Fenton v. Ruchar

300 A.D.2d 898, 750 N.Y.S.2d 900, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12424
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedDecember 19, 2002
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 300 A.D.2d 898 (Fenton v. Ruchar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fenton v. Ruchar, 300 A.D.2d 898, 750 N.Y.S.2d 900, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12424 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

—Lahtinen, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Hester, Jr., J.), entered November 1, 2001 in Delaware County, which granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

In November 1987, Fred Ruchar (hereinafter decedent) transferred real property he owned in the Town of Andes, Delaware County, to the Frederick Ruchar Corporation (hereinafter the corporation). At that time, decedent, as president of the corporation, and one of his sons, defendant Thomas Ruchar, as [899]*899secretary/treasurer, signed two blank stock certificates. Also present at the meeting were decedent’s other son, Robert Ruchar, who was vice-president of the corporation, and decedent’s attorney, Fredrick Neroni. Following decedent’s death in 1990, plaintiff, decedent’s daughter, was appointed executor of his estate, and 10 years later, in April 2000, she commenced this action against Thomas Ruchar and the children of her deceased brother, Robert Ruchar, asserting that the shares of the corporation belonged to the estate. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court treated the action, which had been commenced pursuant to RPAPL article 15, as a request for a declaratory judgment regarding ownership of the shares of the corporation and granted plaintiff’s motion. Defendants appeal.

We reverse. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opponents of summary judgment (see Barker v Kallash, 63 NY2d 19, 23; Ash v Fern, 295 AD2d 869, 870), the record reveals substantial factual issues. While the fact that the stock certificates were left blank effectively made them bearer instruments (see Lichtenstein v Eljohnan, Inc., 161 AD2d 397, 398; Lapidus v Hiltzik, 160 AD2d 682, 684), the proof presented did not undisputedly establish that decedent retained control of the stock certificates until his death. Indeed, Thomas Ruchar submitted an affidavit in opposition to the motion stating that “upon formation of the corporation, equal ownership of the corporation was divided between Thomas Ruchar and Robert Ruchar.” His testimony from an examination before trial in a separate action commenced by plaintiff is included in the record and, when asked whether his father had any shares or retained “any sort of legal interest in the corporation,” Thomas Ruchar responded, “no.” There is thus a factual issue regarding whether decedent ever exercised ownership or control over the shares of the corporation and, if he did, a further issue exists as to whether he transferred the shares during his lifetime.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
300 A.D.2d 898, 750 N.Y.S.2d 900, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12424, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fenton-v-ruchar-nyappdiv-2002.