Fernando Allen Sanchez v. County of San Diego, by and through its Health & Human Services Agency (HHSA); et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02987
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-02987-DMS-KSC FERNANDO ALLEN SANCHEZ,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISMISSING SECOND 14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, by and AMENDED COMPLAINT SUA through its Health & Human Services 15 SPONTE; Agency (HHSA); et al.,

16 Defendants. (2) DENYING MOTIONS FOR 17 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER and EXPEDITED 18 CONSIDERATION and INTERIM 19 RELIEF;

20 (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 21 RECUSAL; and

22 (4) DENYING APPLICATION TO 23 ELECTRONICALLY FILE CASE DOCUMENTS 24

25 [ECF Nos. 9–13, 15] 26 27 28 1 Pending before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff Fernando Allen Sanchez’s Second 2 Amended Complaint (“SAC”), (Second Amended Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 11), and 3 motion seeking temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff also moved 4 for “expedited consideration and interim relief,” and for recusal. (ECF Nos. 10, 12, 15.) 5 Lastly, Plaintiff moved for leave to electronically file case documents. (ECF No. 13.) This 6 Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but 7 dismissed the original and First Amended Complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim. 8 (ECF Nos. 5, 8.) Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must screen the SAC sua 9 sponte. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the SAC and denies all motions.1 10 I. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF SAC 11 A. Legal Standard 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous 14 or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 15 immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 16 (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 17 prisoners”). 18 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under 19 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure 20 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) 21 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 22 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 23 24 25 1 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s pending petition for writ of mandamus, (see ECF 26 No. 14), does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. United States v. Valenzuela-Arisqueta, 724 F.3d 1290, 1297 n.8 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A petition for a writ of mandamus does not deprive the trial court of 27 jurisdiction.”); Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Washington (Tacoma), 360 F.3d 1022, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 28 1 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 2 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the 3 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 4 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not 5 initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 6 1982). 7 B. Factual Background 8 This suit arises from Defendants—the County of San Diego (“County”), County 9 employee Vanessa Huerta, and Administrative Law Judge Navarro (no first name 10 provided)—allegedly depriving Plaintiff of his CalFresh benefits in violation of due 11 process. Plaintiff received CalFresh benefits for two years. (SAC 1.) Plaintiff earned 12 “zero income,” (id. ¶ 30), and remained fully eligible when he attempted to renew his 13 benefits. (Id. at 1.) However, Plaintiff’s benefits were discontinued because the County 14 “blocked all communication, misdirected phone contact information, improperly replaced 15 Plaintiff’s primary number with his mother’s, relied on known-defective Verizon-spam- 16 filter phone technology, [and] failed to process BenefitsCal applications.” (Id.) Plaintiff 17 attempted to call the CalFresh Access Line “numerous times,” but could not reach a human 18 being. (See id. ¶¶ 13–17.) “[T]he County knew Verizon spam filters block County 19 outbound calls, affecting both Plaintiff and his mother.” (Id. ¶ 22.) After repeated attempts 20 to reach the County, Plaintiff connected with a County worker and asked to add his 21 mother’s number as a secondary number. (Id. ¶ 23.) The County worker replaced 22 Plaintiff’s primary number with his mother’s. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.) “County records showed 23 staff never attempted to call both numbers—only one at a time.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Further, 24 “Verizon spam filters blocked all attempted calls to both phones.” (Id. ¶ 26.) “After 25 Plaintiff removed all call filters, the County still called only one number and never 26 corrected the error.” (Id. ¶ 27.) 27 In the complaint for his agency proceedings, Plaintiff used the term “state-sponsored 28 terrorism.” (Id. ¶ 63.) During the first hearing before Judge Navarro, Judge Navarro 1 “highlight[ed]” Plaintiff’s use of this term. (Id.) After Judge Navarro’s “remark,” Plaintiff 2 experienced “off-hours hearing, refusal to record the primary evidentiary session, last- 3 minute evidence dumps, denial of procedural accommodations, failure to issue any written 4 decision.” (Id. ¶ 65.) At Plaintiff’s third hearing, Judge Navarro was “prepared to dismiss 5 the matter immediately.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff objected to the dismissal. (Id. ¶ 56.) Judge 6 Navarro stated that a written decision would follow, but none did. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 58.) Plaintiff 7 has no transcripts, recordings, or indication of the ruling, making an appeal “impossible.” 8 (Id. ¶¶ 59, 61.) 9 Plaintiff also submitted “multiple BenefitsCal applications,” but his “[s]ubmissions 10 were rejected, lost, or erased by system failure.” (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) Plaintiff had no other way 11 to apply for CalFresh benedits. (Id. ¶ 20.) “After reapplying, the County scheduled a 12 renewal interview for November 18, but Plaintiff received the notice after the hearing date 13 passed.” (Id. ¶ 67.) The notice also listed Plaintiff’s mother’s phone number rather than 14 his. (Id. ¶ 68.) 15 The SAC asserts a (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violations of his Fourteenth 16 Amendment right to procedural due process; and (2) § 1983 claim against the County, 17 under a Monell theory of liability; and (3) declaratory relief claim.2 (Id. at 1.) 18 C. Discussion 19 1. Section 1983–Monell Claim 20 A municipality may be liable for the deprivations of constitutional rights deriving 21 from the execution of a municipality’s policies or customs. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 22 of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must 23 sufficiently allege that “(1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality 24 had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff’s] 25 constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional 26

27 2 The Court notes that the SAC Plaintiff filed may be missing pages. Notably, the SAC starts with 28 1 violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff 2 must show a “direct causal link” between the policy and the constitutional deprivation. 3 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). “Isolated 4 or sporadic incidents” are generally insufficient to establish municipal liability. See 5 Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that the County engaged in “ongoing obstruction” 7 is insufficient to establish that his reported injury “resulted from a ‘permanent and well 8 settled’ practice” arising from a “local government custom.” Thompson v. City of Los 9 Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Rather, there must be 10 sufficient factual allegations demonstrating that the County has “widespread, persistent, 11 and well-settled” policies. Plaintiff alleges that he made “numerous” phone calls with no 12 success and “multiple BenefitsCal applications” that were “rejected, lost, or erased by 13 system failure.” (SAC ¶¶ 13, 18.) The allegations also include reference to two hearings 14 in which Judge Navarro reportedly acted improperly. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges an 15 array of frustrations, such as “last-minute evidence dumps,” but does not allege specific 16 instances of when these “dumps” occurred, how many times this occurred, or why. Even 17 when construing the pleading liberally, these allegations are too vague, too sparse, and too 18 attenuated to establish “widespread, persistent, and well-settled” policies. Accordingly, 19 the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the County with leave to amend. 20 2. Section 1983–Official Liability 21 “Suits against governmental officers in their official capacities are subject to the 22 same requirements as Monell claims against local governments.” Johnson v. Cnty. of Los 23 Angeles, No. CV 14-4407 JLS (KK), 2015 WL 4881349, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (internal 24 citation omitted). Thus, “as with claims against local governments under Monell, to 25 impose liability against officials acting in their official capacity, the entity’s policy or 26 custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (citation modified) 27 (internal citation omitted). As stated above, the SAC does not sufficiently allege the 28 County had a policy that caused his alleged due process violations. Further, Plaintiff does 1 not allege that either Huerta or Judge Navarro are policymakers such that a single act by 2 either would amount to Monell liability. See, e.g., id. In fact, the factual allegations make 3 no mention of Huerta. Thus, even construed liberally, the Complaint lacks sufficient 4 factual matter to state a claim against Huerta or Judge Navarro in their official capacities. 5 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983 official capacity claims against 6 Huerta and Judge Navarro with leave to amend. 7 3. Section 1983–Individual Liability 8 To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege “(1) a 9 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) 10 proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” 11 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff sues Huerta in her 12 individual capacity, but does not plead how she violated his rights. As stated above, the 13 factual allegations make no mention of Huerta, nonetheless sufficiently establish that 14 Huerta was involved in any reported obstruction Plaintiff faced. Even when construed 15 liberally, the Complaint lacks sufficient factual matter to state a claim against Huerta in her 16 individual capacity. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against 17 Huerta with leave to amend. 18 4. Declaratory Relief 19 Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief. (SAC 1). However, Plaintiff’s declaratory 20 relief claim “rises and falls with [his] section 1983 claims.” Est. of Posard v. Los Angeles 21 Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. CV 23-10460 PA (EX), 2024 WL 3467775, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 22 May 31, 2024). Because Plaintiff has no surviving § 1983 claims, his declaratory relief 23 claim is also DISMISSED with leave to amend. 24 II. MOTIONS FOR TRO and EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION and INTERIM 25 RELIEF 26 Because the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, there is no operative complaint 27 on which to base Plaintiff’s motions for TRO or for expedited consideration and interim 28 relief. See Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC, No. 3:25-CV-01437-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 1 1645593, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025). The Court DENIES without prejudice 2 Plaintiff’s motion for TRO and for expedited consideration and interim relief as moot. 3 III. MOTION FOR RECUSAL 4 Plaintiff states that he has “transmitted dozens of written communications to the San 5 Diego County District Attorney’s Office [(‘DA’s Office’)] regarding severe injury, 6 housing endangerment, medical decline, and safety concerns affecting both Plaintiff and 7 his mother.” (ECF No. 12, at 1.) However, Plaintiff has not received a response from the 8 DA’s Office, and no prosecution or investigation has occurred. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff 9 contends that, in or around 2014, he was falsely incarcerated after being prosecuted by the 10 DA’s Office for a child support dispute. (See ECF No. 15, at 4.) Petitioner claims that the 11 DA’s Office exercised “supervisory authority” over Department of Child Support Services 12 (“DCSS”) enforcement, and that he has “publicly challenged both administrations 13 regarding suppression of ritual-abuse allegations and retaliatory DCSS enforcement in this 14 case.” (ECF No. 15, at 4.) Plaintiff believes that there is a conflict of interest because the 15 elected District Attorney is the undersigned’s spouse. (Id. at 6.) 16 First, “Plaintiff respectfully places on the record a request that the District Attorney’s 17 Office recuse itself, that the matter be referred to an independent out-of-jurisdiction 18 authority, or that immediate action be taken to prevent further procedural harm.” (ECF 19 No. 12, at 2.) However, the DA’s Office is not a party in this matter. Neither Plaintiff’s 20 prosecution and incarceration nor his current desire for the DA’s Office to investigate a 21 current matter are at issue in this case. Thus, the Court does not have jurisdiction for such 22 a request. 23 Second, to the extent Petitioner moves to recuse the undersigned, (see ECF No. 15, 24 at 3), there is not a sufficient basis to do so. “In the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse 25 himself, a judge has a duty to sit in judgment in all cases coming before him,” United States 26 v. Holland, 501 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 27 (1972)), “except those in which [his] ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Id. 28 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). Recusal is required “only when a reasonable person with 1 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 2 be questioned.” United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir. 1990). A judge’s 3 decision on a motion to recuse must also reflect “the need to prevent parties from too easily 4 obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system . . . 5 to obtain a judge more to their liking.” In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 6 1989). 7 Plaintiff argues that the Court “is asked to adjudicate allegations against the same 8 office now led by the judge’s spouse.” This is not true. Plaintiff’s purported prosecution 9 by the DA’s Office and his incarceration are not at issue here. Neither is any child support 10 that Plaintiff has paid for or is required to pay. Instead, this case is about whether Plaintiff’s 11 CalFresh benefits—which are administered by a separate agency, unrelated to the DA’s 12 Office or DCSS—have been unlawfully withheld. Similarly, while Plaintiff has requested 13 that the DA’s Office investigate “severe injury, housing endangerment, medical decline, 14 and safety concerns,” these matters are unrelated to Plaintiff’s CalFresh benefits. 15 Additionally, based on the facts alleged, the undersigned’s spouse was not leading the DA’s 16 Office during his prosecution and incarceration. See Summer Stephan, San Diego County 17 District Attorney, City of S.D., https://www.sandiego.gov/gangcommission/about/stephan 18 (the undersigned’s spouse was appointed Chief Deputy District Attorney in 2012 and 19 appointed Interim District Attorney in 2017). Thus, based on this record, the Court does 20 not need to adjudicate any matters involving the DA’s Office, DCSS (assuming the DA’s 21 Office exercises “supervisory authority” over that Department), or any other agency related 22 to Plaintiff’s prosecution, incarceration, or potential child support obligations. Further, the 23 undersigned’s spouse is not “a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of 24 a party”; is not “acting as a lawyer in the proceeding”; does not “have an interest that could 25 be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding”; and to the undersigned’s 26 knowledge, is not “likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 27 455(b)(5). Further, Plaintiff does not claim that the undersigned or his spouse have 28 familiarity with the named parties, Huerta and Judge Navarro. For these reasons, the Court 1 finds that at this time, recusal of the undersigned is not warranted. Plaintiff’s motion for 2 recusal is DENIED.3 3 IV. APPLICATION TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE 4 Generally, “[e]xcept as prescribed by local rule, order, or other procedure, the Court 5 has designated all cases to be assigned to the Electronic Filing System.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 6 5.4(a). However, “[a] pro se must seek leave to electronically file documents in each case 7 filed.” Off. of the Clerk, U.S. Dist. Ct., S. Dist. Of Cal., Electronic Case Filing 8 Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual § 2(b) (2025). “A pro se party seeking 9 leave to electronically file documents must file a motion and demonstrate the means to do 10 so properly by stating their equipment and software capabilities in addition to agreeing to 11 follow all rules and policies in the CM/ECF Administrative Policies and Procedures 12 Manual.” Id. The manual refers to the Court’s official web site for CM/ECF technical 13 specifications, id. at § 1(i), which include a “computer running on Windows 7 or higher, 14 MacOS X or higher, or Linux”; “[s]oftware to convert documents from a word processor 15 format to PDF, such as Adobe Acrobat”; a “[d]ocument scanner”; “[i]nternet access 16 capable of downloading and uploading files sizes up to 35 MB”; a “compatible browser, 17 such as Firefox 15 or higher, Microsoft Edge, or Safari 5.1 or higher”; and “[a]n email 18 account to receive notifications from the Court.” Representing Yourself in Federal Court 19 (Pro Se), U.S. Dist. Ct., S. Dist. of Cal. (last visited Nov. 6, 2025, at 14:37 PT), 20 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/ProSe/Prose-FilingInfo.aspx. 21 Plaintiff states that he “is capable of complying with all applicable CM/ECF rules 22 and requirements,” (ECF No. 13), but does not state what equipment and software he has 23 access to. Thus, Plaintiff fails to provide “sufficiently detailed information concerning his 24

25 26 3 Plaintiff also asks the Court to “[s]tay all proceedings and DCSS enforcement immediately”; “[o]rder preservation of all DA, DCSS, and court records”; and “[i]ssue an OSC or TRO preventing further 27 retaliation or deprivation,” (ECF No. 15, at 6), but provides no legal basis for these requests. Therefore, these requests are DENIED. 28 1 ||}computer equipment and software to satisfy the Court that he meets the technical 2 specifications required to electronically file documents.” Weiss v. Equifax Info. Servs. 3 LLC, No. 22-cv-1098, 2022 WL 19334073, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2022). Thus, the 4 || Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff's application for permission to electronically 5 || file. 6 V. CONCLUSION 7 Based on the foregoing, the Court: (1) DISMISSES the SAC with leave to amend; 8 ||(2) DENIES the motions for TRO and expedited consideration without prejudice; (3) 9 || DENIES motion for recusal; and (4) DENIES without prejudice the application to 10 electronically file case documents. Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint to cure 11 defects described above no later than twenty one (21) days from the date this Order is 12 || entered. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: February 11, 2026 2» 15 inn Slo Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28