STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1275
Fidel Pizarro-Rios, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed June 2, 2025 Reversed and remanded Ede, Judge
Carver County District Court File No. 10-CR-14-228
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Angella Erickson, Assistant County Attorney, Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
SYLLABUS
State v. Franson, 921 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27,
2019), which held that a district court had jurisdiction to reimpose a mandatory conditional-
release term because the conditional-release term was authorized when it was imposed and
the defendant did not have a crystallized expectation of finality in a sentence that did not
include a conditional-release term, is inapposite to cases that do not involve resentencing proceedings for determination of a defendant’s predatory-offender risk level based on the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 2015).
OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to correct his sentence,
appellant argues that, because the sentence had expired, the district court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction to reimpose a mandatory ten-year conditional-release term that
the court had previously vacated. 1 Appellant also maintains that our opinion in State v.
Franson, 921 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019)—on
which the district court relied in rejecting appellant’s jurisdictional argument—was
wrongly decided and should be overturned. Because we conclude that Franson is
distinguishable and that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify
appellant’s sentence by reimposing a conditional-release term after the sentence had
expired, we reverse the district court’s order denying appellant’s motion to correct his
1 In his initial brief, appellant asserted that the district court abused its discretion by reimposing the conditional-release term because the court did not commit him to prison upon resentencing him to a stayed sentence. Appellant also contended that the district court did not have the authority to execute his sentence without first holding a trial per Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 296 (2004). Given that a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction “is a threshold question” that appellate courts may raise sua sponte, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing whether the district court had jurisdiction to reimpose the conditional-release term. Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. 2022); see also Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 2010) (“Because a subject-matter-jurisdiction claim involves a court’s power to hear a case, the claim can never be forfeited or waived.” (quotation omitted)). In light of our conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reimpose the conditional-release term after appellant’s sentence expired, we do not reach the merits of appellant’s initial arguments. 2 sentence and remand for the court to vacate the amended sentencing order that reimposed
the ten-year conditional-release term.
FACTS
In a juvenile-delinquency proceeding, respondent State of Minnesota charged
appellant Fidel Pizarro-Rios with criminal sexual conduct and moved to certify him for
adult prosecution. The parties later reached an agreement to resolve the case.
In early March 2014, Pizarro-Rios waived his right to a certification hearing and
agreed to be tried as an adult. The state filed an adult criminal complaint that charged
Pizarro-Rios with third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.344, subdivision 1(b) (2012). The complaint alleged that, between November
and December 2012, Pizarro-Rios engaged in sexual intercourse “with a person who was
at least 13 but less than 16 years of age” and that he was “more than 24 months older than
the complainant.” 2 Because Pizarro-Rios was “no more than 48 months but more than 24
months older than the complainant” at the time of the offense, the statutory maximum
sentence was “not more than five years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subdivision 1(b). 3
Consistent with the terms of the parties’ agreement, Pizarro-Rios pleaded guilty to
the offense at the same March 2014 hearing during which he waived his right to contest
2 According to the complaint, Pizarro-Rios was “approximately two years and ten days older than” the complainant. 3 In 2014, the legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1(b), deleting the language that an actor may be imprisoned “for not more than five years” if the actor is “no more than 48 months but more than 24 months older than the complainant.” See 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 259, § 5, at 934–35. 3 adult certification. The parties stipulated that Pizarro-Rios would receive a stay of
adjudication and a three-to-five-year probationary period, with several conditions. Before
Pizarro-Rios entered his guilty plea, the district court advised him that, if he violated
probation, he could be convicted, sent to prison, and subject to a ten-year conditional-
release term, which would apply per Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 6
(2012). 4 In response to questioning by the district court, Pizarro-Rios confirmed that he
understood what the court had explained to him. And Pizarro-Rios acknowledged
reviewing with his attorney “line by line” a “Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty in Felony Case
Pursuant to [Minnesota] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 15.” The petition states that, “[i]n
this case, the period of conditional release is 10 years.”
Over the next three years, the Minnesota Department of Corrections filed four
separate probation violation reports, which alleged that Pizarro-Rios had violated several
of his probationary conditions. Pizarro-Rios admitted each of the violations, and the district
court responded with an escalating series of sanctions, culminating in the revocation of
probation, entry of judgment, and imposition of an executed 70-month prison sentence in
4 The 2012 version of Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 6, provided:
Subd. 6. Mandatory ten-year conditional release term. Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence otherwise applicable to the offense and unless a longer conditional release term is required in subdivision 7, when a court commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453, the court shall provide that, after the offender has completed the sentence imposed, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for ten years, minus the time the offender served on supervised release. 4 April 2017. 5 At the revocation hearing, the district court told Pizarro-Rios that he had “a
conditional release period of ten years,” and Pizarro-Rios confirmed that he understood.
The district court filed an amended sentencing order on April 3, 2017, committing Pizarro-
Rios to the custody of the Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections for 70 months and
imposing the ten-year conditional-release term.
In September 2017, Pizarro-Rios petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that
his sentence was unauthorized by law, requesting that he be resentenced, and citing
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, 6 among other authority. In
particular, Pizarro-Rios contended that, because he was less than four years older than the
complainant at the time of the offense, his statutory maximum sentence was five years. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C.2. The district
court agreed and filed an order granting Pizarro-Rios’s petition on October 2, 2017. That
order stated, “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that the sentence imposed on April 3, 2017, is
vacated and Pizarro[-Rios] is resentenced to a 60-month prison term.” The district court’s
5 At the time the district court executed his sentence, Pizarro-Rios had a criminal-history score of three and third-degree criminal sexual conduct was a severity level D offense. Based on that criminal-history score and offense severity level, the presumptive-sentence duration in the appropriate cell on the applicable sentencing-guidelines grid was 70 months. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (2012). But the guidelines also provide that, “[i]f the presumptive sentence duration in the appropriate cell on the applicable Grid exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the conviction offense, the statutory maximum is the presumptive sentence.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C.2 (2012). 6 Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, provides that “[t]he court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” 5 October 2, 2017 sentencing order did not reimpose the ten-year conditional-release term
that the district court had imposed in the April 3, 2017 sentencing order.
Two months later, Pizarro-Rios moved to correct his sentence, again citing
subdivision 9 of rule 27.03. Pizarro-Rios asserted that, because the legislature had
reclassified the severity level of third-degree criminal sexual conduct from D to G, a further
reduction of his sentence to a 30-month stayed term was warranted under the amelioration
doctrine. 7 On February 15, 2018, 8 the district court filed an order “for immediate release,”
granting Pizarro-Rios’s motion and stating in relevant part: “The October 2, 2017,
Sentencing Order is hereby vacated”; “[a] 30-month sentence is imposed and [Pizarro-
Rios] shall be given credit for time served”; “[Pizarro-Rios] is deemed to have satisfied
that sentence based on his 928 days served in custody”; and “[Pizarro-Rios] shall be
immediately released from custody.” Like the October 2, 2017 sentencing order, the
district court’s February 15, 2018 sentencing order did not reimpose the ten-year
conditional-release term.
On February 20, 2018, however, the district court sua sponte filed an amended
sentencing order reimposing the ten-year conditional-release term.
7 “The amelioration doctrine applies to cases that are not yet final when the change in law takes effect.” State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2017). An amended statute applies to a crime committed before the statute’s effective date if: “(1) there is no statement by the Legislature that clearly establishes the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine; (2) the amendment mitigates punishment; and (3) final judgment has not been entered as of the date the amendment takes effect.” Id. at 490. 8 Although the date stamped on the district court’s order is “February 15, 2017,” the presiding judge handwrote “February 15, 2018” next to her signature, and the parties do not dispute that the court filed the order in 2018. 6 In March 2024, Pizarro-Rios again moved to correct his sentence under subdivision
9 of rule 27.03. 9 Pizarro-Rios contended that his sentence expired when the district court
filed the February 15, 2018 sentencing order and that, under Martinek v. State, 678 N.W.2d
714 (Minn. App. 2004), and State v. Purdy, 589 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. App. 1999), 10 the
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify his sentence afterward. 11 The state
countered that, even if Pizarro-Rios’s sentence had expired, the district court retained the
authority to reimpose a conditional-release term because Purdy did not apply and, per
Franson, conditional release was authorized at the time of the April 3, 2017 sentencing
order.
9 Pizarro-Rios had also challenged the reimposition of conditional release in a letter motion that he submitted to the district court shortly after the court filed the February 20, 2018 sentencing order. At that time, Pizarro-Rios maintained that the sentencing guidelines required the district court to impose a 30-month stayed sentence, place him on probation, “deem he ha[d] satisfied probation, and discharge him from probation.” He reasoned that, “[b]ecause his correct sentence [was] a stayed sentence and he ha[d] never violated . . . probation on that sentence, he [was] not subject to conditional release.” The state opposed. The district court agreed with the state, ruling that Pizarro-Rios’s “sentence was executed[,] . . . he was given credit for time served[, and the] . . . [s]tatute requires a 10-year [term of] conditional release.” And the district court filed an order denying Pizarro- Rios’s letter motion. 10 See Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498 (“The expiration of a sentence operates as a discharge that bars further sanctions for a criminal conviction.”); see also Martinek, 678 N.W.2d at 718 (citing Purdy for the same principle). 11 Pizarro-Rios also asserted that the district court lacked authority to execute his sentence without a Blakely trial or waiver thereof because his presumptive sentence was a stayed 30-month term and an executed sentence was a departure. Given that neither a Blakely trial nor a waiver occurred, Pizarro-Rios maintained that the district court lacked authority to execute his sentence. Along with rejecting Pizarro-Rios’s jurisdictional argument, the district court was also not convinced by his Blakely claim. 7 After a hearing at which the district court heard arguments from both parties, the
court took the matter under advisement. In June 2024, the district court filed an order
denying Pizarro-Rios’s motion, agreeing with the state that Purdy does not apply and that
Franson controls. Reasoning under Franson that the “expiration of [Pizarro-Rios’s]
sentence does not divest the district court of authority to re-impose the conditional release
period when it properly imposed . . . conditional release at its inception,” the court
“recognized this authority and reimposed the conditional release term when it [became]
aware of the mistake [it had] made just a few days earlier.”
Pizarro-Rios appeals from the district court’s June 2024 order denying his March
2024 motion to correct his sentence.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024
motion to correct his sentence by erroneously determining that it had retained subject-
matter jurisdiction to amend its February 15, 2018 sentencing order?
ANALYSIS
Pizarro-Rios argues that, pursuant to Purdy, the district court abused its discretion
in denying his March 2024 motion to correct his sentence because the court lost subject-
matter jurisdiction to reimpose conditional release after it filed the February 15, 2018
sentencing order. Relying on Franson, the state responds that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024 motion to correct his sentence
because the court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to reimpose the conditional-release
term in the February 20, 2018 sentencing order.
8 Appellate courts “review a district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence
under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, for an abuse of
discretion.” Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2016). The district court “abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous application of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Nunn v. State, 868 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. 2015).
“Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear and determine cases that are
presented to the court.” State v. Losh, 755 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 2008). Whether a
district court has subject-matter jurisdiction “is an issue we review de novo.” Id.
We begin by (A) analyzing whether the district court erroneously applied Franson
to this case, concluding that the court abused its discretion in doing so. We then (B) apply
our precedential decisions in State v. Hannam, 792 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. App. 2011),
Martinek, and Purdy, concluding that, because the district court erroneously determined
that the court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to amend its February 15, 2018
sentencing order, the court abused its discretion by denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024
motion to correct his sentence.
A. The district court abused its discretion by erroneously applying Franson to this case.
In Franson, the defendant (Franson) was required to register as a predatory offender
following a conviction for criminal sexual conduct. 921 N.W.2d at 784. After he did not
do so, Franson was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a
predatory offender. Id. Without a jury’s determination of Franson’s predatory-offender risk
level or an admission by the defendant in that regard, the district court imposed a ten-year
9 conditional-release term, which was required by statute if Franson had been assigned a risk
level of III at the time of the offense. Id. at 784–85. 12
While he was serving his conditional-release term, Franson moved to correct his
sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, citing then-
recent Minnesota Supreme Court precedent, including State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692
(Minn. 2015). Franson, 921 N.W.2d at 785, 787–88. 13 In Her, the supreme court held that,
before a district court could impose a ten-year conditional-release term for a conviction of
failing to register as a predatory offender, a jury had to find that the defendant was a risk-
level-III offender or the defendant needed to admit as much. 862 N.W.2d at 694, 696–97.
Based on the supreme court’s decision in Her, the district court granted Franson’s
motion in part and ordered a resentencing hearing for a jury to determine his risk level.
Franson, 921 N.W.2d at 785. Franson later moved to terminate the proceedings and vacate
the conditional-release term because the complaint did not reference his risk-level
designation. Id. The district court ruled that, because the complaint did not allege that
Franson was a risk-level-III offender, there was nothing for the jury to decide. Id. As a
result, the district court terminated the proceedings and filed a second amended sentencing
order, stating that Franson had served his executed sentence and that there was no
conditional-release term that followed. Id.
12 When the district court first sentenced Franson, the court neglected to impose conditional release, but the court amended its sentencing order three months later—before the expiration of Franson’s sentence—to include the ten-year conditional-release term. Id. 13 “The district court construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief.” Id. at 785. 10 Several days before the district court filed the second amended sentencing order, the
supreme court filed its decision in State v. Meger, 901 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 2017), which
held that Her was not retroactive. Id. The state later moved the district court for
reconsideration of Franson’s amended sentence based on Meger. Id. The district court
granted the state’s motion for reconsideration and filed a third amended sentencing order,
reimposing Franson’s conditional-release term. Id. at 786.
Franson appealed from the third amended sentencing order, arguing that the district
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to reimpose a conditional-release term. Id. This
court disagreed for three reasons. Id. at 786–88.
First, this court said that “the supreme court’s remand instructions in Meger and Her
imply that a district court retains jurisdiction to correct a sentence that contains a particular
conditional-release term or lacks a statutorily mandated conditional-release term.” Id. at
786. The supreme court in Meger reversed the decision of the court of appeals and
remanded to the district court to reinstate the conditional-release term. Meger, 901 N.W.2d
at 425. And in Her, the supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, vacated
the conditional-release term, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Her, 862 N.W.2d at 700.
Second, this court reasoned that, because Franson’s sentence became unauthorized
by law when the district court vacated the conditional-release term, the district court
retained subject-matter jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Franson, 921 N.W.2d at 787–
88. This court explained that a motion to correct a sentence is an appropriate way to
challenge conditional release, but to be eligible for correction, the sentence must be
11 unauthorized by law. Id. And this court concluded that “the district court had jurisdiction
to reimpose the legal and mandatory conditional-release term” because “Her is not
retroactive,” such that “Franson’s period of conditional release was authorized when it was
first imposed, and the district court should not have vacated the conditional-release term.”
Id. at 788.
Third, this court distinguished Martinek and Purdy. Id. This court concluded that
neither case was controlling because the defendants therein “were not on notice that
conditional release was a mandatory part of their sentences, and the district court did not
amend the sentences to include conditional-release terms until after their sentences
expired.” Id. Thus, this court reasoned that “the conditional-release terms were imposed
after the defendants [in Martinek and Purdy had] developed a crystallized expectation of
finality in their sentences.” Id. And this court distinguished the facts of Franson from those
of Martinek and Purdy because Franson was on notice that the conditional-release term
was a mandatory part of his sentence. Id. In particular, the complaint charging Franson
referred to the conditional-release term, Franson’s sentence was amended to include the
term, and the term was lawfully imposed while Franson was still serving his term of
imprisonment. Id. Based on that notice, this court concluded that Franson could not have
developed a crystallized expectation of finality in a sentence that did not include
conditional release. Id. at 788–89. This court reasoned that, “[g]iven the supreme court’s
decision in Meger that Her does not apply retroactively and the state’s motion for
reconsideration challenging the district court’s order vacating conditional release, Franson
did not have a crystallized expectation of finality in a sentence that did not include a
12 conditional-release term.” Id. at 789. Thus, this court held that the district court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to reimpose the conditional-release term on Franson because the term
was authorized when it was first imposed and Franson had not developed a crystallized
expectation of finality in his sentence. Id. 14
We conclude that Franson is distinguishable from this matter. Franson specifically
relied on the unique facts and procedural posture of that case, premising its conclusion that
“Franson did not have a crystallized expectation of finality in a sentence that did not include
a conditional-release term” on “the supreme court’s decision in Meger that Her does not
apply retroactively and the state’s motion for reconsideration challenging the district
court’s order vacating conditional release.” Id. In contrast, the present matter did not arise
out of resentencing proceedings to determine Pizarro-Rios’s predatory-offender risk level
14 Franson was decided by a divided panel of this court—Judge Randall dissented. See id. (Randall, J., dissenting). Citing two nonprecedential opinions, Judge Randall explained his view that the district court had lost subject-matter jurisdiction when it filed the second amended sentencing order. Id. (citing State v. Jones, No. A17-0632, 2018 WL 1145861, at *2–3 (Minn. App. Mar. 5, 2018), and State v. Carlson, No. A18-0144, 2018 WL 4391101, at *2 (Minn. App. Sep. 17, 2018)). See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”). Both Jones and Carlson relied on Martinek and Purdy to conclude that the district court no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction to reimpose conditional-release terms after the defendants’ sentences had expired. See Jones, 2018 WL 1145861, at *2–3; Carlson, 2018 WL 4391101, at *2. Analogizing the facts of Franson to those of Jones and Carlson, Judge Randall concluded that the district court lost subject-matter jurisdiction when it vacated Franson’s conditional-release term, which he saw as “the last remaining condition of Franson’s sentence.” Franson, 921 N.W.2d at 789 (Randall, J., dissenting). And reasoning that the district court “expressly stated” that Franson’s sentence had been satisfied, Judge Randall wrote that the district court no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction to reimpose the conditional-release term. Id. at 789–90. The majority opinion in Franson neither refers to the dissent nor analyzes Jones and Carlson. 13 based on Her, and there was neither an issue of retroactivity nor a motion for
reconsideration by the state that precipitated the reimposition of conditional release here.
Instead, Pizarro-Rios had his sentence twice vacated by the district court for reasons
bearing no relation to the predatory-offender risk-level issue presented in Her, and the court
failed to reimpose conditional release on both occasions. Thus, where—as here—a case
does not involve resentencing proceedings for determination of a defendant’s predatory-
offender risk level based on Her, 15 we hold that Franson is inapposite.
Even if Franson were not distinguishable on those grounds, we would still conclude
that Franson is inapposite to the facts before us because, after the district court twice
vacated Pizarro-Rios’s sentence and resentenced him without reimposing the ten-year
conditional-release term, Pizarro-Rios had a crystallized expectation of finality in a
sentence that did not include conditional release. See Franson, 921 N.W.2d at 789; see also
Black’s Law Dictionary 1858 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “vacate” as, “[t]o nullify or cancel;
make void; invalidate ”; and defining “vacatur” as, “[t]he
act of annulling or setting aside”).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has “repeatedly stated that conditional release is a
mandatory aspect of the sentence to be imposed by the district court on statutorily
15 While no Minnesota appellate court has cited Franson in a precedential opinion, we note that the only nonprecedential decisions of this court that have cited Franson for its jurisdictional holding have done so in appeals from resentencing proceedings for determination of a defendant’s predatory-offender risk level based on Her. See State v. Zimmerman, No. A20-0290, 2020 WL 6554660, at *1–2 (Minn. App. Nov. 9, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2021); Queen v. State, No. A18-1318, 2019 WL 1758007, at *1–3 (Minn. App. Apr. 22, 2019). 14 designated sex offenders.” State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2001) (citing
State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 673–74 (Minn. 2000); State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317,
319 (Minn. 1998)); see also State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393, 396–97 (Minn.
2019) (explaining that, while “a prison sentence in Minnesota [generally] consists of two
terms”—the imprisonment term and the supervised-release term—“certain classes of
offenders, including some sex offenders, also must complete an additional term of
‘conditional release’” (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subds. 6–7 (2018))). The district
court’s October 2, 2017 sentencing order expressly vacated the sentence imposed on April
3, 2017—which had imposed the ten-year conditional-release term—and resentenced
Pizarro-Rios to 60-months’ imprisonment without reimposing conditional release. And the
district court’s February 15, 2018 sentencing order explicitly vacated the October 2, 2017
sentencing order and resentenced Pizarro-Rios to 30-months’ imprisonment with credit for
time served, resulting in the expiration of Pizarro-Rios’s sentence while again failing to
reimpose the ten-year conditional-release term.
We know of no binding precedent holding that a defendant has a crystallized
expectation of finality in a sentence that includes a conditional-release term when the
district court has vacated their sentence and resentenced them without reimposing
conditional release on more than one occasion. Cf. Zimmerman, 2020 WL 6554660, at *1–
2 (applying Franson after “we [had] expressly rejected [the defendant’s] request to vacate
the [conditional-release] term” on direct appeal and instead had reversed and remanded
based on Her for resentencing proceedings to determine the defendant’s predatory-offender
risk level); Queen, 2019 WL 1758007, at *3 (applying Franson and explaining that, “unlike
15 in Jones and Carlson, the district court did not vacate appellant’s conditional-release term”
and instead “merely determined that appellant was entitled to proper fact finding on the
Her issue,” such that “[t]he district court therefore retained jurisdiction”).
Pizarro-Rios urges us to overrule Franson, contending that the decision
misconstrues the supreme court’s opinions in Meger and Her, and that Franson
misinterprets our holdings in Martinek and Purdy. For the following reasons, we decline
to overrule Franson in this case.
“Horizontal stare decisis is the respect that an appellate court owes to its own
precedents and the circumstances under which that court may appropriately overrule a
precedent.” State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 690 n.3 (Minn. App. 2021) (citing Ramos
v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 124 n.5 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 10, 2021). While “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis . . . directs that we adhere to
former decisions in order that there might be stability in the law[,] . . . [s]tare decisis is not
an inflexible rule of law but rather a policy of the law.” Ariola v. City of Stillwater, 889
N.W.2d 340, 356 (Minn. App. 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 66 N.W.2d 763, 770 (Minn. 1954)) (other citation omitted). But just as the Minnesota
Supreme Court regards its own decisions, “[w]e will only overrule our precedent if
provided with a compelling reason to do so[,]” Ariola, 889 N.W.2d at 356 (citing Fleeger
v. Wyeth, 771 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. 2009)), and “[t]he reasons for departing from
former decisions must greatly outweigh reasons for adhering to them[,]” id. (quoting
Johnson, 66 N.W.2d at 770).
16 Because neither Meger 16 nor Her 17 address jurisdictional challenges, we
acknowledge that there is tension between the conclusion in Franson that “the supreme
court’s remand instructions in Meger and Her imply that a district court retains jurisdiction
to correct a sentence that contains a particular conditional-release term or lacks a statutorily
mandated conditional-release term,” 921 N.W.2d at 786, and other precedential decisions
16 In Meger, the defendant pleaded guilty to failing to register as a predatory offender and was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment. Meger, 901 N.W.2d at 420. The district court did not impose the mandatory conditional-release term at the time of sentencing. Id. Several months later, the district court amended the defendant’s sentence to include the conditional- release term. Id. The defendant, relying on the holding in Her—that a jury must find that a defendant is a risk-level-III offender at the time he failed to register before imposing a conditional-release term—moved to correct his sentence. Id. The district court applied Her retroactively and vacated the defendant’s conditional-release term. Id. On appeal, the question presented was whether Her applied retroactively to the defendant’s amended sentence. Id. at 421. The defendant in Meger did not raise and the supreme court did not consider whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to amend the defendant’s sentence. See id. 17 In Her, the district court initially imposed a conditional-release term. 862 N.W.2d at 694. Several years later, the defendant moved to correct his sentence, arguing that the imposition of the conditional-release term violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. On appeal, the defendant’s challenge related to the scope of the jury-trial right under the Sixth Amendment. Id. The defendant did not challenge his conditional-release term on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, nor did the supreme court address the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. We also note that, although the defendant had completed the terms of his imprisonment and supervised release, he was still serving his conditional-release term when he moved the district court to correct his sentence. Id. Thus, the defendant remained in the legal custody of the commissioner of corrections. See State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2015) (“[A]n offender on supervised or conditional release remains ‘in the legal custody and under the control of’ the Commissioner of Corrections.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1(b) (2014))). Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence had not expired. See id.; see also Hannam, 792 N.W.2d at 864 (“In Minnesota, an executed sentence means the total period of time for which an inmate is committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections.” (quotation omitted)). 17 of the Minnesota Supreme Court 18 and the Minnesota Court of Appeals that dictate against
inferring precedent on an issue from a case in which the issue was not raised. See, e.g.,
Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, 131 N.W.2d 632, 645 (Minn. 1964) (pre-Franson
decision holding that opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before
[the] court”); Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. 1950) (pre-Franson
decision holding that appellate decisions are not authority on issues that were “never raised
or called to the attention of the court”); In re Estate of Zych, 983 N.W.2d 466, 474 n.3
(Minn. App. 2022) (post-Franson decision reaffirming the principle against inferring
precedent from caselaw in which an issue was not argued by noting that, because an issue
on appeal in Zych was not raised in another case, the other case “should have no effect on
Minnesota law”); Tipka v. Lincoln Intern. Charter Sch., 864 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. App.
2015) (pre-Franson decision holding that “our rendering a decision resolving a case in
which jurisdiction was never challenged does not establish precedent for jurisdiction”);
Nichols v. State, Off. of Sec’y of State, 842 N.W.2d 20, 28 (Minn. App. 2014) (pre-Franson
decision holding that, “[b]ecause the issue presented by appellants in this case was not
before the court in Alexander [v. Eilers, 422 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. App. 1988)], the
Alexander opinion provides no authority”), aff’d sub nom, Nichols v. State, 858 N.W.2d
773 (Minn. 2015).
18 See State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (“The court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent, as it has repeatedly acknowledged.”). 18 And we are mindful that Franson, 921 N.W.2d at 788, cited Martinek, 678 N.W.2d
at 718, 19 and Calmes, 632 N.W.2d at 645, 648, 20 in adopting the due-process crystallized-
19 Martinek dealt with distinct jurisdictional and due-process claims, citing the crystallized- expectation-of-finality standard only in distinguishing State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 2001), and deciding that “[a]n exchange of letters, to which a defendant is not privy and which is not made a part of the official record, deprives a defendant of a fundamental right of due process.” Martinek, 678 N.W.2d at 717–19. In separately addressing the defendant’s jurisdictional claim, Martinek did not discuss whether the defendant had a crystallized expectation of finality in his sentence and instead quoted Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498, for the proposition that “[t]he expiration of a sentence operates as a discharge that bars further sanctions for a criminal conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). The analysis in Purdy did not consider whether the defendant had a crystallized expectation of finality in his sentence. 589 N.W.2d at 498–99. And Martinek held that, “[o]nce a sentence has expired, the court no longer has jurisdiction to modify even what may be an unauthorized sentence,” ultimately ruling that “[t]he district court no longer ha[d] jurisdiction to modify [the defendant’s] sentence by adding a conditional release term.” 678 N.W.2d at 718–19 (citing Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498–99). 20 Without elaborating on how Calmes applies to a jurisdictional analysis, Franson characterizes Calmes as “recognizing that a due-process violation may occur when a ‘sentence is enhanced after the defendant has developed a crystallized expectation of finality’ in the sentence.” 921 N.W.2d at 788 (quoting Calmes, 632 N.W.2d at 645). The supreme court in Calmes did not address the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to reimpose a conditional-release term after the expiration of a defendant’s sentence. Instead, the supreme court analyzed whether a district court’s decision to reimpose a conditional- release term before the defendant’s sentence expired and while the defendant was still on supervised release—without notice or a hearing—violated the defendant’s rights to due process and protection from double jeopardy, as well as the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d at 645. And the two Minnesota Supreme Court cases from which Calmes, 632 N.W.2d at 644–45, derived the crystallized-expectation-of-finality due- process standard—Humes, 581 N.W.2d at 317, and State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1998), superseded by statute as recognized in State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 551 n.6 (Minn. 2016)—each dealt with subject-matter jurisdiction as a separate question from due process and double jeopardy, applying the crystallized-expectation-of-finality standard only in the latter analysis. See Humes, 581 N.W.2d at 320–21; Garcia, 582 N.W.2d at 881. Although both Humes and Garcia confronted jurisdictional claims, those issues were not based on sentence expiration, but rather concerned arguments that district courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose conditional release under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. See Humes, 581 N.W.2d at 318–19; Garcia, 582 N.W.2d at 880–81. 19 expectation-of-finality standard to decide whether the district court retained subject-matter
jurisdiction after the expiration of Franson’s sentence, notwithstanding that neither
Martinek nor Calmes similarly used that due-process standard in addressing jurisdictional
issues. Indeed, no precedential opinion of a Minnesota appellate court—aside from
Franson—has ever employed the crystallized-expectation-of-finality standard outside of a
due-process analysis, and no such decision other than Franson has applied that principle
over the holdings of Martinek and Purdy.
Here, however, the foregoing issues do not present compelling reasons to overrule
Franson. This is because Franson is inapposite to the facts and procedural history of the
case at hand and, as explained below, Purdy and Martinek remain binding precedent that
we may follow without deciding whether to overrule Franson. Having concluded that
Franson is distinguishable and that the district court abused its discretion by erroneously
applying Franson to the matter before us, we now turn to the resolution of this appeal.
B. Because the district court erroneously determined that it retained subject-matter jurisdiction to amend its February 15, 2018 sentencing order, the court abused its discretion by denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024 motion to correct his sentence.
Before Franson was decided, we had held that “[t]he expiration of a sentence
operates as a discharge that bars further sanctions for a criminal conviction.” Purdy, 589
N.W.2d at 498. In Purdy, the district court denied a defendant’s “motion seeking an order
finding that his sentence had expired” before the court resentenced him by imposing a
conditional-release term. Id. On appeal, we agreed with the defendant’s argument that “his
sentence expired without being amended to include a conditional release term and that[,]
20 upon expiration of the sentence, the court lost jurisdiction to amend it.” Id. And we held
that, “[b]ecause [the defendant’s] sentence was not amended before it expired, the district
court’s denial of the [defendant’s] motion for an order that his sentence had expired and
that he was not resentenced [to include a conditional-release term] was an abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 499.
In Martinek, we similarly held that, “[o]nce a sentence has expired, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to modify even what may be an unauthorized sentence.” Martinek,
678 N.W.2d at 718 (emphasis added) (citing Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498–99). And we ruled
that, when a defendant’s sentence expired before the district court filed an amended
sentencing order imposing a conditional-release term, “[t]he district court no longer ha[d]
jurisdiction to modify [the defendant’s] sentence by adding [the] conditional release term.”
Id. at 718–19.
Finally, in Hannam, this court dismissed the state’s appeal of a sentence “under the
reasoning in Martinek and Purdy[] because respondent’s sentence ha[d] expired, [such
that] this court, like the district court, ha[d] no authority to amend or modify the sentence
to impose further sanctions.” Hannam, 792 N.W.2d at 865.
Hannam, Martinek, and Purdy remain good law. See Mason v. State, 16 N.W.3d
828, 833 (Minn. App. 2025) (describing Hannam, 792 N.W.2d at 864–65, as “dismissing
[an] appeal because [the] sentence expired and concluding that this court, like the district
court, lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence to impose further sanctions” (quotation
omitted); explaining that, in Martinek, 678 N.W.2d at 717–19, we “conclud[ed] that [the]
district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the terms of conditional release when it had not
21 altered the sentence to include conditional release before sentence expired”; and quoting
Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498–99, for its holding that “[t]he expiration of a sentence operates
as a discharge that bars further sanctions for a criminal conviction”), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 23, 2025). And since Franson was decided, we have reaffirmed that district courts
lack subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a motion under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, “to add sanctions to an already-expired sentence,” id.,21
which is the effect of reimposing conditional release, see Martinek, 678 N.W.2d at 718
(“While conditional release is mandatory and nonwaivable, it represents a significant
modification to a criminal sanction, carrying with it the possibility of imprisonment for an
additional [ten] years.”).
Under Hannam, Martinek, and Purdy, the district court lost subject-matter
jurisdiction to reimpose the conditional-release term once it filed the February 15, 2018
sentencing order, which resulted in the expiration of Pizarro-Rios’s sentence. See Hannam,
792 N.W.2d at 864 (“Once an inmate completes the terms of imprisonment and supervised
release, the inmate’s sentence expires.”). This is because “[t]he expiration of [Pizarro-
Rios’s] sentence operate[d] as a discharge that bar[red] further sanctions for [his] criminal
conviction.” Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498. In other words, “[o]nce [Pizarro-Rios’s] sentence
. . . expired, the [district] court no longer ha[d] jurisdiction to modify even what may be an
unauthorized sentence”—i.e., the February 15, 2018 sentencing order that lacked the
21 Cf. id. at 833–34 (holding that a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a motion by a defendant under subdivision 9 of rule 27.03 to correct an allegedly unlawful felony sentence by reclassifying it as a gross misdemeanor—without imposing further sanctions—even after the sentence has expired). 22 mandatory ten-year conditional-release term. Martinek, 678 N.W.2d at 718 (citing Purdy,
589 N.W.2d at 498–99).
Thus, we conclude that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to file
the February 20, 2018 sentencing order amending the February 15, 2018 sentencing order.
The district court therefore abused its discretion in denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024
motion to correct his sentence. See Evans, 880 N.W.2d at 359.
DECISION
Franson is inapposite to cases like this one that do not involve resentencing
proceedings for determination of a defendant’s predatory-offender risk level based on Her.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion by erroneously applying Franson to this case.
When the district court filed its February 15, 2018 sentencing order, Pizarro-Rios’s
sentence expired and the court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to further amend his sentence
by reimposing conditional release afterward. Because the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to file the February 20, 2018 sentencing order, the court abused its
discretion by denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024 motion to correct his sentence. We
therefore reverse the district court’s June 2024 order denying Pizarro-Rios’s March 2024
motion to correct his sentence and remand for the district court to vacate the February 20,
2018 amended sentencing order.
Reversed and remanded.