Feria v. Spencer

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Feria v. Spencer

616 So. 2d 84, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 2895, 1993 WL 72278

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 16, 1993

DocketNo. 93-151

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 616 So. 2d 84 (Feria v. Spencer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Feria v. Spencer, 616 So. 2d 84, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 2895, 1993 WL 72278 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Roberto Feria, petitions this court to issue a writ prohibiting his reprosecution based on the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We grant the writ of prohibition.

During the state’s redirect examination of one of its witnesses the trial court, sua sponte, and without the defendant’s consent, declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. The defendant’s silence when the trial court granted the mistrial cannot be construed as consent. See State v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710 (Fla.1956); Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593 (1906); State v. McNeil, 362 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Moreover, a trial court may only discharge a jury when there is a “manifest necessity” for the act. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); State v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710 (Fla.1956).

In the instant case, the mistrial was not dictated by manifest necessity. In fact, the trial court had no legally sufficient reason to declare a mistrial. Therefore, “the discharge is equivalent to an acquittal and precludes a subsequent trial for the same offense.” Grayson, 90 So.2d at 713. Any retrial would violate the defendant’s constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy.

Writ of prohibition issued.

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PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Roberto Feria, petitions this court to issue a writ prohibiting his reprosecution based on the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We grant the writ of prohibition.

During the state’s redirect examination of one of its witnesses the trial court, sua sponte, and without the defendant’s consent, declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. The defendant’s silence when the trial court granted the mistrial cannot be construed as consent. See State v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710 (Fla.1956); Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593 (1906); State v. McNeil, 362 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Moreover, a trial court may only discharge a jury when there is a “manifest necessity” for the act. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); State v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710 (Fla.1956).

In the instant case, the mistrial was not dictated by manifest necessity. In fact, the trial court had no legally sufficient reason to declare a mistrial. Therefore, “the discharge is equivalent to an acquittal and precludes a subsequent trial for the same offense.” Grayson, 90 So.2d at 713. Any retrial would violate the defendant’s constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy.

Writ of prohibition issued.

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Bluebook (online)

616 So. 2d 84, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 2895, 1993 WL 72278, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/feria-v-spencer-fladistctapp-1993.

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