Ferguson v. Corneli Seed Co.

3 Fla. Supp. 144

This text of 3 Fla. Supp. 144 (Ferguson v. Corneli Seed Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 5th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Lake County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ferguson v. Corneli Seed Co., 3 Fla. Supp. 144 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1951).

Opinion

T. G. FUTCH, Circuit Judge.

In this action which was tried to the court without a jury H. O. Ferguson sued the Corneli Seed Co., a Missouri corporation, for damages sustained by reason of the company having sold him, by name, 60 pounds of Black Diamond watermelon seed which he alleges failed to produce a crop of Black Diamond watermelons, but did produce a crop of melons which were not marketable.

The fact is not disputed that the defendant company shipped from its place of business in St. Louis the seed which the plaintiff planted. The company, however, denies that it sold the seed to the plaintiff, claiming that it sold the seed to Edwin Cauthen of Leesburg, of the Cauthen Grove Service Co., doing business in Leesburg.

The testimony shows that one Murphy, the defendant company’s admitted sales agent in Florida, called on Cauthen in the late summer or early fall of 1949, to sell Cauthen seed for his own use and make inquiry as to others who might need to buy seed. Cauthen gave the agent the plaintiff’s name and the agent called on plaintiff, reporting it back to Cauthen by written memorandum that plaintiff would notify Cauthen if plaintiff decided to buy the seed. This [146]*146agent made sales to two other parties and took an order from one of them. He later called again and wrote one order for the seed wanted by Cauthen, together with two other orders he had obtained, and the seed plaintiff had notified Cauthen he wanted. One of the parties to whom the agent sold later countermanded his order by a card directed to the defendant company, and the seed he had ordered was deleted from the order sent in by the agent.

The conclusion is inescapable that defendant sold the seed to Ferguson and not to Cauthen. The agent simply consolidated the order with Cauthen’s consent for convenience in packaging and shipping. These facts also show privity of contract between plaintiff and the defendant.

Defendant says it disclaimed warranty of type by incorporating into its contract with Cauthen the following clause in paragraph 2 of the Growing Sales Contract—

The seller agrees to plant, or endeavor to cause to he planted, during the season of 1949, an acreage of land, which will produce, under normal conditions an amount of seed of the varieties hereinafter named which will he sufficient to enable the seller to deliver the quantities of the said varieties herein contracted for, and the seller agrees to deliver such seeds in good merchantable condition, as hereinafter defined, and of good germination for the crop of the current year or on about December 1, 1949, or when, after harvest time, they are ready for delivery f.o.b. St. Louis unless otherwise specified, containers extra at cost.

And also in paragraph 7 of the Growing Sales Contract the following appears—

Except as herein otherwise expressly provided, the seller gives no warranty, expressed or implied, as to the productiveness of any seeds, bulbs, or plants we sell, and we will not be in any way responsible for the crop. Our liability in all instances is limited to the purchase price of the seed.

Were this clause sufficient to avoid the implied warranty of variety, it would not be binding on the plaintiff, because the contract with him was verbal, and no reference was made to the alleged disclaimer. If on the other hand defendant sold the seed to Cauthen and not to plaintiff, then the alleged disclaimer would not bind plaintiff. So that defense must fall by reason of the facts.

Another defense interposed is that the seeds furnished were mixed by plaintiff with other seeds in replanting. This defense falls in the face of the undisputed evidence that the seeds which defendant claims were mixed in by replanting were part of a lot [147]*147carried over by plaintiff from the previous year, and from which lot he had planted and produced a good crop of true Black Diamond watermelons. The evidence shows the mixture of seeds to have been very light, except in a small isolated section of the field, where the ground was low and the original plantings were damaged by cold. So, this defense must also fall.

Defendant further defends that the field was not properly cultivated. The evidence establishes the fact that the field was cultivated in the manner and the method used by all successful growers in the Leesburg area, and that there was no neglect.

Defendant further defends that the field was not properly sprayed to prevent insects and disease. The testimony shows conclusively that they were sprayed all that was necessary. Byron Her-long, a man of known veracity, a college trained and practical horticulturist and farmer, who has had fourteen years’ successful experience in growing watermelons, was employed to do the spraying. He testified that all necessary spraying was done.

Defendant further defends that the field should have been irrigated. This it failed to establish. On the other hand, the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff, who has had several years’ experience in growing watermelons, had irrigating equipment on the field, but rain came and made irrigation unnecessary.

The evidence by more than the required preponderance establishes the fact that the field was properly prepared; the seeds purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant properly planted, and thinned; the plants properly cultivated and fertilized, and the crop of melons properly pruned to the maturity of the first melons. The adverse or unfavorable growing conditions urged as a defense by the defendant have not in any way been shown to have existed. The contrary is shown by a preponderance of the evidence.

The fact that a good crop of some type of melons of good size was grown is not only established by the evidence, but is not disputed.

The fact that the melons produced would not pass inspection for grading out as United States No. 1 watermelons so that they could be shipped, is completely established and, in fact, is not disputed. The evidence shows that while literally hundreds of melons were cut in an effort to meet the grade, not a single melon was found that would pass inspection. Every melon - cut from the field showed white meat, some with greenish tinge, some with pink around the seed rows, but never a melon with solid, bright red meat as is the prime characteristic of true Black Diamond watermelons.

[148]*148The evidence given by Byron Herlong (mentioned above) and W. I. Brozier, a man of forty years’ experience in growing, buying, and selling watermelons, and Speck Berry, a man with many years’ experience in growing watermelons, George McCabe, a man who has grown melons for several years, and Owen Raney, who has spent a lifetime in growing melons, Bill Herbert, a trained watermelon inspector — all testified that the melons produced were of the citron type. Dr. Parriss, who is in charge of the watermelon laboratory at Leesburg, when called to the field soon after the trouble was discovered, and Dr. Jamison, of the College of Agriculture of the University of Florida, likewise called to the field at an early stage, both gave their official reports that the field showed heavy citron infestation. Mr. A. M. DeVaney, a state seed inspector, made a like report.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Fla. Supp. 144, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ferguson-v-corneli-seed-co-flacirct5lak-1951.