Fernando Haffid Camero v. Samantha Jo Camero

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided September 8, 2016·No. 01-15-00860-CV·Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTIONS

Appellate case name: Fernando Haffid Camero v. Samantha Jo Camero

Appellate case number: 01-15-00860-CV

Trial court case number: 76468-F

Trial court: 300th District Court of Brazoria County

On October 1, 2015, appellant, Fernando Haffid Camero, proceeding pro se and incarcerated, mistakenly filed a notice of appeal in this Court, from the August 10, 2015 final decree of divorce, but is deemed filed in the trial court on October 1, 2015. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a). Appellant filed no post-judgment motion, making September 9, 2015, his deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See id. 26.1; TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a), (g). Because appellant’s October 1, 2015 notice of appeal may not have been timely filed, this Court issued an Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction on January 21, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 42.3(a), (c). This Court’s Order further directed appellant to timely move for extension of time to file his notice of appeal by providing a reasonable explanation why his notice of appeal should be deemed timely under the “prisoner mailbox rule,” including any proof of when appellant placed the notice of appeal in the outgoing prison mailbox. Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); see also Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617–18 (Tex. 1997).

“Under the mailbox rule, a document is deemed timely filed if it is sent to the proper clerk by first-class mail in a properly addressed, stamped envelope on or before the last day for filing and is received not more than ten days beyond the filing deadline.” Glover v. Berleth, No. 01-09-00679-CV, 2012 WL 114200, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 9.2(b)(1)); see also Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (noting that appellant has burden of “providing some measure of proof that [his] notice[] of appeal w[as] placed in the United States mail on or before [the deadline],” such as “record in the form of the filing letter accompanying the [appellant’s] notice[] of appeal” stating the date the notice of appeal was placed in the “outgoing prison mailbox.”). Under the “prisoner mailbox rule,” the “pleadings of pro se inmates shall be deemed filed at the time they are delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Campbell v. State, 320 S.W.3d 338, 342, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

On August 26, 2016, appellant moved for extension of time to file his pro se brief- affidavit, with a three-page pro se brief/affidavit filed in this Court addressing the merits of his appeal. 1 Appellant also attached two exhibits to his brief, Step 1 and Step 2 offender grievance forms alleging that his legal paperwork was temporarily confiscated by prison staff on August 24, 2015, and not all of it was returned, which may have caused his appellate deadline to expire.

On August 31, 2016, appellant filed a letter in this Court, dated August 24, 2016, claiming that he had provided proof of when he placed his notice of appeal in the outgoing prison mailbox by referring to the Step 1 and 2 grievances he previously submitted. In addition, appellant attached two other exhibits, the first was a letter from the district clerk, dated September 30, 2015, stating that she had received appellant’s September 19, 2015 cover letter, but that he had failed to include the notice of appeal. The second exhibit was appellant’s one-page cover letter entitled “Notice To Appeal,” dated September 19, 2015, and postmarked September 22, 2015, stating that he was enclosing his notice of appeal, but it included no separate notice of appeal.

This Court construes appellant’s August 31, 2016 letter as his letter-motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal because it attaches exhibits to support that motion, and refers to the prior August 26, 2016 pro se brief/affidavit and Step 1 and 2 exhibits, and considers all as proof for his motion. See Glover, 2012 WL 114200, at *2 (stating that “Rule 9.2(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled ‘Proof of Mailing,’ identifies items that an appellate court will accept as conclusive proof of the date of mailing, and expressly permits that an appellate court may consider other proof.”) (citation omitted). This Court further construes appellant’s pro se cover letter, dated September 19, 2015, as his notice of appeal because he provided proof of when he placed the notice of appeal in the outgoing prison mailbox as it was postmarked on September 22, 2015. See id. Also, appellant titled his cover letter “Notice To Appeal,” stated that he was enclosing his notice of appeal, cited the underlying trial court cause number and divorce decree, and addressed it to the district clerk, indicating his intention to appeal.

In this case, appellant’s cover letter “Notice To Appeal,” postmarked September 22, 2015, was mailed by prison staff to the district clerk before the last day for filing,

1 On August 18, 2016, this Court granted appellant’s third extension of time to file his pro se brief-affidavit in support of his until September 14, 2016. On August 31, 2016, the Clerk of this Court retroactively granted appellant’s fourth motion for extension of time to file his pro se brief-affidavit until August 26, 2016, because he included a brief with the motion, both dated August 23, 2016. 2 which was September 24, 2015, including the fifteen-day grace period under rule 26.3(a), implying a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal. See Houser, 243 S.W.3d at 646 (holding that inmate’s “notice of appeal was deemed filed on the day he mailed it [35 days after trial court’s judgment was signed], since it was received one day after the 15-day deadline, . . . and a motion for extension was thereby implied. . . .”) (internal citations omitted); see also McCray v. Mulder, No. 05–08–00420–CV, 2008 WL 2600700, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 2, 2008, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (noting that “the notice of appeal [in Houser] was received by the trial court clerk on the sixteenth day after it was originally due, which was within ten days of the date it was due under rule 26.3(a).”) (citation omitted). Although appellant’s separate notice of appeal was not attached to his September 19, 2015 cover letter, his “Notice To Appeal,” dated September 28, 2015, was mistakenly filed in this Court on October 1, 2015, and deemed filed the same day with the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a). Thus, appellant’s “Notice To Appeal” was deemed filed on October 1, 2015, which means it was “received not more than ten days beyond the filing deadline.” Ramos, 228 S.W.3d at 673.

Accordingly, appellant’s August 31, 2016 letter-motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal is GRANTED under the “prisoner mailbox rule,” and we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal on the merits. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.2(b), 10.5(b), 26.3(b); Houser, 243 S.W.3d at 646; Ramos, 228 S.W.3d at 673; see also Glover, 2012 WL 114200, at *3 (concluding that appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed under the mailbox rule and that court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal).

Because both appellant’s pro se brief, filed August 26, 2016, and his pro se supplemental brief, filed on September 1, 2016, appear to address the merits of his divorce appeal, appellee’s brief, if any, is ORDERED to be filed within 30 days of the date of this order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(b), (d).

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Fernando Haffid Camero v. Samantha Jo Camero, (Tex. Ct. App. 2016).

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