Fernando Irizarry v. Michael J. Clayborne

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 5, 2002
Docket13-01-00751-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Fernando Irizarry v. Michael J. Clayborne (Fernando Irizarry v. Michael J. Clayborne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fernando Irizarry v. Michael J. Clayborne, (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

                                   NUMBER 13-01-751-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                       CORPUS CHRISTIBEDINBURG

FERNANDO IRIZARRY,                                                        Appellant,

                                                   v.

MICHAEL J. CLAYBORNE,                                                   Appellee.

        On appeal from the 343rd District Court of Bee County, Texas.

                                   O P I N I O N

          Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Castillo

                                   Opinion by Justice Yañez

Appellant, Fernando Irizarry, an inmate, appeals the dismissal of his pro se legal malpractice suit for lack of prosecution.  We affirm.

Facts


Irizarry filed his original petition on April 23, 1992.  Service of process was unsuccessful, and appellant filed a motion for default judgment on July 27, 1993.  The trial court never ruled on this motion.  Appellant did not take further action until almost four years later, on June 27, 1997, when he requested a pre-trial hearing.  The trial court did not honor the request.  Nearly two years later, on April 20, 1999, appellant attempted to initiate service of process again.  After another unsuccessful attempt to find defendant, the trial court set the case for July 12, 2001.  The day before the trial, the court received appellant=s motion for issuance of a bench warrant, or in the alternative, a default judgment.  Neither appellant nor appellee appeared on the day of the proceedings and the judge stated, APlaintiff had requested a bench warrant, which I denied;  requested default, but service has not been had in this case for over nine years, so the case is dismissed for lack of prosecution.@

Standard of Review

AWe review a dismissal for want of prosecution under a clear abuse of discretion standard;  the central issue is whether the plaintiff[] exercised reasonable diligence.@  MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam).  AThe test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles or, equivalently, whether under all the circumstances of the particular case the trial court=s action was arbitrary or unreasonable.@  Pedraza v. Crossroads Sec. Sys., 960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (citing Koslow=s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990)).

Analysis


By one point of error, with sub-points, Irizarry contends the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his lawsuit for failure to appear without affording him any method by which he could appear.  Yet, the court did not dismiss for appellant=s failure to appear.  The court dismissed the suit for lack of prosecution.  Nevertheless, in a sub-point, Irizarry complains of the trial court=s failure to issue a bench warrant to afford him an opportunity to appear at hearings related to his lawsuit.  However, Aprisoners have no absolute right to appear personally at civil proceedings.@  Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 (citing Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1995, no writ)).

This Court has decided that when determining whether an inmate should attend court proceedings:

the trial court must balance the interest of the State in preserving the integrity of the correctional system with the prisoner=s interest in access to the courts and strike a balance that is fundamentally fair.  Factors to be considered in weighing these two interests include:  the cost and inconvenience of transporting the prisoner, the security risk presented by the prisoner, the substance of the matter, the need for witnessing the prisoner=s demeanor, whether the trial is before a jury or a judge, and the possibility of delaying trial until the prisoner is released.

Pedraza, 960 S.W.2d at 342 (citing Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1991, no writ)).  A

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Related

Nance v. Nance
904 S.W.2d 890 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
MacGregor v. Rich
941 S.W.2d 74 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Hosey v. County of Victoria
832 S.W.2d 701 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Pedraza v. Crossroads Security Systems
960 S.W.2d 339 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Pruske v. Dempsey
821 S.W.2d 687 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co.
767 S.W.2d 839 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1989)
Koslow's v. MacKie
796 S.W.2d 700 (Texas Supreme Court, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
Fernando Irizarry v. Michael J. Clayborne, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fernando-irizarry-v-michael-j-clayborne-texapp-2002.