Felix Weston and Andrea Weston v. US Bank Trust National Association

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 22, 2025
Docket01-24-00232-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Felix Weston and Andrea Weston v. US Bank Trust National Association (Felix Weston and Andrea Weston v. US Bank Trust National Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Felix Weston and Andrea Weston v. US Bank Trust National Association, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Opinion issued July 22, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00232-CV ——————————— ANDREA WESTON AND FELIX WESTON, Appellants V. U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1220486

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this forcible-detainer action, appellants, Andrea and Felix Weston,

proceeding pro se, appeal from the judgment and writ of possession granting

possession of certain real property to appellee, U.S. Bank Trust National Association. On October 17, 2024, this Court granted the motion to dismiss of

appellee and dismissed appellants’ appeal as moot.

Appellants filed a motion for en banc reconsideration requesting that the Court

“reverse dismissal of the appeal, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the

case for a full examination of the underlying issues.” In response to appellants’

motion for en banc reconsideration, appellee argued that the Court correctly

dismissed the appeal. We withdraw our October 17, 2024 opinion and issue this

opinion in its stead. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(c) (“In dismissing a proceeding, the

appellate court will determine whether to withdraw any opinion it has already

issued.”).

“[A] suit can become moot at any time, including on appeal, and . . . courts

have an obligation to take into account intervening events that may render a lawsuit

moot.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 166–67 (Tex. 2012). With

exceptions not applicable to this appeal, “a court cannot decide a case that has

become moot during the pendency of the litigation.” Id. at 162. A case is moot if

there ceases to be a “justiciable controversy between the parties–that is, if the issues

presented are no longer ‘live,’ or if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in

the outcome.” Id. If a proceeding becomes moot, the court must dismiss the

proceeding. Id.

2 The only issue in a forcible-detainer action is the right to actual possession of

the subject property and the merits of any title dispute shall not be adjudicated. See

Tellez v. Rodriguez, 612 S.W.3d 707, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,

no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e)). An appeal from a forcible-detainer action

becomes moot if the appellants are no longer in possession of the property, unless

appellants hold and assert “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession” of the property. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of the City of San Antonio,

198 S.W.3d 782, 786–87 (Tex. 2006); see Wilhelm v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 349

S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Gallien v. Fed.

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-07-00075-CV, 2008 WL 4670465, at *2–4 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2008, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (mem. op.).

Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the appeal was moot because

the writ of possession was executed, and “[a]ppellants ceased to occupy the

[p]roperty on May 21, 2024 upon the execution of the Writ of Possession.” Appellee

further argued that “the issue of possession was moot as of May 21, 2024,”

destroying this Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal and requiring dismissal. The

appellate record includes a return of writ of possession, filed in the trial court on

May 29, 2024, confirming that on May 21, 2024, a writ of possession on the property

was executed, and in connection with the execution of the writ of possession,

3 appellants were “removed from” the property and “possession of [the property was]

delivered to” appellee.

Appellants did not respond to the motion to dismiss but did submit an

appellants’ brief. However, we conclude that appellants brief failed to assert a

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property.

See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 768; Soza v. Fed. Home

Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-11-00568-CV, 2013 WL 3148616, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that appellant who

failed to respond to appellee's motion to dismiss had failed to assert potentially

meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession).

Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion, vacate the trial court’s judgment,

and dismiss the case. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785, 787, 790 (concluding that

case, not only appeal, was moot and that “court of appeals erred in dismissing only

the appeal and leaving the trial court’s judgment in place”); TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e).

All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, and Gunn, and Dokupil.

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Related

Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio
198 S.W.3d 782 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Wilhelm v. FEDERAL NAT. MORTG. ASS'N
349 S.W.3d 766 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2011)

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