OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder as defined by V.T.C.A. Penal [716]*716Code, See. 19.03(a)(3). After finding the appellant guilty, the jury answered “yes” to the first two special issues submitted under Art. 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. Punishment was assessed at death.
The appellant was convicted of murdering Linda Brown, the estranged wife of Officer James Brown of the Wichita Falls Police Department, on April 18, 1975. The deceased died of a single gunshot wound. The proof showed that Officer Brown had hired the appellant to commit the murder for $400. The appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
The appellant was arrested on January 10, 1976. On May 10, 1976, jury selection began. On May 11, 1976, after three jurors had been selected, the trial court declared a mistrial over the appellant’s objection.
On June 21, 1976, jury selection for the appellant’s second trial began. This time a jury was successfully chosen. However, during the State’s case-in-chief, one of the prosecutor’s questions elicited testimony referring to an inadmissible oral statement made by the appellant. At that point, the appellant’s counsel objected and asked the trial court to declare a mistrial. The court granted the request.
On January 18, 1977, a third trial began. This trial proceeded to a normal conclusion, and on January 21,1977, the jury found the appellant guilty as charged. At the punishment stage of this trial the State’s only evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Leon Morris, a psychologist, and Dr. Jack Tomlison, a psychiatrist.
Outside the presence of the jury Dr. Morris was questioned about any warnings he may have given the appellant concerning the psychological examination he was to do:
“Q Prior to the time that you did this evaluation, Mr. (sic) Morris, did you advise the Defendant that he didn’t have to talk to you?
“A Did I advise him that he did not have to talk to me?
“Q Yes.
“A Yes. The first time that I saw him was April the 15th, 1976. I talked with him briefly. I did not examine him at that time. I left some paper tests for him to complete.
“Q Did you at any time tell him that he didn’t have to talk with you, didn’t have to discuss this with you?
“A I don’t remember. I left the tests with him and the next day I went back, and he had not done them. He left me a note stating that — well, if you would like I can read it to you. It says, T don’t mind doing the tests, but since I have been arrested I have been lied to many times. Therefore, I do not trust anything they come up with for me to do. I will have to talk to my lawyer about this first. I’m sorry. Mark Fields.’ So, the testing was postponed. At this time, he had not done any of the tests.
“Q That was what date?
“A The day I picked the note up was April 16th, 1976, but before that, the day before that, April 15th, the day I left the tests I talked with Mr. John Martin of the district attorney’s office, and I talked to Mr. Bailey, the Defendant’s attorney, and I told both of them that I had been requested to do this examination, and I told them that if they had any information that might be relevant to this examination, I would be happy to consider it, so I did talk with the Defense attorney before doing any tests.
“Q Did you tell Mr. Fields at any time that he did not have to participate in the tests?
“A I believe I did. I don’t know whether I told him that the first day or not, but I told him that later, if not the first time.
* * * * * *
“Q Can you tell the Court whether or not you did at any time tell him, Mark Douglas Fields, that the result of any evaluations you might make of him could be used in evidence against him?
[717]*717“A I don’t remember for sure whether I did or not.
“Q You cannot say that you did?
“A I cannot say that I did. I do remember discussing it with his attorney at the time.
“Q Was he present?
“A No.
* * * * * *
“Q And this examination and evaluation that you made of Mark Douglas Fields was done at the direction of the Court, is that correct?
“A Yes, sir, Judge Kirk.
“Q Did Mr. Fields ever request that you come and talk with him?
“A No, he did not.”
Upon the conclusion of this testimony, the appellant’s attorney objected to allowing Dr. Morris to further testify. The basis of the objection was that the appellant had not been warned that he did not have to talk to Dr. Morris or participate in the tests, and that he had not been warned that the results of the tests could be used as evidence against him. The trial court overruled the objection.
When the jury was returned, Dr. Morris was then asked about the results of his tests:
“Q Do you have a diagnostic impression of this Defendant?
“A Yes, certainly, I do. His diagnosis was anti-social personality disorder.
“Q Generally, can you tell us in lay terms.what the anti-social personality disorder means?
“A Generally speaking, it refers to a criminal kind of orientation. This individual has a very weak conscience or no conscience, and has poor impulse control, has inadequate regard for other people and his feelings are very shallow.
“MR. RICHIE: Your Honor, this is repetitious. He told us that once.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“A (Continuing) The person has little regard for society’s rights and standards, he is very likely to encounter difficulty with rules and laws and very likely to be in trouble over and over and over.
* * * * * *
“Q Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether or not this Defendant is likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future that will constitute a continuing threat to society?
“A I would say he is very likely to.”
After Dr. Morris testified, Dr. Tomlison was questioned outside the presence of the jury:
“Q Dr. Tomlison, did you, under the directions of the Court, see Mark Douglas Fields, the Defendant in this ease?
“A Yes, I did.
“Q Do you recall when you first saw him?
“A I saw him on June the 10th, 1976.
“Q How many times thereafter?
“A Just the one time.
“Q All right, sir, did you, prior to the time — he was in the Wichita County jail at that time?
“A He was in the Wichita County jail.
“Q Prior to the time that you talked with him, did you advise him that he did not have to talk with you?
“A No.
“Q Did you advise him that the results of your examination could be used in evidence against him if he were tried for any offense?
“A Not that I remember.
The appellant’s attorney then made the same objection to Dr. Tomlison’s testimony as he had made to that of Dr. Morris. It, too, was overruled.
Before the jury, Dr. Tomlison testified that, based upon his examination, he believed that the appellant had an “anti-social personality” pattern. After describing this personality pattern, the witness was asked:
“Q Would an individual such as you have just described be likely to con[718]*718tinue to come into contact with society illegally, in other words, they would have problem with organized society?
* * * * * *
“A The question was, as I understand it, in my opinion would he continue to come into conflict with the law?
“Q Yes.
“A Yes, he would.”
At the time of the examinations by Drs. Morris and Tomlison, the appellant was in custody. He had been indicted and was represented by an attorney. The appellant never raised the issues of his competence to stand trial or his sanity at the time of the offense. Although the record contains no written order by the trial court, both doctors testified that their examinations were at the direction of the court. Dr. Morris further testified that he had been instructed to determine whether the appellant was competent to stand trial.
The record fails to reflect that the appellant was advised before the examinations that he had a right to remain silent and that any statement he made could be used against him at the punishment phase of his trial.
We hold that the admission of the testimony of Drs. Morris and Tomlison violated the appellant’s right against self-incrimination as guarantied by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Texas Constitution. The erroneous admission of this testimony requires a reversal of the appellant’s conviction. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Clark v. State, 627 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
In nine grounds of error, the appellant also contends that there was error in the guilt-innocence stage of his trial. We find it necessary to address only five of those grounds.
In two grounds of error, the appellant contends that his confession is inadmissible because his arrest was based on less than probable cause. These grounds of error attack the sufficiency of the affidavit filed in support of the request for an arrest warrant. Although the appellant raised this contention before trial and presented evidence at a pre-trial hearing, he failed to introduce into evidence either the arrest warrant or the affidavit. Our search of the record in this case did not reveal either document. The appellant did not request that either document be included in the appellate record. For these reasons, nothing is presented for review.
In one ground of error, the appellant contends that his confession is inadmissible because it was induced by promises. The only evidence of any promise was the testimony of the appellant’s wife that the district attorney told her that the appellant did not need an attorney because he would be given immunity from prosecution if he testified against his co-defendants. Even if we concluded that such a promise would have rendered the appellant’s confession inadmissible, there was no testimony that this promise, if any, was made to the defendant. The trial court’s finding that the appellant’s confession was not induced by any promises is supported by the record. The ground of error is overruled.
In two grounds of error, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue. On June 15, 1976, before the jury was chosen for the appellant’s second trial, the appellant filed a motion for change of venue. The motion was properly supported by affidavits of two residents of Wichita County as required by V.A.C.C.P., Art. 31.03. The next day the appellant filed another pre-trial motion. One paragraph of that motion asked that his venue motion be carried along with the voir dire of the jury. On June 23, 1976, after the jury had been chosen, but before the trial began, the trial court overruled the motion for change of venue. At no time did the State file controverting affidavits under V.A.C.C.P., Art. 31.04. Although the record in this case is confused, it does not appear that the trial [719]*719court ever held a hearing on the venue motion.
As noted earlier, the appellant’s second trial ended with the declaration of a mistrial. On November 9, 1976, before the appellant’s third trial began, he once again filed a properly supported motion for change of venue. The record does not reflect that this motion was controverted by the State, nor does it reflect that the trial court held a hearing on this motion or specifically ruled upon it. However, the record does include an order by the trial court that “all the prior Motions asserted in the prior trials of this cause be herein incorporated by reference and the rulings thereon remain the same for purposes of this the third trial of this cause.”
As we view the case then, this order by the trial court before the appellant’s third trial had the effect of reaffirming the court’s previous ruling which overruled the appellant’s motion for change of venue without a hearing to take evidence and without controverting affidavits by the State. This was reversible error.
It has long been the rule in this state that a defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law when a properly supported motion is not contested by the State in the form of either controverting affidavits or by evidence presented at a hearing on the motion. McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Hussey v. State, 590 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Stapleton v. State, 565 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Durrough v. State, 562 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
The State argues that the appellant waived his right to pursue this ground of error because he asked the trial court to carry the venue motion along with the voir dire of the jury. This argument misconceives the appellant’s contention. The appellant does not complain on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling on his motion after the jury was chosen, but before the trial began. Rather, he contends that as a matter of law his motion should have been granted because the State never controverted the motion. Thus, the issue before us is not the timeliness of the trial court’s ruling, but the merits of the ruling.
Although the appellant’s motion asking the trial court to carry the venue motion along with the voir dire of the jury may have been a waiver of his right to have the motion granted before selection of the jury, a question not before us in this appeal, it was not a waiver of his right to have the motion granted absent controverting evidence by the State. Furthermore, the selection of an unbiased jury is insufficient to satisfy the State’s burden to join issue with a motion for change of venue. See O’Brient v. State, 588 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Henley v. State, 576 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). As we stated in Henley,
“Appellant was entitled to a change of venue if he could show, even though it would be possible to select a jury whose members were not subject to a challenge for cause, that there were influences in the community which could affect the answers on voir dire, or the testimony of witnesses at trial or that for any other reason a fair and impartial trial could not be had.. .. ”
576 S.W.2d at 72.
The appellant’s motion for change of venue properly put in issue the possible prejudice existing in Wichita County which could prevent him from obtaining a fair and impartial trial. The lack of any controverting evidence by the State entitled the appellant to a change of venue as a matter of law. For this reason, the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion.
As stated above, the appellant presents four other grounds of error which raise contentions dealing with the guilt-innocence stage of his trial. Because these grounds of error attack matters which are not likely to recur in the event of a new trial, we do not address these grounds.
Having determined that this conviction must be reversed, we must next determine whether the State may retry the appellant if it chooses. In three grounds of error, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his plea of former jeopardy, [720]*720and in not submitting that plea to the jury. If we agreed with the appellant a retrial, of course, would be barred. However, we do not agree with the appellant’s contentions.
First, the appellant argues that his first trial was improperly terminated, and that, therefore, both his second and third trials were barred. See Art. 1.10; Art. 27.05, V.A.C.C.P. The flaw in this argument is that when his first trial ended he had not yet been placed in jeopardy.
In McElwee v. State, 589 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we held that in a criminal prosecution, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). At the time the trial court declared a mistrial during the appellant’s first proceeding, only three potential jurors had been chosen and none of these had been sworn in as a juror. No jeopardy had yet attached.
In support of this contention the appellant cites United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); United States v. Kin Ping Cheung, 485 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1973); and McLelland v. State, 420 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). We find none of these cases to be on point. In each a mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent, but in each the trial was ended during the presentation of evidence. In none of these cases was the trial ended before the jury was impaneled.
Second, the appellant argues that the mistrial declared during his second trial should have barred his third trial. In his second trial a number of witnesses had testified for the State. The State then called Sgt. James Shelton of the Wichita Falls Police Department. During redirect examination the following occurred:
“Q Sgt. Shelton, in response to Mr. Bailey’s question about being at 2602 Hairpin, have you ever been out there other than the night—than the time you went out to arrest James Brown?
“A On the premises?
“Q Uh huh.
“A No, sir, not on the premises. We had driven by it.
“Q Had you been in the area?
“A Yes, sir, we had been in the area.
“Q Who were you with at that time?
“A I don’t remember exactly; Mr. Fields was in the car with us.
“Q Why were you all out there?
“A In reference to his statement that he had given. We were trying to verify some information concerning where he had stood at the time the murder had been committed.
“MR. ESTRADA: Your Honor—
“THE COURT: Sustain the objection. The jury is instructed not to consider the question or the answer.
“MR. ESTRADA: We move for a mistrial, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Let me think about that. You all go inside the jury room a minute.”
The court then granted the mistrial. He explained to the jury that the statement to which Sgt. Shelton referred was an inadmissible oral statement and that the law was “very explicit.”
Where the circumstances which cause a mistrial are not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to be no bar to reprosecution. This is so even when the motion is required by prosecutorial or judicial error. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); Chvojka v. State, 582 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
However, the Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant from bad faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor which is intended to provoke a mistrial request. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963).
The appellant seeks to characterize the questioning of Sgt. Shelton, set out [721]*721above, as prosecutorial overreaching. We find no evidence to support such a characterization. It was error for the prosecutor to elicit testimony which revealed the existence of the appellant’s oral statement, but more than error is required to show overreaching. The appellant has demonstrated neither intentional misconduct nor gross negligence on the part of the prosecutor. We, therefore, do not find that the prosecutor’s questioning was intended to provoke a mistrial request.
For these reasons, we hold that the appellant’s plea of former jeopardy was properly overruled by the trial court as a matter of law. It follows, then, that the court did not err in refusing to submit the issue to the jury. No fact issues were presented for the jury’s resolution.
The appellant makes another contention which we must answer. He contends that his right to a speedy trial as guarantied by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when his third trial was held some seven months after the second mistrial was declared, and just over one year after his arrest.1
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the Constitution does not require the State to try a defendant within a specific time period. Rather, the determination of whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been denied depends upon a balancing of four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
In this case, the appellant was arrested on January 10, 1976. He was indicted on January 30, and had counsel appointed to represent him on February 2. After a change of counsel on February 9, several pre-trial motions were filed beginning March 5. These motions were heard and ruled upon April 22. The appellant’s first trial then began on May 10,1976. As previously stated, this trial ended during the jury voir dire on May 11.
Prior to his second trial, the appellant’s counsel filed several new motions beginning May 14. These motions were heard and ruled upon just before the second trial began on June 24, 1976. After this trial also ended in a mistrial, counsel for the appellant again filed several new pre-trial motions. On September 20, 1976, co-counsel Dale Bailey, who had represented the appellant since February 9, asked for, and was granted, permission to withdraw as counsel. Remaining co-counsel filed several new motions in November, 1976. These motions were ruled upon on November 12.
Finally, on January 18, 1977, the appellant’s third trial began. Not until the day before this trial, on January 17, did the appellant file his motion requesting dismissal of the case for failure to provide him a speedy trial.
Under the circumstances of the case we find no denial of the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Although this case was not tried until just over a year after the appellant was arrested, the record reflects that it was at all times an active ease. There were numerous pre-trial motions filed before each of the three trials. These were timely ruled upon. In addition, the appellant had several changes of counsel during this one-year period.2
We, therefore, do not find either the total period of time between the appellant’s arrest and his third trial, or the period of time between his second and third trials, to be excessive in view of the reasons for the delay. We note that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until the day before his third trial. In addition, we note that the appellant has not alleged that he was prejudiced by the delay.
[722]*722For these reasons we hold that the appellant has not been denied his right to a speedy trial as guarantied by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Because the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion for change of venue, and erred in admitting the testimony of Drs. Morris and Tomlison at the punishment stage of the appellant’s trial, we reverse this judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.