Fenwick-Keats Realty LLC v. 212 East 29 St. LLC

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fenwick-Keats Realty LLC v. 212 East 29 St. LLC

108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 86

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 2, 2013

StatusPublished

This text of 108 A.D.3d 435 (Fenwick-Keats Realty LLC v. 212 East 29 St. LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fenwick-Keats Realty LLC v. 212 East 29 St. LLC, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2013).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.), entered July 17, 2012, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on its cause of action for breach of an agreement to pay a broker’s commission, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs and the motion granted.

Defendant’s attorney prepared a proposed brokerage agreement and forwarded it to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs executed the agreement and performed in accordance with its terms. Defendant never executed the agreement, but its attempt to repudiate it came only after closing, i.e., after it had derived the full benefit of the agreement. Thus, defendant is bound by the agreement (see Ambrose Mar-Elia Co. v Dinstein, 151 AD2d 416, 419 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 615 [1989]). Moreover, the contract of sale contained a brokerage provision stating that the seller (defendant) and the purchaser had dealt with no broker who might be entitled to a commission in connection with this transaction other than plaintiffs (collectively, the Broker) and that “Seller shall pay the commission due to the Broker pursuant to a separate agreement between Seller and the Broker.” This language constitutes an admission that plaintiffs were due a broker’s fee from defendant (see id. at 418; Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v New York Blood Ctr., 257 AD2d 64 [1st Dept 1999]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Saxe, Freedman, Clark, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.), entered July 17, 2012, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on its cause of action for breach of an agreement to pay a broker’s commission, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs and the motion granted.

Defendant’s attorney prepared a proposed brokerage agreement and forwarded it to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs executed the agreement and performed in accordance with its terms. Defendant never executed the agreement, but its attempt to repudiate it came only after closing, i.e., after it had derived the full benefit of the agreement. Thus, defendant is bound by the agreement (see Ambrose Mar-Elia Co. v Dinstein, 151 AD2d 416, 419 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 615 [1989]). Moreover, the contract of sale contained a brokerage provision stating that the seller (defendant) and the purchaser had dealt with no broker who might be entitled to a commission in connection with this transaction other than plaintiffs (collectively, the Broker) and that “Seller shall pay the commission due to the Broker pursuant to a separate agreement between Seller and the Broker.” This language constitutes an admission that plaintiffs were due a broker’s fee from defendant (see id. at 418; Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v New York Blood Ctr., 257 AD2d 64 [1st Dept 1999]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Saxe, Freedman, Clark, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 86, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fenwick-keats-realty-llc-v-212-east-29-st-llc-nyappdiv-2013.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack