions for Recusal

¶ 16 Figueroa contends that the district court erred by denying his

motions seeking recusal based on an allegation that the district

court judge and the district attorney representing the Department

were colluding.

¶ 17 We review a district court’s denial of a recusal motion for an

abuse of discretion. Adams Cnty. Hous. Auth. v. Panzlau, 2022

COA 148, ¶ 17. A court “abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on a

misapplication of the law.” Id. (quoting Black v. Black, 2020 COA

64M, ¶ 118).

¶ 18 A recusal motion must include a supporting affidavit and

allege facts sufficient to infer “that the judge is prejudiced or biased,

or appears to be prejudiced or biased, against a party or counsel to

the litigation.” Bocian v. Owners Ins. Co., 2020 COA 98, ¶ 13. A

motion and affidavit are not legally sufficient if they simply allege

conclusions without supporting facts. Id. at ¶ 15.

7 B. Analysis

¶ 19 Figueroa contends that the district court judge exhibited bias

against him because he ruled against Figueroa when denying

Figueroa’s motion to stay the revocation of his license. Figueroa

further argues that the district court judge and the district attorney

“manipulated the judicial process to bring false indictments against

[Figueroa].” The district court denied Figueroa’s three recusal

motions.

¶ 20 We agree with the district court that a party’s disagreement

with an adverse ruling does not constitute grounds to disqualify a

judge. Bocian, ¶ 23. And Figueroa’s remaining arguments as to the

district attorney and court’s manipulation of the judicial process are

conclusory; thus, we decline to address them further. Vickery v.

Evelyn V. Trumble Living Tr., 277 P.3d 864, 870 (Colo. App. 2011).

Therefore, we conclude that the district court judge did not err by

denying Figueroa’s requests that he recuse himself.

V. Motion for Change of Venue

¶ 21 Figueroa contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion for change of venue because of the alleged collusion between

8 the district court judge and the district attorney, resulting in his

due process rights being violated. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 22 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to change venue

for an abuse of discretion. Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57,

¶ 12. A court “abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or based on a misapplication of the

law.” Panzlau, ¶ 17 (quoting Black, ¶ 118).

¶ 23 The court denied the change of venue motion, construing

Figueroa’s request under C.R.C.P. 98(g), which allows for a change

of venue if one party fears he will not receive a fair trial because the

other party has undue influence in that county. The court

concluded that Figueroa’s reasons were based on his belief that the

district attorney and district court were colluding, similar to his

allegations for judicial recusal. Because Figueroa cited nothing

more than “dissatisfaction with a prior ruling,” the court concluded

that the standard for a change of venue was not met.

¶ 24 Figueroa’s motion below and his briefing on appeal contain

only conclusory assertions without providing any evidence or law to

9 support that he would not receive a fair adjudication of his judicial

review action in the county where it was filed. Because his

arguments as to purported collusion between the district court and

the district attorney are undeveloped, we decline to address them

further. Vickery, 277 P.3d at 870.

VI. Figueroa’s Remaining Arguments

¶ 25 Figueroa asserts the following additional arguments:

• The DUI enforcement strategies, attempt to take his blood,

revocation of his license, and DUI proceedings all

constituted violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution.

• The Department of Motor Vehicles fraudulently enforces

DUI proceedings.

• State legislation enables DUI offenses.

¶ 26 Based on the record before us, Figueroa did not raise any of

these arguments before the hearing officer. Therefore, these

arguments have not been preserved for our review, and we will not

consider them. Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 32

P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2001).

10 VII. Conclusion

¶ 27 We affirm the orders.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.