Fields v. Equitable Life Assurance

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Fields v. Equitable Life Assurance

141 S.E. 743, 195 N.C. 262, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 59

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMarch 7, 1928

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 141 S.E. 743 (Fields v. Equitable Life Assurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fields v. Equitable Life Assurance, 141 S.E. 743, 195 N.C. 262, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 59 (N.C. 1928).

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Opinion

BeogdeN, J.

The record discloses that the sole question at issue between the parties was whether or not the plaintiff was permanently disabled within the purview of the terms of the policy, on 9 May, 1923, and thereafter at the time of instituting this action.

The plaintiff contended and insisted that the proof of disability submitted by his attending physician to the effect that he was not permanently disabled was not a correct statement of the true facts for the reason that since his first attack in 1922, he had been wholly and permanently disabled thereafter. Furthermore, a-t the trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that he was permanently disabled, and his physician who furnished the proof of disability on 25 April, 1923, testified that when he used the expression, “not permanently disabled” that he meant that the plaintiff was not confined to his bed. The proof of permanent disability furnished by plaintiff on 25 April, 1923, and his testimony and that of his physician at the trial were conflicting. In such cases the rule of law is thus stated in Hill v. Ins. Co., 150 N. C., p. 1: “The proofs of loss, though not conclusive and irrebuttable by plaintiff, are prima facie true as against him. Ins. Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall., Vol. 89, p. 32; Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S., 232. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show that a statement made in the proofs of loss *264 was erroneous in fact. Tbe plaintiff, having filed them, has vouched for their truth. He must show mistake.”

In the Rodell case, supra, the policy contained a clause that if the insured should “die by his own hand” the policy would be void. It was conceded that the insured died 5 December, 1813, from the effects of poison administered by his own hand. The beneficiary, however, contended that the insured was insane at the time of taking the poison and denied that he committed suicide within the meaning and intent of the policy. The company contended that the proof of loss itself contained evidence avoiding liability. Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, said: “If the proofs also disclosed facts of which the defendant could avail itself as a defense to an action on the policy, this would not derogate from the sufficiency of the proofs as proofs of death. But while the disclosure of such facts might well suggest to the company the propriety of refusing payment and standing suit, it would be no bar to the bringing of a suit; otherwise, no suit could ever be brought until the parties had gone through an extra-judicial investigation resulting favorably to the assured.”

Applying these principles to the facts disclosed in the record, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the question of permanent disability was a question for the jury, and therefore the judgment of nonsuit is

Reversed.

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BeogdeN, J.

The record discloses that the sole question at issue between the parties was whether or not the plaintiff was permanently disabled within the purview of the terms of the policy, on 9 May, 1923, and thereafter at the time of instituting this action.

The plaintiff contended and insisted that the proof of disability submitted by his attending physician to the effect that he was not permanently disabled was not a correct statement of the true facts for the reason that since his first attack in 1922, he had been wholly and permanently disabled thereafter. Furthermore, a-t the trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that he was permanently disabled, and his physician who furnished the proof of disability on 25 April, 1923, testified that when he used the expression, “not permanently disabled” that he meant that the plaintiff was not confined to his bed. The proof of permanent disability furnished by plaintiff on 25 April, 1923, and his testimony and that of his physician at the trial were conflicting. In such cases the rule of law is thus stated in Hill v. Ins. Co., 150 N. C., p. 1: “The proofs of loss, though not conclusive and irrebuttable by plaintiff, are prima facie true as against him. Ins. Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall., Vol. 89, p. 32; Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S., 232. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show that a statement made in the proofs of loss *264 was erroneous in fact. Tbe plaintiff, having filed them, has vouched for their truth. He must show mistake.”

In the Rodell case, supra, the policy contained a clause that if the insured should “die by his own hand” the policy would be void. It was conceded that the insured died 5 December, 1813, from the effects of poison administered by his own hand. The beneficiary, however, contended that the insured was insane at the time of taking the poison and denied that he committed suicide within the meaning and intent of the policy. The company contended that the proof of loss itself contained evidence avoiding liability. Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, said: “If the proofs also disclosed facts of which the defendant could avail itself as a defense to an action on the policy, this would not derogate from the sufficiency of the proofs as proofs of death. But while the disclosure of such facts might well suggest to the company the propriety of refusing payment and standing suit, it would be no bar to the bringing of a suit; otherwise, no suit could ever be brought until the parties had gone through an extra-judicial investigation resulting favorably to the assured.”

Applying these principles to the facts disclosed in the record, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the question of permanent disability was a question for the jury, and therefore the judgment of nonsuit is

Reversed.

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141 S.E. 743, 195 N.C. 262, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fields-v-equitable-life-assurance-nc-1928.

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