Ferris v. Peele

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 25-18
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-18

Filed 5 November 2025

Cumberland County, No. 23CVS005946-250

ROBERT W. FERRIS and SFL+A ARCHITECTS, PA., Plaintiffs,

v.

KATHERINE N. PEELE, LS3P ASSOCIATES LTD., GORDON E. JOHNSON, and GORDON JOHNSON ARCHITECTURE, Defendants.

Appeal by Defendants from Order entered 1 July 2024 by Judge George R.

Hicks, III, in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26

August 2025.

The Charleston Group, by Jose A. Coker, R. Jonathan Charleston, and Timothy Lorick, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Hamilton Stephens Steele + Martin, PLLC, by Tracy T. James and Mark A. Mohr, for Defendants-Appellants Gordon E. Johnson and Gordon Johnson Architecture.

Cranfill Sumner LLP, by Steven A. Bader, Melody J. Jolly, and Elizabeth C. King, for Defendants-Appellants Katherine N. Peele and LS3P Associates Ltd.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Gordon E. Johnson, Gordon Johnson Architecture, Katherine N. Peele, and FERRIS V. PEELE

Opinion of the Court

LS3P Associates Ltd. appeal from an Order Partially Granting and Partially Denying

their Motions to Dismiss Robert W. Ferris and SfL+a Architects, PA’s Complaint.

The Record before us—including the factual allegations made in the Complaint,

which we treat as true solely for purposes of this appeal—tends to reflect the

following:

On 26 April 2021, the Cumberland County Schools Board of Education issued

a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) for architectural services for certain renovations

to E.E. Smith High School. Johnson, Peele, and Ferris are architects licensed by the

North Carolina Board of Architecture and Registered Interior Designers (Board of

Architecture). Johnson and Peele, along with their respective architectural firms,

Gordon E. Johnson Architecture and LS3P, Ltd., (collectively, Defendants), jointly

responded to the RFQ. Ferris and his firm, SfL+a Architects, PA, (collectively,

Plaintiffs) also responded to the RFQ.

On 23 August 2021, Defendants were selected for the project. However, an

agreement between Defendants and the Board of Education was never finalized. On

11 October 2021, Defendants wrote a letter to Joe Desormeaux, the Board of

Education’s Associate Superintendent of Auxiliary Services, alleging Ferris had

violated the terms of the RFQ and the Board of Architecture’s professional conduct

standards by reaching out to members of the Board of Education—after Defendants

had already been selected for the project—for the purpose of altering the selection

and securing the contract. The letter also alleged Ferris had “previously been

-2- FERRIS V. PEELE

sanctioned multiple times by the North Carolina Board of Architecture for similar

past unethical professional conduct.”

On 9 June 2022, Johnson and Peele submitted a formal complaint against

Ferris to the Board of Architecture. On 7 October 2022, while the Board of

Architecture was investigating the complaint, Johnson provided the Board of

Architecture with a copy of the 11 October 2021 letter to Desormeaux.

At the conclusion of its investigation, the Board of Architecture determined

there was probable cause Ferris had violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 83A-15 by “attempting

to supplant another architect on a project” but had not willfully violated the statute

by “offering to pay a gift, commission, political contribution, or other consideration in

order to secure work.” Ferris filed a Petition for Review with Wake County Superior

Court; that appeal was subsequently dismissed on 27 September 2023.

On 6 October 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging

claims for Libel per se, Libel per quod, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, and

Punitive Damages based on Defendants’ statement in the 11 October 2021 letter

which alleged Ferris had previously been “sanctioned multiple times” by the Board of

Architecture. Plaintiffs alleged Defendants published the allegedly defamatory

statement on multiple dates: 11 October 2021, 30 November 2021, and 7 October

2022.

On 11 December 2023, Johnson and Gordon Johnson Architecture filed a

Motion to Dismiss, Answer, and Counterclaim. Peele and LS3P Associates, Ltd.,

-3- FERRIS V. PEELE

likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss, Answer, and Counterclaim on 18 December 2023.

Defendants asserted, inter alia, that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because the

allegedly defamatory statement was protected by absolute privilege and because they

have statutory immunity from claims arising out of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade

Practices Act.

On 1 July 2024, the trial court entered an Order Partially Granting and

Partially Denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court dismissed

Plaintiffs’ claims for Libel as to the 11 October 2021 and 30 November 2021 instances

of publication but not as to the 7 October 2022 instance of publication. Defendants

timely filed Notice of Appeal.

Appellate Jurisdiction

“An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which

does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order

to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Embler v. Embler, 143 N.C. App.

162, 164, 545 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2001) (quoting Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362,

57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)). A party may appeal an interlocutory order if either: (1)

“the trial court enters a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the

claims or parties” and certifies there is no just reason to delay appeal, or (2) “the order

deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a

review prior to a final determination on the merits.” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint

-4- FERRIS V. PEELE

Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Defendants acknowledge their appeal is interlocutory. See generally Reid v.

Cole, 187 N.C. App. 261, 263, 652 S.E.2d 718, 719 (2007) (“Typically, the denial of a

motion to dismiss is not immediately appealable to this Court because it is

interlocutory in nature.” (citation omitted)). However, Defendants argue this Court

nonetheless has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court’s Order

rejecting their invocation of the absolute privilege defense affects a substantial right

which would be lost absent immediate appeal. “A substantial right is one which will

clearly be lost or irremediably adversely affected if the order is not reviewable before

final judgment.” McConnell v. McConnell, 151 N.C. App. 622, 625, 566 S.E.2d 801,

804 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he appellant has the burden

of showing this Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right

which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the

merits.” Jeffreys, 115 N.C. App. at 380, 444 S.E.2d at 254 (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, Defendants argue they are immune from suit because

the allegedly defamatory statement was absolutely privileged and because they have

statutory immunity from claims arising out of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade

Practices Act. “As a general rule, claims of immunity affect a substantial right, and

therefore merit immediate appeal.” Stahl v. Bowden, 274 N.C. App. 26, 28, 850

S.E.2d 588, 590 (2020) (citing Farrell v. Transylvania Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 199 N.C.

-5- FERRIS V. PEELE

App. 173, 176, 682 S.E.2d 224, 227 (2009)). This Court has previously analogized

claims of absolute privilege to claims of immunity from suit. See Topping v. Meyers,

270 N.C. App. 613, 842 S.E.2d 95 (2020), review denied, appeal dismissed, _ N.C. _,

854 S.E.2d 800 (2021) (Mem.); Bouvier v. Porter, 279 N.C. App. 528, 865 S.E.2d 732

(2021), overruled on other grounds by, 386 N.C. 1, 900 S.E.2d 838 (2024).

“Whether an interlocutory appeal affects a substantial right is determined on

a case-by-case basis.” Grant v. High Point Reg’l Health Sys., 172 N.C. App. 852, 853,

616 S.E.2d 688, 689 (2005) (citation omitted). On the facts of this case, we conclude—

to the extent the trial court’s Order dismissed Defendants’ absolute privilege defense

and declined to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on this defense—Defendants have

established the trial court’s Order affects a substantial right which may be lost absent

immediate review. Therefore, this Court has appellate jurisdiction to consider the

merits of this otherwise interlocutory appeal.1

Issue

The issue on appeal is whether absolute immunity bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims

arising out of the 9 June 2022 Board of Architecture complaint.

Analysis

On appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court conducts “a de

1 Defendants have also filed, in the alternative, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari requesting we

review the merits of their case in the event we determine Defendants have no right of immediate appeal. Resting on our conclusion the Order appealed from affects a substantial right and, thus, immediate appeal of this issue is permitted, we dismiss the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as moot.

-6- FERRIS V. PEELE

novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency and to determine

whether the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct.” Leary v. N.C.

Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C. App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2003), aff’d per curiam,

357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003) (Mem.). As such, this Court also views the

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Donovan v. Fiumara, 114 N.C. App. 524, 526, 442 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1994) (citation

omitted). Further, this Court considers “whether, as a matter of law, the allegations

of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted under some legal theory[.]” Harris v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 85 N.C.

App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987) (citation omitted).

In the case sub judice, Plaintiffs alleged distinct claims for Libel per se and

Libel per quod. “Libel per se is a publication which, when considered alone without

explanatory circumstances: (1) charges that a person has committed an infamous

crime; (2) charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) tends to impeach a

person in that person’s trade or profession; or (4) otherwise tends to subject one to

ridicule, contempt or disgrace.” Phillips v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of

Educ., 117 N.C. App. 274, 277, 450 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1994) (citations omitted), disc.

review denied, 340 N.C. 115, 456 S.E.2d 318 (1995) (Mem.). “In an action for libel or

slander per se, malice and damages are deemed presumed by proof of publication,

with no further evidence required as to any resulting injury.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC v.

Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 30, 568 S.E.2d 893, 898 (2002) (citation omitted).

-7- FERRIS V. PEELE

Similarly, “[l]ibel per quod may be asserted when a publication is not obviously

defamatory, but when considered in conjunction with innuendo, colloquium, and

explanatory circumstances it becomes libelous.” Skinner v. Reynolds, 237 N.C. App.

150, 157, 764 S.E.2d 652, 657 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In

contrast to libel per se, “[t]o state a claim for libel per quod, a party must specifically

allege and prove special damages as to each plaintiff.” Id. at 157, 764 S.E.2d at 658

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

“Even if a plaintiff establishes all the essential elements of libel, however, a

defamation action will not lie if ‘the circumstances under which the statement was

published confer upon the publisher a privilege to publish it.’ ” Bouvier, 386 N.C. at

10, 900 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-

CIO, 270 N.C. 160, 170, 154 S.E.2d 344, 354 (1967)). “One such privilege is the

‘absolute privilege,’ which applies when the public has an interest in the defendant

speaking ‘his mind fully and freely.’ ” Id. at 10, 900 S.E.2d at 847 (quoting Ramsey

v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270, 273, 13 S.E. 775, 775 (1891)). “[A] defamatory statement is

absolutely privileged if it is made in the due course of a judicial or quasi-judicial

proceeding and is relevant and pertinent to the subject matter of the proceeding.” Id.

(citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs do not contest the statement was made in the context of a

judicial proceeding: the Board of Architecture’s investigation of Johnson and Peele’s

-8- FERRIS V. PEELE

complaint. Thus, we consider whether the allegedly defamatory statement was

relevant to the Board of Architecture’s investigation. See id.

A statement is irrelevant or impertinent if it is ‘so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.’ Stated another way, a statement is relevant and pertinent ‘if it is so related to the subject matter of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the proceeding.’

Id. (alterations and internal citations omitted) (quoting Scott v. Statesville Plywood

& Veneer Co., 240 N.C. 73, 76, 81 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1954)).

Plaintiffs argue the statement was not relevant to the Board of Architecture’s

investigation because it was not relevant to the violations Johnson and Peele had

alleged in their complaint. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the alleged libelous

statement “did not assist the [Board of Architecture] in determining whether Ferris

attempted to supplant another architect selected for a project or offered contributions

in exchange for awarding a contract in connection with the RFQ.”

The case of Watts-Robinson v. Shelton presents facts similar to those at bar,

and we find it instructive. There, the plaintiff, an attorney, alleged the defendant

had defamed her while testifying against her in a disciplinary hearing investigating

allegations that the plaintiff had “mismanaged entrusted client funds and engaged

in professional misconduct[.]” 251 N.C. App. 507, 507-08, 796 S.E.2d 51, 53 (2016).

The defendant had testified he was concerned the plaintiff was “trying to run some

kind of scam[.]” Id. at 509, 796 S.E.2d at 53. The plaintiff claimed, since the

-9- FERRIS V. PEELE

disciplinary hearing was “not focused on any alleged scam she ran, [the defendant’s]

‘scam’ claim was not ‘sufficiently relevant to the proceeding’ but was ‘palpably

irrelevant to [its] subject matter.’ ” Id. at 512, 796 S.E.2d at 55 (second alteration in

original).

This Court disagreed, noting “central to the subject matter of [the plaintiff’s]

disciplinary hearing was her alleged mismanagement of entrusted client funds,” and

the defendant had testified he became concerned the plaintiff was running a scam

after observing how she dealt with client funds. Id. Thus, “[c]onsidering the entire

exchange in context, [the defendant’s] response . . . was sufficiently relevant such that

it was not palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the disciplinary proceeding.”

Id.

Here, the statement at issue, like the statement in Watts-Robinson, when

considered in the full context of the Board of Architecture’s investigation, was at least

so related to the subject matter of the controversy such that it may have “become the

subject of inquiry in the course” of the proceedings. See Bouvier, 386 N.C. at 11, 900

S.E.2d at 847 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The subject matter of the

Board of Architecture’s investigation, in Plaintiffs’ own words, was whether Ferris

had “attempted to supplant another architect selected for an architecture job and

offered contributions to the county to secure a contract in connection with the RFQ.”

Thus, the allegedly defamatory statement—which alleged Ferris had previously

committed conduct similar to that alleged in Johnson and Peele’s complaint—was

- 10 - FERRIS V. PEELE

sufficiently relevant to the Board of Architecture’s investigation. Certainly, we

cannot conclude the statement here was so “palpably irrelevant” to the proceedings

that “no reasonable man [could] doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.” See id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, at the hearing on Johnson and Peele’s complaint to the Board of

Architecture, Cathe Evans, Executive Director of the Board of Architecture, testified

Ferris’ disciplinary history was, in fact, relevant to the Board of Architecture’s

investigation:

[Evans]: The committee looked at [Ferris’] past, looked at history – which is not out of the ordinary in the course of an investigation against an architect to look to see if there’s anything – any disciplinary history recorded.

(emphasis added). Thus, we agree with Defendants the statement was relevant to

the subject matter of the hearing. Therefore, Defendants’ allegedly defamatory

statement was absolutely privileged, necessarily defeating Plaintiffs’ claims for Libel

per se and Libel per quod. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ claims for Libel should have been

dismissed.

Since Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for Libel, they have also failed to state a

claim for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. The only basis Plaintiffs alleged for

their claim for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices was Libel. Because Plaintiffs’

claim for Libel fails, their claim for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices cannot

properly be based on Libel. See Nucor Corp. v. Prudential Equity Group, LLC, 189

- 11 - FERRIS V. PEELE

N.C. App. 731, 739, 659 S.E.2d 483, 488 (2008) (“As we have already determined that

plaintiff’s claim for libel per se was properly dismissed, plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive

trade practices claim cannot be based upon the libel per se.”). Thus, this claim should

also have been dismissed.2

Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ claim for Punitive Damages, “a claim for punitive

damages is not a stand-alone claim.” Funderburk v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

241 N.C. App. 415, 425, 775 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2015). Further, a claim for punitive damages

may succeed only if Plaintiffs show Defendants were “liable for compensatory

damages and their injury was the result of fraud, malice, or willful or wanton

conduct.” Id. (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-15(a) (2013)). Since each allegation in

Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim, Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages—

punitive or otherwise. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim for Punitive Damages should also have

been dismissed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s

Order denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for Libel, Unfair and

Deceptive Trade Practices, and Punitive Damages and remand with instructions to

2 Because we dispose of Plaintiffs’ claim for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices on this

ground, we do not address the parties’ arguments as to whether Defendants possess statutory immunity from claims arising under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

- 12 - FERRIS V. PEELE

dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendants with prejudice.3

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges TYSON and FLOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

3 Plaintiffs have not challenged the dismissal of their other claims. Consequently, we leave that portion of the trial court’s Order undisturbed.

- 13 -