Fern Tran v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC

Opinion

FERN TRAN, Case No. 5:25-cv-08846-BLF

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR v. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, [Re: ECF No. 8] LLC, Defendant. Before the Court is Defendant Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC’s (“Portfolio’s”) motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF No. 8 (“Mot.”); ECF No. 9 (“Reply”). Pro se Plaintiff Fern Tran has not filed an opposing brief. The motion is suitable for decision without oral argument; the hearing set for March 26, 2026, is VACATED. See Civ. L.R. 7-11(b). The motion is DENIED. On September 12, 2025, Ms. Tran filed her complaint against Portfolio, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Act (“CCRAA”) for failure to investigate. ECF No. 1-1 (“Compl.”). Portfolio removed the action to federal court, ECF No. 1, and filed its answer concurrently with this motion, ECF No. 7 (“Answer”). The complaint alleges as follows. Portfolio is a debt collector. Compl. ¶ 4. Ms. Tran alleges that Portfolio reported that she owed an outstanding balance of $12,057.72 on a Citibank account ending in 2834 to consumer reporting agencies, including Equifax, Experian, and 2834. Id. ¶ 8. On June 2, 2024, June 9, 2025, and September 4, 2025, Ms. Tran submitted online disputes to Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion regarding the Account information, which was transmitted to Portfolio through the Automated Consumer Dispute Verification system. Id. ¶¶ 11– 12. In August 2025, she sent additional dispute correspondence to Portfolio. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Ms. Tran alleges that Portfolio failed to investigate the dispute, unfairly causing her credit score to be lowered. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the same legal standard applies to both. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, when considering a Rule 12(c) motion, a district court “must accept the facts as pled by the nonmovant.” Id. at 1053. The district court then must apply the Iqbal standard to determine “whether the complaint’s factual allegations, together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for relief.” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1054 & n.4 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A district court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding a motion under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), and if such materials are presented to the court and not excluded, the motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). A district court may, however, consider the following materials without converting a Rule 12(c) motion to a Rule 56 motion: “(1) exhibits to the nonmoving party’s pleading, (2) documents that are referred to in the non-moving party’s pleading, or (3) facts that are included in materials that can be judicially noticed.” Yang v. Dar Al-Handash Consultants, 250 F. App’x 771, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential). To succeed on her FCRA claim, Ms. Tran must prove: “(1) Defendant is a ‘furnisher’; (2) Plaintiff notified the [credit reporting agency] that Plaintiff disputed the reporting as information of the dispute; (4) the reporting was in fact inaccurate; and (5) Defendant failed to conduct the investigation required by § 1681s-2(b)(1).” Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1155–57 (9th Cir. 2009). “Similar to the FCRA, the CCCRAA requires furnishers not to provide ‘information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the [furnisher] knows or should know that the information is incomplete or inaccurate.’” Soria v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. 17-cv-00603-CJC-KESX, 2019 WL 8167925, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019) (quoting Cal Civ. Code § 1785.25(a)). Portfolio argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because Ms. Tran failed to timely seek validation of her account and because Portfolio complied with its statutory requirements in investigating each of Ms. Tran’s disputes. Mot. at 12. In support of this argument, Portfolio has submitted documentation reflecting that Portfolio completed its investigations of each of the disputes. See ECF Nos. 7-3, 7-4, 7-6, 7.7. As a threshold issue, it is unclear whether the Court may properly look to this documentation in resolving Portfolio’s Rule 12(c) motion—while Ms. Tran alleges that the investigations conducted by Portfolio were not reasonable, she does not expressly rely on such documentation, and Portfolio’s argument that she incorporated these documents is somewhat tenuous. Even if the Court were to consider them, however, these documents only reflect that an investigation was carried out: They provide no information as to what steps Portfolio took, and this is insufficient as a matter of law to resolve Ms. Tran’s claims at the pleadings stage. “A furnisher cannot escape its obligations ‘by merely rubber stamping,’ particularly ‘where the circumstances demand[] a more thorough inquiry.’” Soria, 2019 WL 8167925, at *8 (quoting Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1156). “[T]he reasonableness of any investigation involving identity theft is likely to be a highly individualized and fact-intensive inquiry.” Miller v. Westlake Servs. LLC, 637 F. Supp. 3d 836, 848 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Romero v. Monterey Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 19-cv-01781-JM-KSC, 2021 WL 268635, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2021). The Court is also not persuaded by Portfolio’s argument in its reply brief that, “[b]y failing to respond, [Ms. Tran] has waived any argument in opposition to [the] motion.” Reply at 2. Each 1 but failed to address arguments against a claim in that brief. See, e.g., Martin v. Masters, Mates, 2 & Pilots, 761 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Martin concedes dismissal of that claim 3 by failing to address the motions to dismiss it in his opposition briefs.” (emphasis added)). In light 4 of Ms. Tran’s pro se status and the dubious nature of Portfolio’s arguments, the Court declines 5 Portfolio’s invitation to find that it has discharged its burden at the pleadings stage simply because 6 Ms. Tran has failed to file an opposition brief. 7 IV. ORDER 8 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: the motion is DENIED. 9 10 Dated: December 19, 2025 1 ey Wy ic DML BETH LABSON FREEMAN %L United States District Judge

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