Figueroa v. Allinson

13 Fla. Supp. 2d 133
CourtCircuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida
DecidedSeptember 20, 1985
DocketCase No. 81-11725 CA (04)
StatusPublished

This text of 13 Fla. Supp. 2d 133 (Figueroa v. Allinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Figueroa v. Allinson, 13 Fla. Supp. 2d 133 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1985).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

JAMES C. HENDERSON, Circuit Judge.

This matter came before the Court on the Motion of American Medical International, Inc. (“AMI”) and Parkway Regional Medical Center, Inc. (“Parkway”) (collectively, the “Movants”) for a Protective Order in connection with a Subpoena Duces Tecum served by Dr. Peter Allinson upon AMI and Parkway who are not parties to this action. Pursuant to this subpoena duces tecum, certain documents have [134]*134been furnished to Dr. Allinson and the balance of the documents called for by the subpoena which Movants claim are privileged have been filed under seal with the Court for an in camera inspection. After consideration of the Motion, argument of counsel at a September 4, 1985 hearing on the Motion, and the memoranda filed by counsel, and after an inspection in camera of the documents at issue, It is

ORDERED:

1. The Court finds that each of the documents submitted by Movants under seal for an in camera inspection by the Court is privileged under one or more of the following privileges:

(a) Section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes, which protects medical review committee materials against both discovery and introduction into evidence.
(b) Section 395.017(3), Florida Statutes, which protects patient records against disclosure without the consent of or notice to the patient.
(c) Section 90.502(2), Florida Statutes, which prohibits disclosure of attorney/client privileged communications; and
(d) rida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(2), which prohibits disclosure of attorney work product without a showing of unusual circumstances which has not been made in this case.

2. Appendix 1, submitted in camera to the Court on September 4, 1985, together with the documents contained in the Movants’ Supplemental In Camera Submission, consists entirely of documents privileged from both discovery and introduction into evidence by Section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part:

“The proceedings and records of committees . . . shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee . . .”

These documents relate to the proceedings of “committees” as such term is used in Section 768.40(1), Florida Statutes:

“committee(s) ... of a medical staff of a licensed hospital . . . which committee is formed to evaluate and improve the quality of health care rendered by providers of professional health services or to determine that health services rendered were professionally indicated or were performed in compliance with the applicable standard of care . . .”

[135]*135There are two major appellate decisions construing this privilege, one of which involves Parkway and Dr. Peter Allinson who seeks here again the same type of records he was denied in Parkway General Hospital, Inc. v. Allinson, 453 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). In that case the Third District Court of Appeal quashed an Order granting discovery to Dr. Allinson of:

“the minutes of the medical staff review committee meetings at which (plaintiff Allinson’s) continuation as a member of the medical staff at Parkway General was discussed and voted upon.”

In Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court held that the following materials were privileged under this statute:

(i) the records of a hospital credentials committee;
(ii) the testimony of witnesses before the committee which denied plaintiff of staff privileges.

The purpose of the statute and its dual bar against discovery and introduction into evidence of medical review committee minutes and records is to promote physician candor and self-regulation, as the Florida Supreme Court explained in Holly v. Auld, supra at 450 So.2d 220:

“A doctor questioned by a review committee would reasonably be just as reluctant to make statements, however truthful or justifiable, which might form the basis for a defamation action against him. . .”

3. Appendix 2 of the in camera submission consists of documents which are privileged under Section 395.017(3), Florida Statutes, as patient records:

“(3) Patient records shall have a privileged and confidential status and shall not be disclosed without the consent of the person to whom they pertain but appropriate disclosure may be made without such consent . . .:
(d) In any civil or criminal action, unless otherwise prohibited by law, upon the issuance of a subpoena from a court of competent jurisdiction and proper notice by the party seeking such records to the patient or his legal representative.”

Allinson admits he has not complied with the prerequisites imposed by this statute. Therefore, any disclosure of the Appendix 2 documents would be contrary to law, North Miami General Hospital v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., 397 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981).

[136]*1364. Appendices 3(i) and 3(ii) of the in camera submission consist of material covered by the attorney/client privilege (Section 90.502(2), Florida Statutes) and the attorney work-product privilege (Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(2)). These appendices comprise:

(i) Risk management incident reports in which Allinson is named; and,
(ii) The “Peter Allinson File”.

The risk management reports in Appendix 3(i) are explicitly designated as “Report(s) of Incident” which are “prepared at the request of and for the use of the hospital’s attorney.” In Associated Medical Institution, Inc. v. Trube, 394 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), the Third District Court of Appeal granted a writ of common law certiorari and quashed a trial court order requiring disclosure of incident reports because under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.280(b)(2):

“A party cannot be compelled to produce materials which are the work product of his attorney and which relate to the subject matter of the suit without a showing of unusual circumstances.”

Cf. numerous other Florida appellate decisions holding that incident reports prepared for use by counsel are attorney work-product, e.g.: Dade County v. Monroe, 237 So.2d 598,600 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1970) (police department incident reports); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Limeburner, 390 So.2d 133, 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (utility accident reports); Alachua General Hospital v. Zimmer USA, Inc., 403 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (hospital investigation report); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So.2d 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (grocery store accident reports). As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So.2d 108, 113 (Fla. 1970):

“A party may not be required to set out the contents of statements, absent rare and exceptional circumstances, or to divulge his or his attorney’s evaluation of the substance of statements taken in preparation for trial.”

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Related

In Re Murphy
560 F.2d 326 (Eighth Circuit, 1977)
Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette
236 So. 2d 108 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1970)
Reynolds v. Hofmann
305 So. 2d 294 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1974)
Goldstein v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company
118 So. 2d 253 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1960)
Schetter v. Schetter
239 So. 2d 51 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1970)
PARKWAY GENERAL HOSP., INC. v. Allinson
453 So. 2d 123 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1984)
Alachua General Hosp., Inc. v. Zimmer USA, Inc.
403 So. 2d 1087 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)
Dees v. Scott
347 So. 2d 475 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1977)
Associated Medical Inst., Inc. v. Trube
394 So. 2d 563 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis
435 So. 2d 307 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1983)
No. Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Royal Palm Beach Colony
397 So. 2d 1033 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)
Holly v. Auld
450 So. 2d 217 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1984)
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Limeburner
390 So. 2d 133 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1980)
City of Lake Worth v. First Nat. Bank in Palm Beach
93 So. 2d 49 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1957)
City of Anna Maria v. Miller
91 So. 2d 333 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1956)
Dade County v. Monroe
237 So. 2d 598 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1970)

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Bluebook (online)
13 Fla. Supp. 2d 133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/figueroa-v-allinson-flacirct-1985.