Fergeson v. Commonwealth (ORDER)

• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 250302
• Status: Published

Opinion

VIRGINIA: In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on Thursday, the 23rd day of April, 2026.

Present: Powell, C.J., Kelsey, McCullough, Chafin, Russell, Mann, JJ., and Millette, S.J.

JASON JOSEPH FERGESON, APPELLANT,

against Record No. 250302 Court of Appeals No. 0182-24-1

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, APPELLEE.

UPON AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.

Jason Joseph Fergeson appeals his conviction for misdemeanor abuse or neglect of a

vulnerable adult, in violation of Code § 18.2-369. He contends that the adult in question, his

girlfriend, was not “vulnerable” as defined by the statute because she was only temporarily

intoxicated rather than chronically ill or disabled. Finding the evidence sufficient to support

Fergeson’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

A. THOMPSON’S OVERDOSE

Under familiar principles of appellate review, we recite the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below. Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va.

176, 182 (2024).

On the morning of November 9, 2022, A.J. Burrell and his neighbor were driving near

the King William Travelodge in Williamsburg. In a wooded area behind the property, the pair

spotted Fergeson and his girlfriend, Lindsey Thompson. Thompson lay slumped against a tree, non-responsive. Her face was pale and her lips were blue. Fergeson stood crouched over

Thompson, slapping her face, in an apparent effort to awaken her.

Concerned about Thompson’s wellbeing, Burrell and his neighbor exited their vehicle

and approached Fergeson. Fergeson was unperturbed. He asked the pair for a ride up the street,

intending to leave Thompson where she was. Burrell and his neighbor refused, alarmed that

Thompson appeared not to be breathing. Fergeson tried to dismiss their concerns; he told them

not to call 9-1-1 because, as he put it, Thompson “does that all the time.” Burrell and his

neighbor called 9-1-1 nonetheless.

As they waited for first responders, Burrell and his neighbor kept the 9-1-1 operator on

speaker phone. Fergeson, who likewise remained on the scene, refused to allow Burrell or his

neighbor to come within ten feet of Thompson, despite the operator’s urging that someone begin

performing CPR on Thompson immediately. Fergeson told Burrell and his neighbor to “move

away” from Thompson several times, and he continued to repeat that Thompson “does this

normally.” When the operator asked for an update on Thompson’s breathing, Fergeson falsely

relayed that she was breathing normally. Burrell told the operator he thought Thompson had

died.

Minutes later, emergency responders arrived on scene and found Thompson unconscious.

Her breathing was shallow and eventually stopped completely. Paramedics began mechanically-

assisted breathing to prevent her from dying. Field testing confirmed a buildup of carbon

dioxide in Thompson’s bloodstream, which indicated a prolonged period of shallow breathing.

Thompson was transported to the hospital by ambulance for a suspected drug overdose. En

route, she was given the anti-overdose drug, Narcan, intranasally. Shortly after arriving at the

hospital, she was also given an intravenous Narcan drip.

2 Thompson’s bloodwork revealed the presence of several controlled substances in her

system, including morphine, cocaine, and a large amount of fentanyl.1 While opioids like

morphine and fentanyl have legitimate pharmacological uses, often as sedatives, Thompson had

ingested the equivalent of ten times the amount of fentanyl required to sedate an average,

nontolerant patient. Several other fentanyl-based compounds identified in her bloodstream

suggested that the drugs had been illegally manufactured.

The Commonwealth’s expert witness, a forensic toxicologist, explained that opioids

target a specific receptor in the brain; the interaction between drug and receptor is what produces

a euphoric effect in the user. Overdose, she explained, occurs when that receptor becomes

overloaded. This impedes the body’s ability to take in oxygen, which, in turn, causes “coma or

death.” Narcan works by freeing that receptor and blocking it from further contact with opioids,

thereby allowing the body to recover. Narcan’s effect is temporary though. It frequently

requires readministration because it depletes quicker than the opioids. Nevertheless, the forensic

toxicologist testified that she had never heard of an overdose victim requiring an intravenous

Narcan drip. This, she opined, suggested that the attending doctors believed Thompson would

immediately relapse and die without a continuous infusion of the drug.

Thompson survived the episode and discharged herself from the hospital the next day.

B. THE TRIAL COURT

Fergeson was indicted on two counts: felony abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult, in

violation of Code § 18.2-369, and misdemeanor interference with a 9-1-1 call, in violation of

Code § 18.2-164. He elected a bench trial.

1 Thompson’s medical records, admitted into evidence without objection, noted her “history of polysubstance abuse,” including “a known history of opiate abuse” and cocaine abuse. 3 At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Fergeson moved to strike both

charges. He argued that Code § 18.2-369 was inapplicable because he was not a “responsible

person,” his actions did not constitute “abuse or neglect,” and Thompson was not a “vulnerable

adult,” as defined in the statute. Fergeson also contended that Thompson had not suffered

serious bodily injury, as required to support the offense’s felony gradation. As for the

misdemeanor interference with a 9-1-1 call, Fergeson argued that he had not threatened anyone

against calling the police, nor had he damaged their phones. The trial court denied his motion.

Fergeson then briefly testified in his own defense before renewing his motion to strike.

The trial court again denied his motion. Presumably because closing arguments would have

mirrored the motion to strike, the trial court dispensed with closing arguments, without objection,

and announced its verdict.

On the charge alleging interference with a 9-1-1 call, the trial court found Fergeson guilty

of attempted interference, a lesser-included offense. It explained that while Burrell had

successfully dialed 9-1-1, making the completed offense inapplicable, Fergeson had still

attempted to prevent Burrell from doing so.

On the abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult charge, the trial court likewise found

Fergeson guilty, though only of a misdemeanor. Reviewing each of the statutory elements, the

trial court first found that Fergeson had “neglected” Thompson through his willful failure to

provide her with care. It also noted that Fergeson’s intentional conduct equally amounted to

“abuse” under Code § 18.2-369. Next, it said, Thompson qualified as a “vulnerable adult”

because she had been utterly unresponsive. The temporary nature of her incapacitation, the trial

court said, did not matter. Finally, while Fergeson—as Thompson’s romantic partner—did not

automatically owe her a heightened duty of care, Fergeson nevertheless became a “responsible

4 person” under Code § 18.2-369 when he assumed control of the scene and prevented bystanders

from rendering aid. Finding no serious bodily injury to Thompson, however, the trial court

reduced the gradation of the charge to misdemeanor neglect of a vulnerable adult. Fergeson was

sentenced to twelve months’ incarceration on each count. He timely appealed to the Court of

Appeals.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS

By published opinion, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s judgment. Fergeson v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. App. 80, 85 (2025). It held that the

evidence was sufficient to sustain both of Fergeson’s convictions. Id. at 89.

Addressing first the conviction for abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult, the Court of

Appeals explained that Thompson met Code § 18.2-369(C)’s definition of a “vulnerable adult.”

That subsection defines vulnerability as “impair[ment] by reason of mental illness, intellectual or

developmental disability, physical illness or disability, or other causes, including age.” Id. at 90

(quoting Code § 18.2-369(C)). The Court of Appeals defined “impaired” as “functioning poorly

or incompetently,” and “illness” as “the quality, state or condition of being sick; bodily or mental

indisposition.” Id. at 91 (cleaned up). “Disability,” it said, “means ‘a physical or mental

condition that significantly limits a person’s motor, sensory, or cognitive abilities.’” Id. The

Court of Appeals also noted that the list broadly includes “other causes,” which it said defies

temporal limitation and instead “focuses on the impact of the condition on the adult.” Id.

“Regardless of whether Thompson’s condition is considered a physical illness or an ‘other

cause,’” the Court of Appeals explained, “it certainly impaired her ability to care for herself.” Id.

at 92. Thompson “was entirely incapacitated and vulnerable.” Id.

5 The Court of Appeals next concluded that Fergeson became a “responsible person” in

fact when he assumed control of Thompson’s care and unsuccessfully attempted to prevent

Burrell or his neighbor from calling the police or performing CPR on Thompson. Id. at 94-95.

Finally, Fergeson’s actions were sufficiently willful, rather than accidental, to constitute

either “abuse” or “neglect” under the statute. Id. at 95-96. Thus, the Court of Appeals

concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found all elements of the offense had been met.

We awarded Fergeson this appeal, which challenges only Thompson’s classification as a

“vulnerable adult” under Code § 18.2-369(C). 2

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, ‘the relevant

question is, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1, 10 (2019) (quoting Sullivan v.

Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)) (emphasis added). “In answering this limited

question,” appellate courts must “‘accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable

inferences deducible from the evidence.’” Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024)

(quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 523, 527 (2009)). “The judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017).

2 The Court of Appeals also affirmed Fergeson’s conviction for attempted interference with a 9-1-1 call, however, as Fergeson’s petition for appeal assigned error only to the Court of Appeals’ “vulnerable adult” ruling, we address only this discrete inquiry. See Rule 5:17(c)(1)(i) (“Only assignments of error assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed by this Court.”). 6 This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Baker v.

Commonwealth, 284 Va. 572, 576 (2012).

B. THOMPSON QUALIFIED AS A “VULNERABLE ADULT” UNDER CODE § 18.2-369(C)

“The primary purpose of statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent.’” Botkin v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 309, 314 (2018) (quoting Brown v.

Commonwealth, 284 Va. 538, 542 (2012)). “This Court determines legislative intent from the

words employed in the statute.” Id. (quoting Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259 (2004)).

Words “are to be construed according to their ordinary meaning, given the context in which they

are used.” GEICO Advantage Ins. Co. v. Miles, 301 Va. 448, 455 (2022) (quoting City of Va.

Beach v. Bd. of Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236 (1993)). “If language is clear and unambiguous,

there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will

be given it.” Botkin, 296 Va. at 314.

Code § 18.2-369(A) prohibits any “responsible person” from “abus[ing] or neglect[ing]”

any “vulnerable adult.” As noted above, Fergeson has abandoned his challenge to the first and

second of these elements; he contests only Thompson’s classification under the third.

Code § 18.2-369(C) defines a “vulnerable adult” as:

any person 18 years of age or older who is impaired by reason of mental illness, intellectual or developmental disability, physical illness or disability, or other causes, including age, to the extent the adult lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make, communicate, or carry out reasonable decisions concerning his well-being or has one or more limitations that substantially impair the adult’s ability to independently provide for his daily needs or safeguard his person, property, or legal interests.

Fergeson, who has never argued that Thompson was underage, conceded during oral argument

that Thompson was “impaired” to the extent required by the statute.

7 Fergeson’s argument, instead, turns narrowly on subsection (C)’s list of qualifying causes

of impairment. Specifically, he contends that the General Assembly enacted the statute only to

protect those suffering from “developmental, mental, or otherwise long-lasting and enduring”

conditions. He notes that the statute “does not mention ‘intoxication’ or any other form of

temporary impairment,” and that those omissions show the legislature’s intent to exclude non-

chronic conditions from the statute’s reach. He also urges that several canons of construction,

including the rule of lenity, support a narrower application of the statute.

The Commonwealth counters that a victim need not suffer from a chronic condition

under the statute because Code § 18.2-369(C) contains no temporal limitation. Even one

suffering from a temporary impairment, such as voluntary intoxication, would qualify. At oral

argument, the Commonwealth clarified that the statute’s limiting principle is not the permanence

of the impairment itself; rather, it is the extent of the impairment, which must rise to the requisite

level as described in the second half of the definition. Thompson, the Commonwealth argues,

was “unconscious, nonresponsive, and barely breathing,” and thus, plainly impaired to the

required degree here.

“As we have often said,” however, “‘[t]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we

decide cases on the best and narrowest grounds available.”’ Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va.

411, 419 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)). While the parties

debate a broader point of statutory interpretation—whether the definition of “vulnerable adult”

encompasses one who is only temporarily intoxicated—Fergeson’s appeal is, at bottom, a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Because “this limited question,” Garrick, 303 Va.

at 182, can be resolved on the facts of this case, we need go no further than that: A rational trier

of fact could conclude that Thompson’s impairment was not, in fact, caused by mere temporary

8 intoxication, but rather, by a near-fatal overdose—a condition encompassed by the plain

language of the statute.

The Commonwealth’s forensic toxicologist in this case explained that opioid overdose

occurs when the drug overloads a specific receptor in the brain. This has the effect of inhibiting

the body’s oxygen intake, which causes coma or death. Thompson—who suffered complete

respiratory failure after a prolonged period of shallow breathing—was well on her way to the

latter. Only with massive medical intervention, including mechanically-assisted breathing and

novel use of an intravenous Narcan drip, was she able to be resuscitated. Contrary to Fergeson’s

characterization of her state as something temporary, a rational trier of fact could conclude that

Thompson’s condition was not a mere transient blackout or passing episode of reduced capacity

from which she would have eventually recovered; rather, it was a near-fatal episode, with death

stayed only by treatment.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that, under these circumstances, it is not necessary to

delineate the exact category into which Thompson’s condition fell. Whether a “physical illness

or disability,” or an “other cause,” the plain language of Code § 18.2-369(C) evinces the General

Assembly’s intent to protect, at a minimum, individuals who are impaired to the magnitude that

Thompson was here. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, “[n]ot every illness is chronic

or long term, and yet could cause impairment within the meaning of a statute.” Fergeson, 84 Va.

App. at 80. We likewise find apt its analogy to stroke: “[T]he effects of a stroke,” it said, “can

be temporary or long-term; some people recover very quickly, while others recover more slowly

or have long-term issues. Thus, the focus of the statute appears to be on the impairment of the

adult regardless of the duration of that impairment.” Id. We agree.

9 While we acknowledge that the application of this statute may, in other cases, result in

ambiguity, it does not do so here. Because the plain language of Code § 18.2-369(C)

unambiguously captures the nature of Thompson’s impairment, it is unnecessary to resort to

canons of statutory construction, including the rule of lenity. See Botkin, 296 Va. at 314 (“When

an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules for construction of statutes do not apply.”);

see also Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 598 (2003) (rule of lenity applies only to

ambiguous penal statutes). Thus, the trial court’s interpretation of Code § 18.2-369(C) was

correct here, and its judgment was not plainly wrong. Pijor, 294 Va. at 512. Accordingly, the

Court of Appeals did not err by affirming it.

III. CONCLUSION

Our holding today is a narrow one. We do not conclude that impairment by reason of

temporary intoxication per se renders an adult “vulnerable” within the meaning of Code

§ 18.2-369(C). That is a question for another day. We hold only that the evidence in this case

was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the magnitude of Thompson’s condition

rendered her a “vulnerable adult” under the plain language of Code § 18.2-369(C).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. This order shall be published in the

Virginia Reports and certified to the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of the City of

Williamsburg and James City County.

A Copy,

Teste:

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