F.E.O., the Mother v. Department of Children and Families

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed April 2, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-1609 Lower Tribunal No. D22-15623 ________________

F.E.O., the Mother, Appellant,

vs.

Department of Children and Families, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle Alvarez Barakat, Judge.

F.E.O., the Mother, in proper person.

Karla Perkins, for appellee Department of Children and Families; Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Laura J. Lee, Assistant Director of Appeals (Tallahassee), for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 39.801(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“If a parent appears for

the advisory hearing and the court orders that parent to appear at the

adjudicatory hearing for the petition for termination of parental rights, stating

the date, time, and location of the hearing and, if applicable, instructions for

appearance through audio-video communication technology, then failure of

that parent to appear, either physically or, by agreement of the parties or at

the discretion of the court, through audio-video communication technology,

at the adjudicatory hearing constitutes consent for termination of parental

rights.”); M.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 230 So. 3d 512, 513 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2017) (“We review the trial court's order denying M.P.'s Motion to Set

Aside and Vacate the Final Judgment of Termination of Parental Rights

under an abuse of discretion standard.”); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.

2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (observing that the “abuse of discretion” standard

of review is highly deferential: “Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the

judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of

saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would

take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable [people] could differ as

to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said

that the trial court abused its discretion.”) (modernized) (citation omitted); see

also E.S. v. Dep’t of Children and Family, 878 So. 2d 493, 496 (Fla. 3d DCA

2 2004) (requiring, in the context of a motion to vacate a default entered upon

a constructive consent to termination of parental rights, that “the party

seeking to vacate the default act with due diligence, demonstrate excusable

neglect, and demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense to the

termination petition.”).