Fenton v. People of the Virgin Islands

Opinions

Opinion

For Publication

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS JAHZEEL FENTON ) S Ct Civ No 2022 0010 Appellant/Petitioner ) Re Super Ct Crim No SX 2019 MC 78 ) )

V )

)

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ) ISLANDS PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ) ISLANDS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY ) GENERAL WYNNIE TESTAMARK ) DIRECTOR OF THE U S VIRGIN ) ISLANDS BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS ) ET AL )

Appellees/Respondents )

)

0n Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St Croix Superior Court Judge Hon Jomo Meade

Considered October 11, 2022 Filed January 17 2024

Cite as 2024 VI 5

BEFORE RHYS S HODGE ChiefJustice MARIA M CABRET Associate Justice and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice

APPEARANCES

Jahzeel Fenton Pro Se Appellant

Denise George, Esq Assistant Attorney General St Thomas U S VI

Pamela R Tepper, Esq Solicitor General St Thomas U S V I Attorneysfor Appellee

Opinion of the Court

Page 2 of 12

OPINION OF THE COURT SWAN, Associate Justice

$1 Appellant Jahzeel Fenton appeals the Superior Court 5 denial of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus The petition alleged that suspected critical evidence had been wrongly withheld,

the privation of which influenced Appellant to plead nolo contendere in a plea agreement which,

due to such privation, was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent We determine Appellant’s

claims to be procedurally barred and we therefore affirm the Superior Court’s order denying the

Appellant s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘|2 On March 19, 2010, Jo Ana Lang (hereinafter ‘Lang”) was gravely injured upon receiving

multiple gunshot wounds to the torso Officers of the Virgin Islands Police Department

(hereinafter “V I P D ”) arrived at the scene of the crime in response to a report of a domestic

violence dispute in Estate Two Williams located on St Croix Upon arrival, they observed Jahzeel

Fenton (hereinafter “Appellant”), standing over the victim as she lay on the floor with wounds to

her back and stomach Appellant was arrested and subsequently charged by infomation with six

counts which included (I) attempted murder in the first degree, (2) assault in the first degree

domestic violence, (3) unauthorized possession of a firearm, (4) mayhem, (5) discharging or

aiming a firearm, and (6) simple assault and battery—domestic violence (App’ee Br at 4) All

six counts emanated from the shooting and injury of Lang (App’ee Br at 5) Because of

allegations that Lang’s children were present during the shooting, the People of the Virgin Islands

(hereinafier ‘ Government”) later filed a superseding information adding four counts of child

abuse (SA at 5)

Page 3 of 12 1B In the course of discovery, Appellant, through his counsel, requested production of a

separate bullet trajectory report or analysis, which lies at the core of this appeal Appellant based

his request on an assertion made in the crime scene evidence report prepared by Linda Pascal

(hereinafter “Pascal ’), a forensic technician with V I P D , who processed the crime scene on the

day of the shooting The report stated that a trajectory was then completed ” (App Br at 3) On

February 18, 2016, Appellant filed in the Superior Court a motion to compel discovery due to the

Govemment’s failure to produce the alleged independent bullet trajectory report requested On

March 1, 2016, the court granted the Appellant’s motion in an order giving the Government 14

days to deliver to Appellant any “bullet trajectory analysis and’or report ” (App Br at 4) The trial

was scheduled for August 15, 2016

114 After failing to receive the requested discovery, on June 27, 20 I 6, Appellant filed a motion

to dismiss the case pursuant to Brady v Maryland, 373 U S 83 (1963), asserting that the

Government was withholding exculpatory evidence because it failed to comply with its discovery

obligations by failing to provide the alleged bullet trajectory analysis report The court conducted

a final pretrial conference on August 8, 2016, during which it heard arguments on Appellant s

motion to dismiss During the conference, the Govemment asserted through Assistant Attorney

General Zuleyma Chapman (hereinafter Chapman ) that the alleged bullet trajectory report

requested by the Appellant did not exist, a declaration that was purportedly confirmed by the author

of the investigative report (S A at 27 28) Chapman further asserted that any notes created during

the investigation and discoverable documents in the Govemment’s possession had previously been

delivered to Appellant s counsel (S A at 28) Ultimately, the court denied Appellant s motion

(App Br at 4) However the court prohibited the Government from using any evidence at trial

regarding bullet traj ectory that required expert evaluation (App ee Br at 5) Following the court 5

Page 4 of 12

ruling at the final pretrial conference, Appellant s counsel informed the court that a plea agreement

had been consummated between the Appellant and the Government Pursuant to the plea

agreement, the Appellant entered a plea of “No Contest” to assault in the first degree with domestic

violence, designated as count 2 of the superseding information, with all other counts in the

superseding information were to be dismissed (App Br At 4) On July 26, 2017, based on this

plea, the court sentenced Appellant to 20 years of incarceration

1|5 The Appellant began his initial challenge to his imposed sentence on August 7, 2017, when

he appealed to this Court, averring that “his plea of no contest was not knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent because the Superior Court gave him a sentence to which he did not acquiesce ” Fenton

v People 69 V I 889 894 (V I 2018) Appellant premised his argument on the contention that

the Superior Coun violated former Superior Court Rule 126' and should have ‘ (1) given him notice

of its intention and (2) a chance to withdraw the plea” before imposing a sentence that was higher

than the 10 years recommended in his plea agreement Id at 897 In our opinion filed on

November 16, 2018, this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, concluding that

Fenton’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent The Superior Conn adequately advised him that it could sentence him to a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment as well as require him to pay restitution, and Fenton understood those consequences Moreover in this case of first impression, we find that under former Superior Court Rule 126, the Superior Court did not have to inform Fenton of its intention to deviate from the plea agreement or allow him the opportunity to withdraw his plea due to its deviation

' Former Superior Court Rule 126 provided, in pertinent part A defendant may plead guilty, not guilty or 11010 contendere to any complaint or information In no case shall the court accept a plea of guilty without first determining if the defendant understands the nature of the charge against him, and that the plea is voluntarily made The defendant shall be entitled to change a plea of not guilty to guilty at any time before the findings Where a plea of guilty is entered the court may hear the witnesses in support of the complaint prior to judgment and sentence, and after such hearing, may, in its discretion, refuse to accept the plea This rule was superseded effective December 1, 2017, when the current rule governing pleas, Rule 1 1 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure, came into effect

Fenton v Gavel nmem ofthe V" gm Islands 2024 VI 5 S Ct Civ N0 2022 0010 Opinion oflhe Court Page 5 of 12

[d at 902

116 On September 18, 2019, Appellant filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Superior Court The matter was subsequently referred to the Magistrate Division on March 26,

2020, pursuant to §4 V I C § 123(b)(2), to make factual findings, conclusions of law, and

recommendations pertaining to Appellant 3 claim and his eligibility for a writ of habeas corpus

Although a hearing was conducted on August 7, 2020, the Magistrate Division failed to issue a

written order memorializing its findings On April 29, 2021, following review, the Superior Court

held that the Appellant had presented a prima facie case Consequently, it granted Appellant s

petition (S A at 04) However, the court prohibited Appellant from challenging the legality of his

plea on the basis that it violated Rule 126, as that claim was previously addressed on its merits by

this Court and therefore was procedurally barred The Govemment filed its return to Appellant’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 19, 2021, followed by Appellant s traverse filed on

June 29 2021

A Writ of Habeas Corpus Evidentiary Hearing

1|7 On June 29, 2021, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing addressing the remaining

assertions in Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus During the hearing, Appellant was

able to not only testify on his own behalf but also to submit exhibits for the court to consider in its

review of his petition (See generally S A ) The crux of Appellant s argument to the court focused

on the investigation of the crime scene on the night of the crime and thereafter Appellant

emphasized the language in the comprehensive narrative of the crime scene evidence report,

specifically the statement that a trajectory was completed (S A at 66) Appellant contends that

the notion that a separate report of the bullet trajectory analysis was not completed is “ethically

Page 6 of 12

impossible and would show the ‘implausibility of the Govemment’s theory ’ (S A at 31)

Appellant asserts that this crime scene report is exculpatory evidence, thus triggering his rights

under the Brady decision More specifically, Appellant contends that producing this report would

have revealed that the victim shot herself, and Appellant’s acquisition of the report prior to his

plea would have led him not to enter a plea of nolo contendere (S A at 41)

118 Appellant buttresses this argument with claims of additional asserted constitutional

violations including (1) that the Government failed to ensure forensic technician Linda Pascal’s

presence at the final pretrial conference or at the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, (2) that the

V I P D violated a federal consent decree requiring the police force to conduct a three part ballistic

analysis which would have included a separate bullet trajectory report, and (3) that the Government

was under a duty to test the items retrieved from Appellant upon his arrest for gunshot residue,

and the retum of those items without this testing not only violated his rights but supports

Appellant’s contention that the Government only sought to advance its theory of the case rather

than to advance justice (See S A at 43)

1|9 In response to this argument, the Government asserted that the mere mention of “a

trajectory being completed” does not equate to a representation that a separate report was created

(S A at 66) The Government notes that the crime scene evidence report makes no mention of a

separate report or any other independent report whatsoever, and that simply mentioning “a

trajectory being completed” does not inherently denote that a repon was done (S A at 67) In its

closing argument, the Government underscored that no repoxt outside of the crime scene evidence

report exists and that all existing evidence was tendered to Appellant’s counsel at the time of

Appellant s plea (S A at 66 67) Furthermore, the Government contended that Appellant’s nolo

contendere plea was undertaken knowingly and voluntarily thus waiving any of the constitutional

Page 7 of [2

challenges he currently asserts (S A at 67) The Government emphasized not only in its closing,

but also in the cross examination of the Appellant, that although Appellant emphasizes his inability

to address Pascal in his argument before the court, it was his plea that waived that right, together

with other rights such as the right to a jury trial and right to cross examine the Govemment’s

witnesses who would have been called to testify at trial (S A at 67)

1110 Throughout the course of the hearing and in order to support his claim, Appellant moved

three exhibits into evidence for the court’s consideration Those exhibits included (1) a DNA lab

analysis report, (2) a record of property received report, and (3) a medical chronology report

pertaining to the victim (S A at l3 14) The court tookjudicial notice ofthe crime scene evidence

report on behalf of Appellant (S A at 63) The Government also moved into evidence exhibits

to support its opposition, which included the plea agreement and a copy of the change of plea

pretrial conference hearing transcript (S A at 15) During the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing,

the court gave the Appellant pro se leniency2 and asked a number of clarifying questions to ensure

that the Appellant’s contentions were clearly understood by the court (See generally S A)

Ultimately, the court denied Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and memorialized its

decision in an October 15, 2021 order The court anchored its holding on two main conclusions

that the Appellant failed to establish the existence of the alleged undisclosed evidence and that the

Appellant’s “no contest plea negated his claim of a due process violation On March 3, 2022, the

Appellant filed a notice of appeal 3 For the reasons explicated below, we affinn the Superior

2 Wet”): v Long ReefCondo Assn 57 V l 163 167 (V I 2012) Kuts/ta v Califomta State College 564 F 2d 108 l l 1 (3d Cir 1977) (elaborating that leniency is given since pro se litigants are typically not conversant with the rules governing appeals )

3 Roduguez v Bu; eat! ofCon ectlons, 58 V l 367, 374 n 6 (V 1 2013)

Page 8 of 12

Court 3 order denying the Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, though for different

reasons than those elucidated by that court 4

II DISCUSSION

A Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

1111 This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 4, section 32 of the Virgin

Islands Code Under Section 32, this Court is granted jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from

final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court[] V I CODE ANN tit 4, §

32(a) A final order is a judgment from a court which concludes the litigation on the merits, leaving

nothing for the court to do but to execute the judgment Williams v People 55 V I 721 727 (V I

2011) In re Truong 513 F 3d 91 94 (3d Cir 2008) (citing Bethe] v McAllister Bros Inc 81

F 3d 376, 381 (3d Cir 1996)) An order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a final

order from which an appeal may lie ’ George v Wilson, 59 V I 984, 988 (V I 2013) (quoting

Suarez v Gov I erhe V1 56 V I 754 758 (VI 2012)) Since the Superior Court 8 October 15

2021 order denied Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we have jurisdiction over this

matter “We exercise plenary review over constitutional challenges ” Fenton, 69 V I at 894 (citing

Brow ne v People, 56 V I 207 217 (V I 2012)) Furthermore, the Superior Court 5 application

of law is reviewed de novo while the court 8 findings of fact are reviewed for clear error Fenian,

69 V I at 894 (citing Blyden 1 People 53 V I 637 646 (V I 2010))

4 “It is well established that, under the “right result, wrong reason’ doctrine, where the record otherwise suppons the trial court's judgment, an appellate court may affirm that judgment for reasons other than those relied upon by the trial court, even if the trial court's reasons are erroneous Antilles School Inc v Lembach, 64 V I 400, 438 n 23 (V I 2016) (citing cases)

Page 9 of 12

B Writ of Habeas Corpus

1112 In the Virgin Islands, relief in the form of habeas corpus derives from the guarantee found

in section 3 0f the Revised Organic Act of 1954, which states that [3]“ persons shall have the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the same shall not be suspended except as herein

expressly provided ’ 48 U S C § 1561 In accordance with the Virgin Islands habeas corpus

statute, “[e]very person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense

whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment

or restraint ” 5 V I C § 1301 “‘[G]ranting the writ of habeas corpus constitutes an intermediate

step in the statutory procedure’ it does not address the underlying merits of the petition's

allegations, nor does it entitle the petitioner to the ultimate relief sought in the petition Blya’en,

64 VI at 376 (quoting Rivera Moreno v Govt of the VI 61 VI 279 311 (VI 2014))

Additionally, “[t]he purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is not to detennine guilt or innocence, or

to weigh the evidence submitted at trial or to determine the strength of the prosecutor 3 case” but

“to prevent manifest injustice ” Rodriguez v Bureau ofCorrecnons, 5 8 V I 367, 376 (V I 2016)

In reviewing the Appellant’s petition, we conclude that Appellant has failed to show entitlement

to habeas relief

C Appellant’s Claims are Procedurally Barred

1]13 The function of a plea in the criminal justice system is merely to provide one method of

conviction which may conclude a criminal matter The United States Supreme Court has noted

that “[t]his mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury

Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we should continue to do so,

whether conviction is by plea or by trial Tollett v Henderson, 411 U S 258, 263 (1973)

Typically, when entering a plea a defendant partakes in a two part consideration first the

Page 10 of 12

acknowledgement of guilt, and second, the waiver of trial and the rights that accompany it See

North Catalina v Alford, 400 U S 25, 37 (1970) As pertains to nolo contendere pleas, it is

important to recognize that implicit in this procedure is “a recognition that the Constitution does

not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling to expressly admit his

guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence ”

Id Moreover, these types of pleas function as guilty pleas and allow the court to treat the defendant

as ifhe were guilty 1d at 37

1|l4 As this Court has stated

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea

E1110!“ Gm tofthe V 1 60 V I 702 707 (V I 2014) (citing Toilet! 411 U S at 267) The habeas

petition now before this Court is not Appellant’s first, but rather his second attack on the voluntary

and intelligent character of his plea In his direct appeal in 2018, Appellant argued that his plea

was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent as he had relied upon the recommended sentence from

his plea agreement of 10 years stating that he would not have acquiesced had he known that the

trial judge was going to sentence him to 20 years, despite having been infomed that a 20 year

sentence was a possible outcome Fenian, 69 V I at 902 Now, he argues that his plea was not

knowing, voluntary and intelligent due to the wrongful withholding of suspected critical evidence

In doing so, Appellant is merely attempting to recycle his past unsuccessful appeals but with new

vestments ” Elliott, 60 VI at 706 His arguments have changed, yet the issue they support

Page 1] of 12

remains the same, and issues already considered and rejected by this Court on the merits on direct

appeal may not be relitigated through a habeas petition Blyden 64 V I at 377

1115 Appellant had the opportunity on direct appeal to make any and all arguments he could

think of to support his claim that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent The fact that

he failed to exhaust his potential arguments in that instance does not give him the right to relitigate

the same issue with novel arguments in a petition for writ of habeas corpus See 1d at 378 ( This

Court’s rejection of an issue properly raised on direct appeal constitutes binding precedent on both

this Court and the Superior Conn in all subsequent cases, particularly with regard to the same party

raising the same issue through a collateral proceeding such as a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus ’) (citing Bryan v Fawkes V I 416, 457 (V I 2014)) Upon review, therefore, this Court

upholds the trial court 3 order denying the Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, though

we hold that the trial court should have denied the petition because Appellant 3 claims were

uniformly procedurally barred

III CONCLUSION

1116 We hold that the Superior Court did not err in denying the Appellant s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus, though not for the reasons elucidated by the court Appellant’s claims were

procedurally barred, as he had raised the same claims on his direct appeal, which claims were

rejected by this Court in its opinion concerning that appeal, Fenton, 69 V I 889 Accordingly, the

Superior Court should not have considered the claims of Appellant’s habeas petition but rather

denied the petition on the grounds that the claims were procedurally barred However, we support

and affirm the court’s final determination in its October 15, 2021 order Appellant’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus is denied

Page 12 of 12

Dated this 17th day of January, 2024

B HE COUR [£4

IVE ARLINGTON AN Associate Justice

ATTEST VERONICA J HANDY ESQ Clerk of the Court

eputy Clerk II

Date [mink 3‘ I i 2])1‘4’

J