Ferazzoli v. Hamilton

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ferazzoli v. Hamilton

141 A.D.3d 686, 35 N.Y.S.3d 654

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 27, 2016

Docket2015-04176

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 141 A.D.3d 686 (Ferazzoli v. Hamilton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ferazzoli v. Hamilton, 141 A.D.3d 686, 35 N.Y.S.3d 654 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sher, J.), dated March 11, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Rosa Ferazzoli did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Rosa Ferazzoli (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) *687 did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the injured plaintiff’s lumbar spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]). In addition, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) by submitting a transcript of the injured plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which demonstrated that she missed only two days of work following the accident (see John v Linden, 124 AD3d 598, 599 [2015]; Marin v Ieni, 108 AD3d 656, 657 [2013]; Richards v Tyson, 64 AD3d 760, 761 [2009]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Leventhal, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sher, J.), dated March 11, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Rosa Ferazzoli did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Rosa Ferazzoli (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) *687 did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the injured plaintiff’s lumbar spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]). In addition, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) by submitting a transcript of the injured plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which demonstrated that she missed only two days of work following the accident (see John v Linden, 124 AD3d 598, 599 [2015]; Marin v Ieni, 108 AD3d 656, 657 [2013]; Richards v Tyson, 64 AD3d 760, 761 [2009]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Leventhal, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

141 A.D.3d 686, 35 N.Y.S.3d 654, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ferazzoli-v-hamilton-nyappdiv-2016.

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