Ferguson v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 19, 2023
Docket9:23-cv-81264
StatusUnknown

This text of Ferguson v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department of Corrections (Ferguson v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ferguson v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department of Corrections, (S.D. Fla. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-81264-RAR

BERNARD FERGUSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se civil rights Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint (“Compl.”), [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the “West Detention Center” in Palm Beach County, Florida (the “Jail”), alleges that eight individuals and entities associated with the Jail have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by refusing to provide him with “buprenorphine” to treat his “opioid-use disorder.” Id. at 8. After carefully reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a prima facie deliberate indifference claim against some (but not all) of the Defendants, but the Complaint cannot proceed to service because it does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss some of Plaintiff’s claims and order Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to address these remaining procedural and substantive defects before it will allow the remaining claims to proceed to service. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1 Plaintiff “was a regular heroin and oxycodone user,” and admits that he was “addicted” to these substances and “other opiates” in the past. Id. at 6. Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff “had been participating in a Suboxone treatment” at a local clinic.2 Id. Plaintiff informed the Jail’s medical staff during his intake that he “had been participating in Suboxone treatment” and that he “had already begun to experience withdrawal symptoms,” but the Jail “never provided me with any treatment for my addiction.” Id. Plaintiff’s withdrawal symptoms continued to worsen—he

suffered from “vomiting, nausea, diarrhea, loss of appetite, shakes, and fatigue”—until he began to “self-medicat[e] . . . through unconventional means[.]” Id. at 6–7.3 Plaintiff again requested Suboxone from the Jail’s medical staff, who now informed him that he should “sign-up for the M.A.P.S. program” and complete “an 85 day drug education program called ‘Another Way.’” Id. at 7. After fulfilling these requirements, Plaintiff met with Defendant Allison Perry, the Director of “The Recovery Research Network,” to discuss Petitioner’s “opioid-use history.” Id. Ms. Perry arranged for Plaintiff to meet with Defendant Dr. Ronald Waits the next day. See id. At his meeting with Dr. Waits, Plaintiff admitted that he “had been self-medicating” with Suboxone to avoid withdrawal symptoms after a urinalysis drug test revealed that Plaintiff “had Suboxone in [his] system.” Id. at 7–8. Despite the positive drug test,

1 Since the screening standard under § 1915A is functionally similar to the “failure to state a claim standard” under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the Court will assume all of the factual allegations in the Complaint are true. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). The parties should not interpret the Court’s recitation of the factual allegations in the Complaint as a comment on their veracity.

2 “Suboxone” is a brand name for the drug “buprenorphine,” which is both a Schedule III narcotic and a treatment for patients who are addicted to opioids. See United States v. Abovyan, 988 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).

3 Although Plaintiff never explicitly says so, the unavoidable conclusion is that Plaintiff began self- medicating with contraband Suboxone. Dr. Waits diagnosed Plaintiff with opioid-use disorder (“OUD”) and prescribed Plaintiff buprenorphine to treat it. See id. On August 7, 2023, after receiving his prescription for buprenorphine for three days, Plaintiff was approached by Defendant Sergeant Faircloth. Sgt. Faircloth informed Plaintiff that he had been issued a disciplinary report for “misuse of authorized medication” because of his positive drug test before Dr. Waits had prescribed him buprenorphine. See id. at 8. Sgt. Faircloth then explained that Plaintiff “was being taken off [his] medication pursuant to the Department’s

policy.” Id. at 9. Since then, Plaintiff has not received any buprenorphine for his OUD and is currently suffering “severe side effects from the withdrawals.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff eventually saw a different Jail doctor, Defendant Dr. Mouhammed,4 on August 16, 2023. Dr. Mouhammed told Plaintiff that “he would leave it to Dr. Waits to put me back on Suboxone because he took me off, but he acknowledged that it was a mistake to take me off.” Id. at 10. The next day, on August 17, 2023, Plaintiff “woke up laying in my own feces and bodily waste” and “collapsed” from the “terrible withdrawal symptoms.” Id. When Plaintiff saw Ms. Perry later that day, he “explained to her everything that has taken place in the past two weeks.” Id. at 11. Ms. Perry agreed that she would “try to talk to Dr. Waits” about getting Plaintiff back on medication. Id. Despite Dr. Mouhammed and Ms. Perry’s promises, Plaintiff still is not

receiving buprenorphine and is suffering from severe withdrawal symptoms while in the Jail. See id. at 11–13. LEGAL STANDARD The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

4 In another portion of the Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that Dr. Mouhammed might be an advanced registered nurse practitioner—not a doctor. See Compl. at 2. (emphasis added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” Id. § 1915A(c). In conducting its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the complaint[] or any portion of the complaint,” when it is (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[;]” or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Similarly, if a plaintiff wishes to proceed in forma pauperis rather than prepaying the filing fee, § 1915(e)(2) requires the court to “dismiss [a] case

at any time if the court determines that . . . the action” fails for the same enumerated reasons articulated under § 1915A. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the Court must hold the allegations in a pro se civil rights complaint “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v.

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Ferguson v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ferguson-v-palm-beach-county-sheriffs-department-of-corrections-flsd-2023.