Fields v. Talawanda Board of Educ., Ca2008-02-035 (2-2-2009)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 2, 2009
DocketNo. CA2008-02-035.
StatusPublished

This text of Fields v. Talawanda Board of Educ., Ca2008-02-035 (2-2-2009) (Fields v. Talawanda Board of Educ., Ca2008-02-035 (2-2-2009)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fields v. Talawanda Board of Educ., Ca2008-02-035 (2-2-2009), (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Angel Fields ("Angel"), and her mother and step-father, Tracy and Greg Davis, appeal a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees, Talawanda School District Board of Education, Talawanda School District, and Talawanda High School.

{¶ 2} On January 8, 2003, Angel was a student at the Talawanda High School. That *Page 2 day, Angel sustained multiple amputations to the fingers and a portion of her right hand while operating a jointer machine during an industrial arts class taught by appellees' employee, Anthony Limberios. A jointer machine is used and is equipped with a safety guard which covers the blade when not in use. When surfacing a board on a jointer machine, an operator uses a push block to push the board through so that one's hands are not exposed to the blade. As the board is pushed through, it pushes against the guard which swings out. Once the board has gone through, the guard swings back and covers the blade. On the day she was injured, Angel was using a push block which had been handmade at the school, had a knob on the front and a handle on the back, and had a lip (a.k.a. a fixed heel or rear step) at the rear.

{¶ 3} According to Angel, she was pushing the board across the blade, using the push block. Her left hand was on the knob, her right hand was on the back handle. As soon as the board cleared the blade, there was a release of resistance as Angel was no longer pushing against the blade. This caused a jerk which caught her off guard. "[W]hen it did, I guess the [back] handle was loose, I guess I must have jumped, and my [right] hand just relaxed. My shoulder probably relaxed * * *, and my hand went into the blades that were exposed." When her right hand came off the push block, the end of the push block was about three inches past the blade. Her left hand never came off the knob. After the board went through the blade, the guard started to swing back and hit the side of the push block which was either flush with or slightly wider than the board.

{¶ 4} Angel and the Davises filed a complaint against appellees alleging that Angel's injuries were caused by the negligent and reckless acts of appellees' employees and the physical defects within or on the grounds of the buildings. Specifically, appellants asserted that the push block Angel was instructed to use was a handmade device made in the school, even though the school had several manufactured push blocks; was not designed to work *Page 3 with the guard of the jointer machine; did not meet or comply with the manufacturer's safety instructions; did not comply with appellees' own rules regarding classroom use of equipment; and violated Ohio's Occupational Safety and Health Rules ("OSHA rules"). Appellees moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under R.C. Chapter 2744.

{¶ 5} On January 10, 2008, the trial court granted summary judgment to appellees on the ground they were immune from liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). The trial court found that there was "no evidence to show that Limberios' instructions, tests, and teaching methods were performed in a wanton or reckless manner. Further, the evidence presented on Limberios' decision to utilize the hand-made push block as opposed to the manufactured one, despite its differences in size, shape, and design, does not rise to the level of wanton or reckless."

{¶ 6} Appellants appeal, raising one assignment of error:

{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN GRANTING IMMUNITY TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES."

{¶ 8} Appellants argue that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Limberios acted recklessly. They further argue that the use of equipment by a political subdivision employee cannot be a discretionary matter when the equipment does not comply with applicable safety standards.

{¶ 9} This court reviews a trial court's decision on summary judgment de novo. White v. DePuy, Inc. (1999), 129 Ohio App.3d 472, 478. In applying the de novo standard, we review the trial court's decision independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Id. at 479. A court may grant summary judgment only when: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence submitted that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to *Page 4 have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Civ. R. 56(C);Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346,1993-Ohio-191.

{¶ 10} The process of determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability involves a three-tiered analysis. Elston v.Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, ¶ 10. The first tier provides a general grant of immunity to political subdivisions regarding acts or omissions of the political subdivision or its employees in connection with a governmental or proprietary function. R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). In this case, it is undisputed that appellees are political subdivisions as defined in R.C. 2744.01(F), engaged in a governmental function as defined in R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(c).

{¶ 11} The second tier involves exceptions to immunity located in R.C. 2744.02(B). In particular, R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) provides that "political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function[.]" The exception in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applies here. See Banchich v. Port Clinton Pub. SchoolDist. (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 376; Bolling v. N. Olmsted City Schools Bd.of Edn., Cuyahoga App. No. 90669, 2008-Ohio-5347 (both involving injuries resulting from the operation of a jointer machine).

{¶ 12} Finally, under the third tier, immunity may be reinstated if a political subdivision can successfully assert one of the defenses listed in R.C. 2744.03. This case concerns the application of the defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Under R.C. 2744.03

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Related

White v. Depuy, Inc.
718 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1998)
Bolling v. N. Olmsted City Schools Bd. of Edn., 90669 (10-16-2008)
2008 Ohio 5347 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2008)
Banchich v. Port Clinton Public School District
581 N.E.2d 1103 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1989)
Barnes v. Meijer Dept. Store, Unpublished Decision (4-5-2004)
2004 Ohio 1716 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2004)
Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies
67 Ohio St. 3d 344 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1993)
Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Department
639 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
Elston v. Howland Local Schools
865 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2007)
O'Toole v. Denihan
889 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2008)
Fabrey v. McDonald Police Dept.
1994 Ohio 368 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
Fields v. Talawanda Board of Educ., Ca2008-02-035 (2-2-2009), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fields-v-talawanda-board-of-educ-ca2008-02-035-2-2-2009-ohioctapp-2009.