Fields-Davis v. G & F Associates

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fields-Davis v. G & F Associates

1 A.D.2d 475, 767 N.Y.S.2d 229

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 17, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 1 A.D.2d 475 (Fields-Davis v. G & F Associates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fields-Davis v. G & F Associates, 1 A.D.2d 475, 767 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Hudson Management appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Milano, J.), dated June 21, 2002, as, upon renewal, denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion, upon renewal, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “A special employee is described as one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another” (Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp. 78 NY2d 553, 557). While there are many factors to consider in determining whether a special employment relationship exists, the key factor is the right to direct the work and exercise control over the employee (cf. Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., supra; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 AD2d 419, 420 [1987]). The appellant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the injured plaintiffs employer controlled the alleged special employee. In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to such control.

In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Altman, J.P., Smith, Friedmann and Crane, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Hudson Management appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Milano, J.), dated June 21, 2002, as, upon renewal, denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion, upon renewal, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “A special employee is described as one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another” (Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp. 78 NY2d 553, 557). While there are many factors to consider in determining whether a special employment relationship exists, the key factor is the right to direct the work and exercise control over the employee (cf. Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., supra; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 AD2d 419, 420 [1987]). The appellant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the injured plaintiffs employer controlled the alleged special employee. In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to such control.

In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Altman, J.P., Smith, Friedmann and Crane, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

1 A.D.2d 475, 767 N.Y.S.2d 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fields-davis-v-g-f-associates-nyappdiv-2003.

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