Fernando Allen Sanchez v. County of San Diego, by and through its Health & Human Services Agency (HHSA); Vanessa Huerta, in her individual and official capacities; Judge Navarro, Administrative Law Judge, in her official capacity

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02987
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-02987-DMS-KSC FERNANDO ALLEN SANCHEZ,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, by and COMPLAINT SUA SPONTE; and through its Health & Human Services 15 Agency (HHSA); VANESSA HUERTA, (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 16 in her individual and official capacities; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING JUDGE NAVARRO, Administrative Law 17 ORDER Judge, in her official capacity for

18 injunctive/declaratory relief, [ECF Nos. 6, 7] 19 Defendants.

20 21 Pending before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff Fernando Allen Sanchez’s First 22 Amended Complaint (“FAC”), (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 6), and motion 23 seeking temporary restraining order (“TRO”), (ECF No. 7). This Court previously granted 24 Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but dismissed the original 25 Complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 5). Because Plaintiff is 26 proceeding IFP, the Court must screen the FAC sua sponte before ruling on Plaintiff’s 27 motion for TRO. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the Complaint and denies 28 the motion for TRO. 1 I. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF FAC 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous 5 or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 6 immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 7 (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 8 prisoners”). 9 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under 10 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure 11 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) 12 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 13 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 14 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 15 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the 16 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 17 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not 18 initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 19 1982). 20 B. Factual Background 21 This suit arises from Defendants—the County of San Diego (“County”), County 22 employee Vanessa Huerta, and Administrative Law Judge Navarro (no first name 23 provided)—allegedly depriving Plaintiff of his CalFresh benefits in violation of due 24 process. Beginning in 2021, Plaintiff’s CalFresh benefits required renewal. (FAC ¶ 46). 25 Over the course of multiple years, Plaintiff attempted to renew or reapply for CalFresh 26 benefits over twenty one times. (Id. ¶ 47). Specifically, Plaintiff called the County’s 27 CalFresh Access Line twelve times and submitted five online applications through the 28 County’s BenefitsCal portal. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 51). The County’s administrative records show 1 at least nine of these attempts. (Id. ¶ 48). During the calls, Plaintiff received “contradictory 2 instructions, was told to wait for callbacks that never came, and was informed that his 3 applications could not be located in the County’s system.” (Id. ¶ 50). Plaintiff’s online 4 applications were rejected due to system errors, “[l]ost entirely with no confirmation or 5 follow-up, or “[b]locked by technical failures in the County’s application processing 6 system.” (Id. ¶ 52). Plaintiff also emailed Huerta three times and called and left voicemail 7 messages four times, asking for assistance with his benefits renewal. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 60). 8 Huerta never responded to Plaintiff’s communications. (Id. ¶ 61). Plaintiff was unable to 9 renew his benefits. (Id. ¶ 53). 10 Eventually, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing regarding the denial of his 11 CalFresh benefits renewal. (Id. ¶ 65). The hearing was before Judge Navarro on an 12 unspecified date. (Id. ¶ 66). At the hearing, Huerta falsely testified that she never received 13 communications from Plaintiff; however, the County’s electronic records showed 14 Plaintiff’s emails at the time. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 63). Huerta also admitted that the County’s 15 outbound telephone calls are routinely blocked by Verizon Wireless’s spam-filter 16 technology, that applicants using Verizon Wireless frequently do not receive County calls, 17 that County is aware of this “systemic problem,” and that the County has no “workaround, 18 alternative contact method, or mitigation strategy.” (Id. ¶ 54). Notably, Plaintiff uses 19 Verizon Wireless as his cellular provider. (Id. ¶ 55). At the end of the hearing, Judge 20 Navarro ordered Huerta to contact Plaintiff and help him with his renewal, to which Huerta 21 agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 69). Judge Navarro did not issue a written decision following the 22 hearing. (Id. ¶ 70). 23 Following the hearing, the County attempted to contact Plaintiff via two automated 24 telephone calls placed at 5:13 a.m. and 5:16 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 73). The robocalls “left no 25 voicemail, provided no instructions, scheduled no interview, and contained no substantive 26 information.” (Id. ¶ 76). When Plaintiff called back, an automated message played, stating 27 that the phone number could not receive calls. (Id. ¶ 75). There were no other 28 communications from the County. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 77–80). 1 Plaintiff submitted his application to reapply for CalFresh one week before filing the 2 original Complaint (November 4, 2025). (Id. ¶ 84). As of the filing of Plaintiff’s FAC 3 (November 19, 2025), the County has taken no action on Plaintiff’s application. (Id. ¶¶ 81, 4 85–87). Plaintiff has yet to receive benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 82, 88). 5 The FAC asserts (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all Defendants for violations 6 of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process; and (2) a § 1983 claim 7 against the County, under a Monell theory of liability. (Id. at 12–14). Plaintiff also asserts 8 a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking declarations that 9 Defendants violated Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights and that Plaintiff is entitled 10 to retroactive issuance of withheld CalFresh benefits and immediate reinstatement of 11 benefits. (Id. at 14–15). 12 C. Discussion 13 1. Section 1983–Monell Claim 14 A municipality may be liable for the deprivations of constitutional rights deriving 15 from the execution of a municipality’s policies or customs. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 16 of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim under § 1983, a 17 plaintiff must sufficiently allege that “(1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the 18 municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [the 19 plaintiff’s] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the 20 constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 21 2020). The plaintiff must show a “direct causal link” between the policy and the 22 constitutional deprivation. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 23 2016) (en banc). “Isolated or sporadic incidents” are generally insufficient to establish 24 municipal liability. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 25 Plaintiff purports several policies as the basis of his Monell claim: (1) the use of 26 automatic calls from non-operational phone numbers as the primary method to contact 27 applicants; (2) the “[f]ailure to remedy known call-blocking technology failures”; (3) 28 “[i]gnoring applicant emails and written communications”; (4) the “[a]utomated rejection 1 of online applications without functional alternatives”; (5) the “[f]ailure to issue written 2 administrative decisions”; (6) failure to respond to Temporary Restraining Order requests; 3 and (7) the tolerance and ratification of false testimony by County employees during 4 administrative hearings. (FAC ¶¶ 95, 116). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that these 5 supposed policies are “widespread, persistent, and well-settled,” (FAC ¶ 117), is 6 insufficient to establish his reported injury “resulted from a ‘permanent and well settled’ 7 practice” arising from a “local government custom.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 8 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Rather, there must be sufficient 9 factual allegations demonstrating that these policies are indeed “widespread, persistent, 10 and well-settled.” Even when construing the allegations liberally, there are at best very 11 few instances of these “policies” occurring. For example, there is at most one alleged 12 instance of tolerating false testimony. There are no alleged instances of the County failing 13 to respond to Temporary Restraining Order requests. Further, Plaintiff fails to establish 14 the causational element. In other words, even if these policies do occur on a permanent 15 and well settled basis, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how these policies were the “moving 16 force” behind the expiration or rejection of his CalFresh benefits. In fact, even after 17 experiencing unsuccessful phone calls and online applications, Plaintiff was provided an 18 administrative hearing wherein Judge Navarro directed Huerta to assist Plaintiff with his 19 benefits renewal application. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Monell 20 claim against the County with leave to amend. 21 2. Section 1983–Official Liability 22 “Suits against governmental officers in their official capacities are subject to the 23 same requirements as Monell claims against local governments.” Johnson v. Cnty. of Los 24 Angeles, No. CV 14-4407 JLS (KK), 2015 WL 4881349, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (internal 25 citation omitted). Thus, “as with claims against local governments under Monell, to 26 impose liability against officials acting in their official capacity, the entity’s policy or 27 custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (citation modified) 28 (internal citation omitted). As stated above, the FAC does not sufficiently allege the 1 County had a policy that caused his alleged due process violations. Further, Plaintiff does 2 not allege that either Huerta or Judge Navarro are policymakers such that a single act by 3 either would amount to Monell liability. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 4 Plaintiff’s § 1983 official capacity claims against Huerta and Judge Navarro with leave to 5 amend.1 6 3. Section 1983–Individual Liability 7 To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under § 1983, 8 Plaintiff must sufficiently allege “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 9 Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” 10 Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (internal 11 citation omitted). “Property interests are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are 12 created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from 13 an independent source such as state law.” Id. at 1067 (citation modified) (internal citation 14 omitted). “Once a state creates a liberty interest, it cannot take it away without due 15 process.” Johnson, 2015 WL 4881349, at *4 (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 16 (2011)). Therefore, “procedural due process protections apply to the termination of welfare 17 benefits for those statutorily entitled to them.” Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 18 260 (1970)). “Key to a property interest determination is whether the person alleging a 19 due process violation has an entitlement to the benefit at issue, conferred through statute, 20 regulation, contract, or established practice.” Armstrong, 22 F.4th at 1067. 21 Plaintiff must sufficiently allege that he was entitled to CalFresh benefits. Plaintiff 22 simply alleges that he “is eligible for CalFresh food assistance benefits.” (FAC ¶ 44). This 23 is conclusory. Plaintiff fails to specifically and factually allege that he is entitled to 24 CalFresh benefits. It thus follows that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that he had a 25 26

27 1 In light of this determination, the Court does not examine whether Plaintiff’s claims against Huerta and 28 1 || property interest that carries due process protections. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 2 || Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Huerta in her individual capacity with leave to amend.” 3 4. Declaratory Relief 4 Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action against Defendants under § 2201, seeking 5 declarations that Defendants violated Plaintiffs procedural due process rights and that 6 Plaintiff is “entitled to immediate reinstatement of CalFresh benefits with retroactive 7 |lissuance of withheld benefits.” (FAC §] 125). Plaintiffs declaratory relief claim “rises and 8 || falls with [his] section 1983 claims.” Est. of Posard v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s □□□□□□ 9 CV 23-10460 PA (EX), 2024 WL 3467775, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2024). Because 10 || Plaintiff has no surviving § 1983 claims, his declaratory relief claim is also DISMISSED 11 || with leave to amend. 12 II. MOTION FOR TRO 13 Because the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, there is no operative complaint 14 || on which to base Plaintiff's motion for TRO. Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC, No. 3:25- 15 || CV-01437-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 1645593, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025). The Court 16 || DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff's motion for TRO as moot. 17 II. CONCLUSION 18 Based on the foregoing, the Court: (1) DISMISSES the FAC with leave to amend; 19 |land (3) DENIES the motion for TRO without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a Second 20 || Amended Complaint to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21) 21 || days from the date this Order is entered. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: December 2, 2025 \ 4 \ 74 rr WM. 95 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge 26 27 9g ||° Because the Court finds that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege a protected property interest, the Court declines to address whether the other elements are sufficiently pled.