Feng Ying Li v. Attorney General United States

619 F. App'x 123
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJuly 17, 2015
Docket14-4830
StatusUnpublished

This text of 619 F. App'x 123 (Feng Ying Li v. Attorney General United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Feng Ying Li v. Attorney General United States, 619 F. App'x 123 (3d Cir. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION *

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Feng Ying Li, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her fifth motion to reopen her removal proceedings. Because the BIA acted within its discretion, we will deny the petition.

I

Li entered the United States in 1998 without a valid entry document. She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that “the [Chinese] government was looking for [her] and wanted [her] to be fined and sterilized” following the birth of her first child. A.R. 3225-26. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that she was not credible and denied her application in 1999. The BIA affirmed and ordered her removal. Li remained in the United States, had a second child, and filed four motions to reopen her removal proceedings based on China’s population control policies, each of which the BIA denied. See Li v. Att’y Gen., 562 Fed.Appx. 78, 79-80 (3d Cir.2014) (not precedential) (describing procedural history).

In 2013, Li filed a fifth motion to reopen, this time on the basis of her political activities. In her motion, Li stated that she joined the Party for Freedom and Democ *125 racy in China (“PFDC”) and that she participated in public protests in the United States against the Chinese government. She claimed that the Chinese government “discovered” her activities and that “some policemen came to her parents’ home in China” and “demanded” that she “return to China to receive punishment.” A.R. 50-51. In support of these claims, she submitted, among other things, her PFDC membership card, photographs of her participating in PFDC activities, a letter from her mother describing the police encounter, and certain “[background materials,” A.R. 60, including: a November 14, 2012 New York Times article describing leadership changes within the Chinese Communist Party; a January 7, 2013 New York Times article discussing protests in China over media censorship; a February 28, 2013 Epoch Times article describing the arrest of “[a]ctivists and petitioners” at Chinese New Year gatherings in Beijing and Shanghai, A.R. 141; and the United States Department of State (“State Department”) 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions in China.

The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the evidence Li submitted failed to establish that there had been a change in country conditions for political dissidents since 1999, when the IJ first ruled on Li’s asylum application. Li filed a petition for review, which we granted. See Li, 562 Fed.Appx. 78. While we agreed with the BIA that the evidence in the record “indicates that treatment of political activists in 2007 was substantially similar to how political activists were treated in 1999,” we directed the BIA to consider on remand whether more recent State Department Country Reports (“Country Reports”) “provide evidence that the treatment of political activists in China has worsened” since 2007. Id. at 81.

On remand, the BIA considered the Country Reports for 1999 and each of the years from 2008 through 2013, and found that while there appears to have been a gradual increase in the repression of political dissent since 1999, when the government instituted a “crackdown” against the China Democracy Party, “conditions for political dissidents ... are not significantly worse than the conditions discussed in the 1999 Country Report.” A.R. 5. The BIA also found that the newspaper articles Li submitted failed to establish that there has been a significant worsening of conditions, and that her decision to join the PFDC was a changed personal circumstance that did not constitute evidence of changed country conditions. Accordingly, the BIA concluded that Li “has not met her burden of establishing that conditions in China for political dissidents have worsened significantly since 1999” and denied her motion. A.R. 6. Li petitions for review.

II -

The BIA had jurisdiction to review Li’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, “regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request for relief.” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir.2011). We give “broad deference” to the BIA’s ultimate decision, Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), which we will disturb only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the BIA concludes that the petitioner has not established a prima facie case to reopen proceedings, we review the BIA’s findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir.2002). Under this standard, *126 we must uphold the BIA’s factual findings “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Ab-dille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir.2001).

Ill

Li’s fifth motion to reopen is both time- and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a petitioner generally may file only one motion to reopen and must do so “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”). To overcome this procedural hurdle, she must “present[ ] material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ.” Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir.2007); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing that the “time and numerical limitations ... shall not apply” if a petitioner presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available during the initial hearing).

The BIA correctly concluded that Li failed to meet her burden of establishing changed country conditions.

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