Feng v. Tripp

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 YVONNE YA-WEN FENG, Case No. 24-cv-07539-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. VACATE ORDER, MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT, AND MOTION 10 ROBERT K. TRIPP, TO COMPLETE OR SUPPLEMENT THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD Defendant. 11 Re: ECF Nos. 40, 42, 47 12 13 Before the Court are Plaintiff Yvonne Ya-Wen Feng’s motion to vacate judgment, ECF 14 No. 40, motion to vacate order, ECF No. 42, and motion to complete or supplement the 15 administrative record, ECF No. 47. The Court will deny the motions. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 In this action, Feng alleges that the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 18 is conspiring with the pharmaceutical industry to stalk her, poison her, and attempt to murder her 19 to suppress a miracle medical therapy that Feng invented. See ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 3–5. On June 6, 20 2025, the Court entered an order denying Feng’s motions for preliminary injunction and APA 21 review and granting Tripp’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. ECF No. 36. 22 On June 27, 2025, Feng moved to vacate judgment. ECF No. 40. On July 2, 2025, Feng 23 moved to vacate the Court’s order dismissing the case. ECF No. 42. On July 8, 2025, Tripp filed 24 a brief opposing both motions. On July 14, 2025, Feng filed a reply. On August 20, 2025, Feng 25 moved to complete or supplement the administrative record. ECF No. 47. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a movant may seek relief from a “final 1 neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered 2 before the court's decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) 3 satisfaction of the judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see 4 Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 A. Motions to Vacate Judgment and Order 7 Feng’s motion to vacate judgment, ECF No. 40, and motion to vacate order, ECF No. 42, 8 raise substantially the same arguments. Feng argues that the Court’s order dismissing the case 9 “should be vacated because of the cumulative procedural errors, granted a moot motion, exclusion 10 of critical evidences, inconsistent rulings, bias, Abuse of Discretion, and Violation Due Process.” 11 ECF No. 40 at 1; see also ECF No. 42 at 1–2. 12 Feng argues that the motion to dismiss was moot when the Court granted it, because 13 “Plaintiff has already cured procedural deficiencies identified in prior filings.” Id. at 2. But while 14 Feng had filed an amended complaint, the motion to dismiss that the Court granted was Tripp’s 15 second motion to dismiss, which challenged the sufficiency of the amended complaint. ECF No. 16 24. Thus, it was not a moot motion. 17 Feng next argues that “the Court dismissed the case for lack of standing, yet concrete 18 injuries were clearly established . . . .” ECF No. 40 at 2. But the Court did not dismiss the case 19 for lack of standing; rather, the Court found it lacked jurisdiction under the substantiality doctrine. 20 ECF No. 36 at 4. 21 Next, Feng argues that a number of the Court’s case management decisions in this action 22 warrant vacation of its order dismissing the case: that the Court erred by (1) issuing orders 23 continuing a case management conference and dismissing the case on the same day; (2) granting 24 Tripp’s administrative motion to continue a case management conference without waiting for a 25 response from Feng; (3) failing to rule on Feng’s preliminary injunction motion for 2.5 months; 26 (4) vacating the hearing on Feng’s preliminary injunction motion. ECF No. 40 at 3–4. “It is well 27 established that ‘[d]istrict courts have inherent power to control their dockets. . . . ” Atchison, 1 Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1998)). “[A]ll federal courts are 2 vested with inherent powers enabling them to manage their cases and courtrooms effectively . . . .” 3 United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 1008) (en banc) (quoting Aloe Vera of 4 Am., Inc. v. United States, 376 F.3d 960, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citation modified)). 5 Feng has not presented any authority suggesting that any of the Court’s case management 6 decisions in this action warrant vacation of the Court’s order. ECF No. 42 at 6. 7 Next, Feng argues that the Court erred in not granting Feng, a pro se plaintiff, leave to 8 amend. ECF No. 40 at 4. But the Court considered her pro se status, ECF No. 36 at 4, and 9 nevertheless determined that granting leave to amend would be futile in light of the Court’s lack of 10 jurisdiction over the action. Id. 11 Finally, Feng argues that the Court ought to have construed her suit to be against Tripp in 12 his official, rather than his individual capacity. ECF No. 40 at 4; ECF No. 42 at 6. Feng does not 13 explain how this would bear on the Court’s finding that the substantiality doctrine bars its review 14 of this action. 15 Because Feng has not presented a legitimate basis to vacate the Court’s order dismissing 16 the case, the Court will deny her motions to vacate judgment and to vacate the Court’s order. 17 B. Motion to Supplement or Complete the Administrative Record 18 Feng also moves to “complete or supplement the administrative record in this action.” 19 ECF No. 47. As an initial matter, the Court has already determined that it does not have 20 jurisdiction over this case, so it has no power to grant the relief she seeks. ECF No. 36 at 4. But 21 even if the Court had jurisdiction, it still could not grant this motion, which requests that 22 “Defendants USCIS or ICE . . . produce the complete administrative record related to” Feng’s 23 immigration applications. ECF No. 47 at 2. The amended complaint does not name the United 24 States Customs and Immigration Services or the United States Immigration and Customs 25 Enforcement as defendants, see ECF No. 16 at 3, and does not request any relief related to Feng’s 26 immigration proceedings, see id. at 16–17. Accordingly, Feng’s “requested relief is beyond the 27 scope of the allegations in [her] complaint” and thus she is “not . . . entitled to the relief [she] 1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2013). 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Feng’s motions to vacate order, to vacate 4 || judgment, and to supplement or complete the administrative record. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 || Dated: August 29, 2025 7 JON S. TIGA g United States District Judge 9 10 11 12

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