Fendrich v. United States

23 Cust. Ct. 159, 1949 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 882
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedSeptember 14, 1949
DocketNo. 53545; protest 116113-K (Indianapolis)
StatusPublished

This text of 23 Cust. Ct. 159 (Fendrich v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fendrich v. United States, 23 Cust. Ct. 159, 1949 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 882 (cusc 1949).

Opinions

Mollison, Judge:

When this case was originally submitted for decision, a careful review of the evidence was made by this division and it was found that upon a point vital to determination of the issues, which point was raised in the brief filed on behalf of the defendant, the record was silent. In the interests of justice the ease was accordingly restored to the docket for the purpose of permitting the introduction of evidence upon the point. This was done, and the case again submitted for decision.

This issues and the evidence offered up to the time of the original submission of the case were fully set out and discussed in the memorandum accompanying our order restoring the case to the docket, and for convenience that memorandum, appearing in 18 Cust. Ct. 200, Abstract 51734, is reproduced herewith and adopted as part of this opinion:

[160]*160In December 1943, the plaintiff (a corporation) in this case imported into the United States 91 bales of leaf tobacco from Cuba. It was all invoiced as “un-stemmed fillers tobacco” and was entered as unstemmed filler tobacco at the rate of 28 cents per pound under the provisions of paragraph 601, Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §1001, par. 601), apparently as amended by the trade agreement with Cuba reported in T. D. 50541. It was classified by the collector as unstemmed filler and wrapper tobacco mixed, and assessment was made on the portion determined to be filler tobacco at the rate of 14 cents per pound under the provisions of paragraph 601, as amended, su-pra, and on the portion determined to be wrapper tobacco at the rate of 91 cents per pound under the provision for unstemmed wrapper tobacco in the same paragraph, as amended. It should be noted that the difference between the entered and assessed rates on the portion of the tobacco found by the collector to be unstemmed filler tobacco was due to the fact that an agreement in force at the time of importation between the United States and Cuba (T. D. 50050) provided that an annual quota of 22,000,000 pounds of filler tobacco would be entitled to the reduced rate, and that the tobacco was entered at the nonquota rate but was found to be entitled to the quota rate.
The protest at bar is directed against the assessment of duty made by the collector on that portion found by that officer to be wrapper tobacco, the claim being that such tobacco was, in fact, unstemmed filler tobacco, dutiable at the rate of 14 cents per pound.
On the consular invoice the tobacco was divided into seven lots, containing respectively 46, 7, 4, 14, 4, 6, and 10 bales, or a total of 91 bales. The bales covered by the third and seventh lots, 14 bales in all, were found by the collector to contain only filler tobacco. The bales covered by the second lot, seven in all, were found to contain 8 percent wrapper tobacco, and the bales covered by the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth lots, 70 in all, were found to contain 10 percent wrapper tobacco.
Paragraph 602 of the tariff act contains a definition of the terms “wrapper tobacco” and “filler tobacco” as follows:
The term “wrapper tobacco” as used in this title means that quality of leaf tobacco which has the requisite color, texture, and burn, and is of sufficient size for cigar wrappers, and the term “filler tobacco” means all other leaf tobacco.
In the same paragraph are set forth statutory requirements for examination of leaf tobacco for classification purposes as follows:
* * * In the examination for classification of any imported leaf tobacco, at least one bale, box, or package in every ten, and at least one ih every invoice, shall be examined by the appraiser or person authorized by law to make such examination, and at least ten hands shall be examined in each examined bale, box, or package.
The bales covered by the shipment in question were numbered 50818 to 50908, inclusive. It appears that the plaintiff was instructed by the customs officers to provide for the statutory examination the following 13 bales:
50854/6
50859/60
50865
50871
50882
50885
50889
50894
50899/900
and examination of the same was made by Customs Examiner Brice Lane at the plaintiff’s warehouse in Evansville, Ind., on January 18, 1944, less than a month after importation of the merchandise. It is apparent that Mr. Lane’s advisory return is the basis of the classification adopted by the collector.
In the presentation of its case the plaintiff offered in evidence documents purporting to be the written statements of three persons made under oath relating to the tobacco at bar. Upon objection to the admission of the same made by counsel for the defendant, the judge presiding at the hearing on circuit ordered the documents marked for identification, reserving decision on their admissibility for the division having cognizance of the subject matter.
Probably nothing in our American system of evidence is more fundamental than the requirement that testimonial assertions, sought to be given probative [161]*161■value, must be subjected to certain tests, the chief one of which is cross-examination, which experience has shown to be necessary in order to establish their value. Although the statements in question appear to be under oath, they are extrajudicial, and were made under circumstances which prevented the application of the safeguarding test of cross-examination. As offered in this court, they are nothing more than hearsay, and as the circumstances do not bring them under any of the veil-recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, and as there is no exception •created by statute applicable to cases arising under section 514, Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. 1940 ed. § 1514), as does the case at bar, the objections made by •counsel for the defendant are sustained and the documents denied admission into •evidence.
There was also offered in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff a copy on a single sheet of what was stated by the secretary of the plaintiff corporation to be the private invoices given by the seller of the tobacco at bar to the purchaser, the plaintiff corporation. No objection to this was made by counsel for the defendant on the ground that it was a copy, but objection was made on the ground “that it is a self-serving declaration.” During the course of the discussion concerning the document at the time it was offered, it was said that the same described the merchandise as “filler tobacco.” The judge of this court presiding at the hearing on circuit ordered the document marked for identification and reserved ruling on its admissibility for this division of the court. A careful examination ■of the document as offered fails to disclose that the merchandise is described thereon as “filler tobacco,” although it does appear to describe the merchandise as “Unstripped Havana Vueltas Tobacco,” whatever that may mean.

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Bluebook (online)
23 Cust. Ct. 159, 1949 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 882, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fendrich-v-united-states-cusc-1949.