Fenton v. Ryan

122 N.W. 756, 140 Wis. 353, 1909 Wisc. LEXIS 267
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 5, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 122 N.W. 756 (Fenton v. Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fenton v. Ryan, 122 N.W. 756, 140 Wis. 353, 1909 Wisc. LEXIS 267 (Wis. 1909).

Opinion

Baewes, J.

The court found that of the 576 ácres'em-braced within the boundaries of the proposed village about 465 acres were rural or agricultural lands sparsely settled, not having the distinctive characteristics of a village, and not reasonably appurtenant to the remaining territory, and not necessary to be included within the limits of the proposed village for any legitimate purpose. Of the remaining 113 acres the court found that seventy-five acres were covered with water, and that the settled portion of the proposed village contained but thirty-eight and one-half acres, and that one half a section of land, including the submerged acreage, was ample territory for the proposed village, in view of its location, surroundings, and prospect of future growth. Upon the findings so made the court denied the application of the petitioners.

But one substantial objection is urged in support of the claim that the order appealed from is erroneous. It is argued that it is no proper function of a court to decide whether the proposed boundaries include an excessive amount of land, so long as the proposed area does not conflict with any statutory requirement. It is urged that the matter of fixing the limits of the village is a legislative or political question and not a judicial one, so long as such limits include one half a square mile in area and do not include the entire town. The cases of In re North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 1033, and Nash v. Fries, 129 Wis. 120, 108 N. W. 210, are cited as sustaining the contention so made. It is held in the North Milwaukee Case that courts cannot decide questions of legislative policy by determining whether or not a village should be incorporated ; that the legislature .may say what prerequisites must exist and what steps must be taken before incorporation can be effected, and may authorize the courts to determine [356]*356whether such facts exist, hut that no discretion can he vested in the courts to grant or refuse a certificate of incorporation. It was said by way of illustration, that a court might determine such questions as whether the survey was. correct,, whether the population was as large as the statute required in proportion to the area, and whether the statutory requirements have been complied with on all questions of fact which the court may determine, hut that the court might not determine whether the lands embraced in the petition should justly be included in the village, or whether the interests of the inhabitants would be promoted by the incorporation, or whether the boundaries of the village could be enlarged or diminished as justice might seem to require; such questions being legislative or political and not judicial. In Nash v. Fries, supra, it was held that if ch. 21, Laws of 1905, should be construed as vesting any discretion in the court to say whether a new town should be organized or not, the law could' not be upheld under the rule of the North Milwaukee Case.

If, as contended by counsel for appellant, the court, in deciding that the boundaries of the proposed village included territory which should have been excluded, was passing upon a question that was legislative and not judicial, it follows as a matter of course that the order appealed from is erroneous under the decisions referred to. .That the question is one for judicial determination is decided in State ex rel. Holland v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 86 N. W. 677, 89 N. W. 501. In deciding that case the court construed the law providing for the incorporation of villages in connection with sec. 3, art. XI, of our constitution, which declares that “It shall be the duty of the legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages/’ and also in connection with sec. 23, art. IY, of the constitution, which provides that “The legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable.” The court there [357]*357defined what a village was understood to mean at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and held: (1) That if the law authorizing the incorporation of villages, as properly construed, permits rural territory possessing none of the attributes of villages to change from town to village government at will, it cannot be sustained. (2) That the law providing for the incorporation of villages fixes no limitation as to the maximum size of the territory that may be incorporated, except that it must be part of a town or towns, and prescribes no restriction as to density of population, except that it shall contain a resident population of not less than a stated number. (3) That a village means an assembly of houses less than a ■city, but nevertheless urban or semi-urban in its character, and having a density of population greater than can usually be found in rural districts, and that this was the understood meaning of what constituted a village at the time the constitution was adopted. (4) That if the law providing for the incorporation of villages contains no restriction upon the size or density of population of the territory sought to be incorporated, a restriction must be implied from the name of the corporation and the purpose for which it is incorporated. (5) That only territory urban in character, with such adjacent lands as are naturally connected with and are reasonably appurtenant and necessary for future growth in view of the surroundings and circumstances of the location and prospects of future prosperity, may be incorporated in the village. ( 6) That the territory seeking admission as a village must be harmonious with the idea of what a village actually is. It may not include large areas of rural or agricultural lands sparsely settled or widely distributed. It may only include lands having the distinct characteristics of a village, and such additions as have a natural connection with and seem rea1 sonably appurtenant to and necessary for future growth. (7) That it is a question of fact, to be determined in each case as the question arises, whether the provisions of the constitu[358]*358tion-referred to may be violated by including territory within the limits of the village which should not be included therein. Such inquiry is judicial, not legislative, at least in the absence of any legislative declaration on the subject. (8) That the right to incorpórate a village under sec. 854 is limited to such territory lis possesses the characteristics mentioned. It must be a village in fact, with a reasonably compact center or nucleus of population, and not a mere agricultural community. If territory beyond the thickly settled limits is included, such territory ought reasonably to possess some' natural connection with and adaptability to village purposes and seem reasonably to be necessary for future growth and development. (9) That in the absence of some specific-legislation the courts must meet and determine in each given case the fact as to whether these restrictions have been overstepped.

It will be observed that the only declaration the legislature-has made which affects the case before us for consideration is that any part of any town or towns not less than one half a square mile in area and not included in any village and all lying in the same county, which shall contain a resident population of 300 persons therein, may become incorporated as a village by taking certain steps enumerated in the statute. The legislature, having the power to create villages, necessarily has a large discretion in the matter of determining what the boundaries of such villages shall be.

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Bluebook (online)
122 N.W. 756, 140 Wis. 353, 1909 Wisc. LEXIS 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fenton-v-ryan-wis-1909.