Ferreira v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 22, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-10587
StatusUnknown

This text of Ferreira v. Doe (Ferreira v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ferreira v. Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NELSON FERREIRA, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-10587 (LLS) JOHN OR JANE DOE, M.D.; ORDER TO AMEND SUPERINTENDENT, DOWNSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Bare Hill Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. By order dated December 29, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint contains the following allegations. In December 2019, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility “for the purposes of reception to the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.” (ECF No. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff was “forced to go through the medical asses[s]ment process,” and was examined in “a curtained exam room” with “a curtained door,” and instructed to remove all his clothing except for his boxers and socks. (Id.) Because the “curtain door” was “left open,” the “people that were passing by” could “see in the exam room” while Plaintiff was undressed and being examined, and other prisoners “in adjoining rooms” could hear Plaintiff’s conversation with the doctor about

Plaintiff’s “medical history” and “protected medical information.” (Id.) The doctor examined Plaintiff’s “eyes, ears, and throat,” and listened to Plaintiff’s heart, lungs, and chest. The doctor also had Plaintiff lie down on a table and examined his abdomen and testicles. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff distinguishes these experiences from medical examinations that he had when he was not incarcerated. In those situations, the examination was done in a private room, Plaintiff would be given a gown to wear, and the doctor would examine Plaintiff by moving the gown as necessary to have access to different parts of Plaintiff’s body. Plaintiff alleges that he was “never informed of his right to refuse the physical examination.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks $125,000 in damages. (Id. at 4.) He names as Defendants a John or Jane Doe doctor, and the Downstate

Correctional Facility superintendent. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 and Personal Involvement To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, No. 19-3712, _ F.3d _, 2020 WL 7687688, at *7 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff names as Defendants two John Doe doctors and the Downstate superintendent, but the complaint does not contain facts showing how these individuals were personally involved in violating his rights.

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Related

West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Matson v. BD. OF EDUC., CITY SCHOOL DIST. OF NY
631 F.3d 57 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Reynolds v. Goord
103 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D. New York, 2000)
Rodriguez v. Ames
287 F. Supp. 2d 213 (W.D. New York, 2003)
Selah v. Goord
255 F. Supp. 2d 42 (N.D. New York, 2003)
Pabon v. Wright
459 F.3d 241 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Ferreira v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ferreira-v-doe-nysd-2021.