Fickett v. United States

149 Ct. Cl. 697, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95, 1960 WL 8479
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 4, 1960
DocketNo. 384-53
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 149 Ct. Cl. 697 (Fickett v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fickett v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 697, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95, 1960 WL 8479 (cc 1960).

Opinion

JoNes, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit by an officer in the United States Naval Reserve who became 60 years of age on July 2, 1949. He seeks retired pay under the Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1081.

Plaintiff was mustered into the Naval Militia of the State of Maine on April 4, 1906, and served continuously until June 7, 1915. He was discharged therefrom to accept a commission as ensign. He served in that capacity and as lieutenant, junior grade, from June 8, 1915, until April 5, 1917, at which time his organization was called into the Federal Service. Plaintiff thereafter saw periods of service with the United States Navy and Naval Reserve Force until July 1,1982, when he was transferred, upon his own request, to the Honorary Retired List in the rank of lieutenant without pay or allowances.

Title III of the Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1087, as amended, provides for a system of retirement with pay [699]*699for members and former members of the National Guard and other reserve components of the armed forces. The statute provides that subject to certain conditions any person who upon attaining the age of 60 years and who has completed an aggregate of 20 or more years of satisfactory Federal Service in the organizations named in the act should upon application be granted retired pay. The act included under conditions named not only federally recognized service in the National Guard, but also the Naval Militia subject to compliance with certain standards described by the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy was authorized by the act to prescribe such rules, regulations, and procedures as he might deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of Title III.

The plaintiff was denied retirement on the premise that neither his service in a Naval Militia prior to February 16, 1914, nor his service while on the United States Naval Ee-serve Honorary Eetired List from July 1, 1932, to June 30, 1949, could be credited as Federal Service within the meaning of the 1948 act. Accordingly, plaintiff was advised by the Chief of Naval Personnel that excluding these two periods he had only a total creditable service of 18 years and 24 days, and that he did not have 20 years of satisfactory Federal Service in components of the armed services.

In seeking retired pay, the present suit was filed on the ground that these two periods of service which had been rejected should be allowed and that plaintiff is entitled to retired pay.

After the filing of this suit, the Comptroller General ruled on January 11, 1954, that under the terms of the 1948 act, supra, service on the Honorary Eetired List of the Naval or Marine Corps Eeserve, being service as a member of a reserve component, should be deemed a period of satisfactory Federal Service as provided in the act.

This ruling disposes of the major issues involved in this case. It is practically admitted that plaintiff is entitled to recover retired pay on the basis of his satisfactory service rendered after the passage of the Act of February 16,1914, 38 Stat. 283.

[700]*700Plaintiff, however, contends that his service prior to the 1914 act, and especially that period of service between April 4,1906, and May 27,1908, should be counted.

Plaintiff claims credit for this service on the basis of what is known as the Dick Act, approved January 21, 1903, 32 Stat. 775. Pie cites this court’s opinions in Price v. United States, Waterbury v. United States, and Presson v. United States, reported in volume 121 Ct. Cl. at pages 664, 687, and 695, respectively.

In those cases this court held that the National Guard was federally recognized by the terms of the Dick Act for any period of service subsequent to January 21, 1903. The plaintiff asserts that if he is entitled to credit for all or any portion of his service between April 4, 1906, and February 16, 1914, he would be entitled to a greater retirement pay on the basis of longevity of service.

It is very clear that plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the period of service between May 27, 1908, and February 16,1914, on account of the provision in the 1908 amendment to the Dick Act, 35 Stat. 399, which in reenacting the major provisions of the Dick Act, included this provision:

That the provisions of this Act and of section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force.

On the basis of this amendment the service could not be counted between the date of its adoption in 1908 and February 1914, when the Naval Militia was specifically included subject to the conditions named in the 1914 act. This later act sets out fully the provisions for the operations of the Naval Militia and fully recognizes it as an organization. At that time, 1914, or soon thereafter, the Navy Department set up a comprehensive and detailed program for the Naval Militia.

Plaintiff asserts, however, that the very enactment of this amendment in 1908 by implication shows that it was the intention of the Dick Act to include the Naval Militia prior to the adoption of the amendment in the 1908 act.

The defendant asserts that this was merely a clarifying provision and that all of the terms of the 1903 act show that it was meant to apply only to the land forces.

[701]*701It seems to us that the Dick Act manifestly applied only to the land forces in the form it was enacted in 1903. It makes no mention whatever of the Naval Militia. It provides that the organization, armament and discipline of the organized militia in the several states “shall be the same as that which is now or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular and Volunteer Armies of the United States.” It refers to the pay provided by law for the Regular Army. It stipulates that the Secretary of the Army may issue to the militia such arms and equipment “as are required for the Army of the United States.”

We have secured a report of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in connection with the enactment of S. 4316, dated May 8, 1908. This report discusses the new law and certain amendments to the original Dick Act, but makes no reference whatever to the amendment which plaintiff seeks to invoke. The entire report is based on the land forces militia. It includes a letter from the Acting Secretary of War and also a statement by the Assistant Secretary of War. No reference is made anywhere in the report except in connection with the land forces. The report includes a statement to the effect that National Guardsmen are on the same plane as Regular Army if war occurs; that in the event of war they become a part of the United States Army; that the volunteers should be officers of the United States Army and the National Guard who may be found qualified. It states that the forces of the National Guard, after taking their education and their drill work which they get in their State armories, will go to their State camps for one year; that the Army will give them as many officers as may be needed to assist them in instruction and advice and especially to endeavor to provide a small body of regular well trained troops as a sort of exhibit or example. When the entire bill and report are considered together, it becomes manifest that it was intended that the original Dick Act should apply only to the land forces prior to the 1914 act after which there is no doubt the Naval Militia was included.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Stern
155 Ct. Cl. 824 (Court of Claims, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 Ct. Cl. 697, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95, 1960 WL 8479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fickett-v-united-states-cc-1960.